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The idea of a learning process has become broadly accepted among military historians of the First 
World War, but explanations for how and why this occurred remain limited. This thesis uses a 
number of different disciplines alongside more orthodox historical analysis of what the British 
Expeditionary Force (BEF) did at the divisional level to learn the lessons from combat in an 
uncompromising operational environment. At the beginning of 1916 the BEF was predominantly a 
citizen army lacking experience. This marked a low-point in the BEF's fighting capabilities. This 
thesis charts the development from 1916 to the Armistice in 1918 using the British 32nd Division as 
a case study. The division participated in a number of major operations including the Battle of the 
Somme, the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line, the Battles of Nieuport, Passchendaele, 
Amiens and the Hundred Days. They experienced both success and failure ensuring they are a 
representative case from which to draw broader conclusions. This thesis argues that the BEF's 
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How did the British Army learn on the Western Front during the First World War? That is the 
question that lies at the heart of this work. The concept of learning has loomed large over the 
historiography of the Great War yet this most fundamental question of how it actually occurred has 
been overshadowed by other issues. Debates have raged over the competence of senior figures, the 
conduct of battles and the experience of the 'everyman at war'.1 How the BEF improved has often 
been subsumed by these larger themes. One of the biggest impediments to the study of learning 
during the First World War has been the lack of common acceptance, within the Anglophone 
literature at least, of any development having actually taken place. Historians have often found 
themselves fighting on ground not of their own choosing challenging perceptions of futility, victim-
hood and poetic sacrifice. Since the 1980s this has begun to change and, within the academic world 
at least, there is a broad acceptance of what has come to be simplistically known as the 'learning 
curve' concept. This has opened the way for more technical studies of the BEF between 1914 and 
1918 and this thesis is intended to contribute to this growing area of study. 
 
Given the limitations of word length this work will not cover the entirety of the conflict. The 
changing composition of the British forces on the continent would require any broad conclusions to 
come with a detailed list of caveats, which might reasonably require studies unto themselves. By 
1916 Britain had accepted the need for a national commitment.2 The 'Military Service Act' of 
January 1916 marked a watershed moment: it was the last nail in the coffin of the idea that Britain 
could operate under the notion of 'business as usual'.3 Sir William Robertson in his new role as 
                                                 
1 The literature review will cover these schools of study in more depth; for the origin of the term 'everyman at war' see 
Charles Purdom, Everyman at war: sixty personal narratives of the war (London, J.M. Dent, 1930) 
2 David Stevenson, 1914-1918: The History of the First World War (London, Allen Lane, 2004) pp.268-270  
3 For an account of the introduction of the Military Service Act see Peter Simkins, Kitchener's Army: The Raising of 
the New Armies, 1914-16 (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1988) pp.138-161 
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Chief of the Imperial General Staff began working out the manpower requirements and remarked: 
'The only safe basis of calculation was to assume that every man in the country would  sooner or 
later be needed for one kind of national work or another.'4 Summer 1915 had seen the blooding of 
the first divisions of the New Army at Hooge in Belgium, Suvla Bay on the Gallipoli peninsula, and 
later at the Battle of Loos. The commitment of these citizen formations would only increase in 
1916. The character of the army in 1916 was markedly different from the one that set sail for France 
in August 1914. The largely citizen volunteer force had no experience of the scale of the battles that 
would face them, thus the start of this work picks up from this lowest ebb of practical experience. 
 
The tactical level of war was the pivotal level for learning. The division would have frequent 
opportunities to gather and implement the lessons of combat and gain experience of battle. It was at 
the divisional level and below that many of the tactical developments occurred, yet it remains 
understudied. To address this gap and provide an insight into how learning functioned the BEF's 
32nd Division will be the main focus of this study. This is not a divisional history. To address the 
complexities of how a large organisation learns the work will draw upon a number of different 
scholarly disciplines. Organisational learning theory, leadership and political theory have all been 
considered and employed to help understand why the division was a success or failure in certain 
situations. This approach always carries with it the danger of unfair ex post facto judgements, so to 
eliminate this possibility the prevailing Edwardian understanding of these concepts, as shown 
through documents, doctrine and testimony, have been considered alongside any modern theories. 
There are thus two different, but complementary, sets of criteria to help explain the changes that 
occurred in the 32nd Division 1916-1918. 
 
This work has looked at divisional learning from three different perspectives: Structure; Battle 
                                                 
4 Sir William Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, Vol. I (London, Cassell, 1926) p.294 
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Wisdom and Leadership. The first three chapters cover structure, chapter four describes battle 
wisdom, while chapters five and six handle leadership. A number of case studies have been used 
throughout to explore different aspects of the learning process in greater detail. Before 
understanding how the division learnt it is important to ascertain how the division functioned.  
 
Part I will assess the principles upon which the division and indeed the BEF based their 
development and command structure. Modern organisational learning theory has been used to 
explore key ideas such as canonical and non-canonical instruction and communities-of-practice. 
These have been considered alongside the contemporary attitudes to command structure as 
established through the British Army's ethos and doctrine. The BEF's structural principles remained 
broadly consistent throughout the war. There was an emphasis upon decentralisation and the 
feedback system, although imperfect, was fit for purpose. In 1916 the flaw in the command system 
and structure was a human one and this study has included a specific case study on the experiences 
of 1 July 1916. The balance between intervention and delegation had not been struck correctly 
creating a paralysis of command. This problem was largely rectified by a tremendous overhaul in 
the divisional leadership, but more prescriptive doctrine also helped bridge the gap between 
principle and practice. The BEF also showed a propensity to learn from its French allies. Inter-allied 
exchanges were far from ideal throughout, but liaison between the two nations was valued and 
supported the existing system of appraisal. 
 
Chapter four looks at 'Battle Wisdom', a term originally coined in reference to the Second World 
War and combat fatigue but which also could comfortably be applied to the First World War.5 It 
embraces the idea that after a period of adjustment new soldiers become 'battle-wise' and their 
efficiency in combat commensurately rises. This therefore is a vehicle through which to assess the 
                                                 
5 Roy Swank and Walter Marchand, 'Combat Neuroses: the Development of Combat Exhaustion', Archives of 
Neurology and Psychiatry, Vol.55: No.3 (March, 1946) pp. 236-247 
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process that enabled soldiers to gain experience and develop. In evaluating the concept of battle 
wisdom as it applied to the soldier of the First World War a case study of 'scrounging' has been 
included. This seemingly minor act was representative of the acclimatisation to army life and had 
manifestly positive effects upon the primary group. In contrast to the minor act of scrounging were 
cases of outright disobedience; there was one notable case of a refusal to attack in the 32nd Division 
and this has been examined in detail to assess the effects on cohesion and learning. Battle wisdom 
was essentially an evolutionary process. Beneficial actions and methods persevered along with the 
troops whose lives were improved as a result; conversely actions that might otherwise harm the 
individual or group died out. The importance of this learning at the lowest level has not been fully 
realised by historians who have generally seen aspects of battle wisdom within the broader 
framework of 'trench experiences'.6 It was much more important than that. Battle wisdom provided 
soldiers with a means of adapting to the changing conditions of war. If these experiences jarred with 
orders, soldiers at the lowest level were wont to change their implementation without authorisation, 
and often they were right to do so. Disobedience at its worst could have a corrosive effect on unit 
cohesion and reputation, but these negatives need to be weighed-up against the possibility of saving 
lives that might otherwise have been lost for little gain. 
 
The role of the leader, one of the most important but little understood aspects of learning, is covered 
in chapters five and six. Leadership theory has offered many important insights into effective ways 
through which people have led, yet it has barely considered the legacy it could have on learning. 
The General Officer Commanding 32nd Division had the capacity to promote or hinder the learning 
process. To illustrate the importance a general could have on this through his leadership decisions 
Major-General Cameron Deane Shute has been assessed as a case study. The principles by which he 
commanded; the alienating aspects of martinet discipline; his understanding of tactical methods, are 
                                                 
6 John Lewis-Stempel, Six Weeks: The short and gallant life of the British Officer in the First World War (London, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2010) pp.161-162 
 11 
all considered to demonstrate that on the whole he was a good leader by Edwardian standards but 
his legacy as a leader who promoted learning was far more mixed. 
 
These three approaches cover the main dimensions of the divisional learning process: structure, 
implementation and leadership. There is significant overlap between the three and in some respects 
they are contingent upon one another. For structural improvement to occur soldiers at the lowest 
levels were required to feed information about best-practices up the chain of command. The 
leadership then needed to be responsive to the information it was receiving; the commander needed 
to be aware of doctrinal and tactical change to avoid acting as an impediment or road-block to 
improvement. The issue of what constitutes 'improvement' is a particularly tough one for the 
military observer gifted with hindsight to adequately define. As Jonathan Krause has observed in a 
recent study of the French Army in 1915: 'It is one of the essential hurdles for students of military 
history to surpass: the recognition that a particular force can do everything 'right' and still suffer 
defeat.'7 Krause draws upon Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray's work Military Effectiveness, 
Vol. I: The First World War as further supporting evidence for this conclusion. All three authors are 
correct to point out the pitfalls of evaluating an organisation or process merely on the outcome of 
battle especially when facing a dynamic enemy attempting to implement their own improvements. 
When they wrote: 'Judgements on effectiveness should retain some sense of proportional cost and 
organizational process' Millett and Murray were attempting to correct a tendency to view victory 
and defeat as the final arbiter of organisational quality.8 This work accepts these conclusions and 
many of the points set out above are organisational or procedural. That being said, victory and 
defeat should not be entirely removed from any judgement. The final purpose of learning was to 
                                                 
7 Jonathan Krause, Early Trench Tactics in the French Army: The Second Battle of Artois, May-June 1915 (Farnham, 
Ashgate, 2013) p.1 
8 Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, Military Effectiveness Vol.1, The First World War (London, Unwin Hyman, 
1988) p.3. Works such as John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London, Pimlico, 1994) p.313 in particular fall foul of 
Millett and Murray's important point regarding process and organisation. Keegan does not accept victory in the First 
World War was brought about by tactical or organisational improvements seeing it only as a victory of materiel. 
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effect the defeat of the Central Powers. To ignore the relationship between the process of 
improvement and the outcome of battle places undue emphasis on the means rather than the ends. 
Thus, this work has drawn conclusions regarding the process considered in light of contemporary 
expectations, but also analysed how changes contributed towards improving the fighting capabilities 
of the division, or the BEF more generally. 
 
The 32nd Division has rarely been the source of much acclaim during the First World War, so why 
choose them? It is precisely because the 32nd Division were relatively unremarkable that they offer 
an excellent case study of the 'average' British division. They were a 'New Army' formation 
originally created as the 38th Division, part of Kitchener's Fifth New Army (K5), but this was later 
changed when K5 became K4 and the 38th became the 32nd. By the end of July 1916 the division 
was a fairly well balanced one incorporating seven New Army battalions, one Territorial Battalion 
and four Regular Army battalions.9 Peter Simkins in his study 'Co-stars or Supporting Cast? British 
Divisions in the 'Hundred Days', 1918' does not highlight the 32nd Division for any particular 
mention, although his empirical approach accounts for their actions within his overall conclusion 
that the British divisions have been undervalued and overlooked.10 John Lee's article in the same 
volume confirms the difficulty of rating certain divisions, but notes that some were 'much more 
“famous” than others'.11 The 32nd Division was not one of these. Lee questioned whether the lesser 
known formations' lack of a divisional history affected their acclaim.12 It is certainly a valid 
hypothesis as far as the 32nd Division was concerned. No divisional history of the formation was 
ever produced and yet they took part in some of the war's major engagements. 
                                                 
9 New Army: Lancashire Fusiliers: 15th,16th; Northumberland Fusiliers: 16th (17th were pioneers but have not been 
included in totals above); Border Regiment: 11th; Highland Light Infantry: 15th, 16th, 17th; Territorial: Royal Scots: 
5/6th; Regular: King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry: 2nd; Manchester Regiment: 2nd; Dorsetshire Regiment: 1st and 
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers: 2nd. Before the end of July 1916 the 19th Lancashire Fusiliers had replaced5/6 Royal 
Scots. This meant that on 1 July 1916 the division had an 8/4 split of New Army to Regular battalions. 
10 Peter Simkins, 'Co-stars or Supporting Cast? British Divisions in the 'Hundred Days', 1918' in Paddy Griffith, 
British Fighting Methods in the Great War (London, Frank Cass, 1996) pp.50-69 
11 John Lee, 'The SHLM Project' in Griffith, British Fighting Methods (1996) p.176 
12 Ibid., p.176 
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The 32nd Division had the task of taking the village of Thiepval and Mouquet Farm on 1 July 1916. 
This was followed by operations around the Leipzig Salient and Ovillers until they were withdrawn 
for rest and refit in mid-July. They returned to the Somme in November to assault the Munich and 
Frankfort positions. In 1917 they picked up where they left off on the Somme near Serre north of 
Beaumont Hamel, then went on to hold the right of the British line next to the French during the 
German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line. They were in reserve at Messines Ridge and repulsed a 
heavy German attack during the Battle of Nieuport but at the loss of a small section of front line 
trench. Localised actions were to continue in that region until they moved to the Ypres Salient 
where on 2 December they launched a night attack on the Passchendaele ridge. The innovative but 
limited attack demonstrated some interesting ideas but was ultimately a failure. The following year 
the 32nd Division launched two sizeable raids against the German defences south of the Houthulst 
Forest on 18/19 and 27/28 February 1918. When the Germans launched their Spring offensives on 
21 March 1918 the division was engaged in line holding in the Houthulst positions. By the time 
Operation Mars launched on 28 March, and subsequently petered out a few days later, the division 
was brought down to support the British forces recently attacked near Arras. Fortunately for the 
men of the division the German focus had shifted further north and they avoided any German 
infantry attacks. Rather than remain placid upon arrival the division launched one of their most 
successful assaults of the war on the village of Ayette, which had fallen to the Germans during 
Operation Mars. Battalions of the 97 and 96 Brigades took the village and supporting positions by 
surprise in a night assault and inflicted heavy losses on the German battalion and Machine Gun 
Company holding the position.13 
 
Having escaped the worst of the German Spring offensives (but incurring significant casualties 
                                                 
13 The supporting positions could not be consolidated on the first night but were fully taken the following night. 
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from relentless German gassing) the division was to take a leading role in the Hundred Days. They 
were attached to the Canadian Corps and took part in the final two days, 10 and 11 August, of the 
Battle of Amiens, thereafter moving on 15 August to the Australian Corps for subsidiary operations 
following up the attack. On 11 September they left the Australian Corps to join IX Corps with 
which they stayed until the Armistice exactly two months later. Their performance during the 
Hundred Days was marked by a series of successes: the passage of the Somme, destruction of the 
Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line (part of the Hindenburg Line) and the Battle of the Sambre where they 
forced a crossing of the Sambre-Oise canal near the village of Ors. During this last phase of the war 
the division captured 2700 prisoners, 80 guns and 500 machine guns and they were held in high 
esteem in the upper reaches of the army.14 Upon leaving IX Corps in December 1918 the corps 
commander, Lt-Gen. Walter Braithwaite, wrote a note of thanks to the division: 'You came with a 
splendid reputation, and you have kept – indeed enhanced – it.'15 The division had been involved in 
both offensive and defensive battles between 1916 and 1918, they had experienced periods of open 
and semi-open warfare during the German withdrawal and in 1918 they were at the forefront of 
Fourth Army's advance. That there was no divisional history written and their most famous (or 
infamous) commander, Cameron Deane Shute left no papers has made them an unattractive 
prospect for historians. Their achievements are certainly worthy of note but they were not atypical 
of the average British division. This makes them a particularly useful case study and one which 




The idea of a learning process taking place within the British Army during the First World War is 
one that has developed along a number of lines of enquiry. Historians have looked in some detail at 
                                                 
14 TNA, WO 95/2372 32nd Division General Staff, November 1918, G.S.1/1/1, 12 November 1918  
15 Ibid., December 1918, A.460, Appendix 3 
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the capabilities of many of the BEF's highest ranking officers. French, Haig, Plumer, Rawlinson, 
Horne, and Gough have all been the subject of studies of one sort or another in the last thirty 
years.16 The corps level too has been given a scholarly assessment by Andy Simpson, in his 
important work Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-1918.17 
There have been a number of technical studies looking at the operational conception and 
understanding of warfare between 1914 and 1918 which have greatly driven the debates about the 
learning process. The first study to take this organisational and operational approach was Shelford 
Bidwell and Dominick Graham's Fire-Power: The British Army Weapons & Theories of War 1904-
1945. Published in 1982, the work looked at the integration of weapons systems in the British Army 
and how the intellectual development evolved with new technologies that increased the proliferation 
of fire-power on the battlefield. While many of their conclusions can be challenged today, not least 
their position on the doctrinal developments, their approach was a significant improvement upon 
much of the literature that had hitherto criticised the British Army's collective understanding of 
war.18 A number of subsequent authors built upon aspects of Bidwell and Graham's work, most 
notably Tim Travers whose The Killing Ground has been largely superseded in terms of scholarship 
but the ideas have remained an insightful source of debate. This work challenges a number of 
Travers's central ideas, but it must be noted that at the time of its publication in 1988 the move to 
frame the war within its pre-1914, Edwardian concepts was influential and remains so today. Indeed 
                                                 
16 Richard Holmes, The Little Field-Marshal: Sir John French (London, Jonathan Cape, 1981); Gary Sheffield, The 
Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army (London, Aurum, 2011); Gary Mead, The Good Soldier: A Biography of 
Douglas Haig (London, Atlantic Books, 2007); Geoffrey Powell, Plumer: The Soldier's General (London, Leo 
Cooper, 1990); Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry 
Rawlinson 1914-1918 (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992); Simon Robbins, British Generalship during the Great War: the 
Military Career of Sir Henry Horne (1861-1929) (Farnham, Ashgate, 2010); Helen McCartney and Gary Sheffield, 
'Hubert Gough' in Ian Beckett & Steven Corvi (eds.), Haig's Generals, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2006) pp.75-96; 
Gary Sheffield, 'An Army Commander on the Somme: Hubert Gough' in Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman, 
Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 1914-1918 (Staplehurst, Spellmount, 
2004) pp.78-80; Ian FW Beckett, 'Hubert Gough, Neill Malcolm and Command on the Western Front' in Brian Bond 
et al. 'Look to your Front' Studies in the First World War by the British Commission for Military History 
(Staplehurst, Spellmount, 1999) pp.1-12. 
17 Andy Simpson, Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-1918 (Stroud, 
Spellmount, 2006) 
18 Alan Clark, The Donkeys, (London, Hutchinson, 1961); A.J.P. Taylor, The First World War: An Illustrated History 
(Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1966); Basil Liddell Hart, Liddell Hart's History of the First World War (London, 
Cassell, 1970) originally published as The Real War 1914-1918 (1930) 
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while his conclusions regarding the psychological battlefield, cult of the offensive and fire-power 
are challenged at length throughout this thesis Travers should be given great credit for establishing 
the parameters of the debate. It is a testament to his influence that this work focuses on how pre-war 
conceptions related to thought and practice during the Great War. This work is not the only one that 
recognises the validity of Travers's approach. Nikolas Gardner's idea of the 'hybrid officer' as laid 
out in Trial by Fire: Command and the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 owes much to The 
Killing Ground. Hybrid officers were senior commanders and staff who combined an understanding 
of modern trends in warfare with traditional traits associated with regimental officers. 19 Gardner’s 
monograph fills the void of an operational study of the actions of 1914 but overstates the 
importance of personal connections. Spencer Jones's From Boer War to World War offers a 
necessary corrective to Gardner's work by demonstrating the changes brought about after the Boer 
War and their influence on the fighting in 1914.20 Jones joins a growing list of recent authors who 
have approached the operational history of the BEF by rigorously drawing on a broad base of 
archival sources. Jonathan Boff's study Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third 
Army and the defeat of Germany in 1918 is an outstanding work of operational and international 
history. Drawing heavily on both British and German sources Boff demonstrates the flaws in both 
the British and German systems but represents excellently the dynamic that existed between the two 
sides. The argument that 'Third Army's application of modern warfare was less than ideal, but 
proved sufficient to defeat its enemy' is difficult to fault.21 It is with this argument in mind that 
many of this work's criticisms of the British structure, experience and leadership must be 
considered. The feedback system under Major-General T. S. Lambert, GOC 32nd Division in 1918, 
for example, took a step back from the advanced empirical model implemented by Major-General 
                                                 
19 Nikolas Gardner, Trial By Fire: Command and the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 (Westport, CT, Praeger, 
2003) passim. particularly p.238-239 
20 Spencer Jones, From Boer War to World War, Tactical Reform of the British Army, 1902-1914 (Norman, University 
of Oklahoma Press, 2012) 
21 Jonathan Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the defeat of Germany in 
1918 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012) p.21 
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C. D. Shute in 1917, but nevertheless it proved sufficient to provide substantial lessons for future 
operations. 
 
The operational approach to understanding how the BEF developed between 1914 and 1918 has 
expanded down a number of subsidiary routes looking at specialist aspects. Works like Paddy 
Griffith's Battle Tactics on the Western Front and Sanders Marble's British Artillery on the Western 
Front in the First World War have respectively offered deep insights into the tactical evolution of 
the British infantry as well as the structural and technical improvements that occurred in the 
artillery. The issue of intelligence and its contribution to the Entente's victory has often been 
overlooked and Jim Beach's Haig’s Intelligence: GHQ and the German Army 1916-1918 stands 
alone as the best exploration to date of the developments that occurred in the 'I' branch.22 Logistical 
development was a pivotal aspect of the BEF's growth. To allow the higher tempo of operations in 
1918 munitions and materiel needed to reach the front in sufficient quantities and in a timely 
fashion. Nevertheless studies of this aspect are still limited. Ian Malcolm Brown's book British 
Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919 remains the leading work in this field, although Keith 
Grieves's The Politics of Manpower, 1914-1918 considers the difficult issue of manpower allocation 
during the war and should be considered an important adjunct piece to Brown.23 Morale is never far 
away from any explanation of the Entente's victory in 1918 and the subject has finally begun to 
receive the level of exploration its importance demands. Alexander Watson's work Enduring the 
Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914-1918 takes a 
similar international comparative approach to Jonathan Boff's Winning and Losing. Watson 
recognises the importance of good supply during the German Spring Offensives as critical to 
maintaining the morale of the British forces while the increasing apathy among the front line 
                                                 
22 Jim Beach, Haig’s Intelligence: GHQ and the German Army 1916-1918 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2013); see also James Beach, 'British Intelligence and the German Army, 1914-1918' (Ph.D thesis, University 
College London, 2004) 
23 Ian Malcolm Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919 (Westport, CT, Praeger, 1998); Keith 
Grieves, The Politics of Manpower, 1914-198 (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1988) 
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German soldiers led to higher rates of surrender during the Hundred Days.24 The broader theme 
that, across nationalities, morale could be sustained throughout appalling attacks thus prolonging 
the war is a valuable addition to the historiography of morale.25  
 
In addition to these specialist themes there have been a number of campaign histories that have 
incorporated many of the above findings. The Somme has received two important treatments in the 
last decade. Gary Sheffield's The Somme succinctly captured the tactical, operational developments 
while recognising that the battle changed the strategic dynamic between the Entente and the 
Germans.26 More recently William Philpott's Bloody Victory has set the battle more firmly within its 
coalition context and laid out a strong case for the remembrance of the French contributions made 
on the Somme in 1916.27 Peter Simkins's work specifically covering the 32nd Division's assault on 
the Munich and Frankfort trenches on 18 November 1916 and the subsequent battle to reach 
isolated pockets of British troops cut off by the Germans emerging from their dugouts once the 
barrage had lifted, is one of the few works that looks at operational, campaign history with a direct 
focus on the 32nd Division.28 There still remains a yawning gap in the historiography covering early 
1917. The German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line has not received any recent scholarship and 
the Battle of Nieuport is also overshadowed by its proximity to the opening of the Third Battle of 
Ypres. Andrew Weist's Passchendaele and the Royal Navy offers some significant insights into the 
context of the planned combined operations on the Flanders coast. His conclusions are challenged 
by Mark Karau's Germanophile: “Wielding the Dagger” The MarineKorps Flandern and the 
German War Effort, 1914-1918 and it is one of the few works to handle the Battle of Nieuport from 
                                                 
24 Alexander Watson, Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 
1914-1918 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008) p.179 
25 Ibid., pp.231-235 
26 Gary Sheffield, The Somme (London, Cassell, 2003) 
27 William Philpott, Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme and the Making of the Twentieth Century (London, 
Little, Brown, 2009) 
28 Peter Simkins, 'Somme footnote: the Battle of the Ancre and the struggle for Frankfort Trench November 1916', in 
The Imperial War Museum Review No.9 (1994) 
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the German perspective.29 The 32nd Division's attack on the Passchendaele Ridge in December 1917 
has been consigned to a footnote in the historiography. Michael LoCicero's Ph.D thesis has greatly 
expanded our understanding of this action and its part in the broader strategic decisions taken by the 
British in late 1917.30 The actions of the Hundred Days have begun to garner far more attention 
over the last decade as its importance as the culminating point of British strategy has been realised. 
J.P. Harris's with Niall Barr's Amiens to the Armistice: The BEF in the Hundred Days' Campaign, 8 
August-11 November 1918 gives an excellent narrative account of operations although the role of 
the dominion forces often takes precedence over the British divisions; consequently despite their 
important role the 32nd Division is often portrayed as the supporting cast rather than leading 
player.31 The contribution British divisions made during the Hundred Days is covered empirically 
by Peter Simkins's 'Co-stars or Supporting Cast? British Divisions in the 'Hundred Days', 1918' in 
Paddy Griffith's British Fighting Methods in the Great War. This article should be read as a 
companion piece to Harris and Barr's effort for it redresses many of the deficiencies of the former's 
broadly narrative work.32 
 
The divisional level of war has featured heavily in nearly all of the works cited here. But, it has 
received scant treatment as a level of command in and of itself. John Bourne is one of the few 
scholars to have published an analytical piece directly addressing the command level in 'British 
Divisional Commanders During the Great War: First Thoughts'. His work on William Heneker's 
command of the 8th Division also draws some important conclusions about the quality of divisional 
generalship during the war.33 There also exists a large corpus of divisional histories. These are often 
                                                 
29 Mark Karau, “Weilding the Dagger” The MarineKorps Flandern and the German War Effort, 1914-1918 (Westport, 
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32 Peter Simkins, 'Co-stars or Supporting Cast? British Divisions in the 'Hundred Days', 1918' in Paddy Griffith's 
British Fighting Methods in the Great War (London, Frank Cass, 1996) pp.50-69 
33 John Bourne, 'British Divisional Commanders During the Great War: First Thoughts' in Gun Fire 29, (1993) pp.22-
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narrative and drawn mainly from the war diaries and experiences of a core of surviving soldiers. As 
a resource they are often valuable but as already noted no such divisional history exists for the 32nd 
Division. Nonetheless it is worth recognising that Cyril Falls's, History of the 36th (Ulster) Division 
is one of the finer efforts and couples insight and analysis well. 
 
It is worth briefly accounting for some of the key works from different disciplines relating to 
learning structure, battle wisdom and leadership. Organisational learning initially drew on a range 
of different but related fields of study: organisational behaviour, communication, and individual 
personal relationships. The first true exploration of organisational learning as a stand-alone area of 
study was published in 1978 by Chris Argyris and Donald Schön in Organizational Learning: A 
Theory of Action Perspective.34 The work suggested that organisational learning was about 
responding to internal and external factors (what they describe as single-loop learning) and 
questioning the values, processes and assumptions that led an organisation to take certain decisions 
in the first instance (double-loop learning).35 The final objective, in their view, is an organisation 
capable of adapting to any changing context in which it may find itself. Therefore the exploration of 
what constitutes the 'learning organisation' has been at the heart of much of the literature stemming 
from Argyris and Schön's work. While originally drawing on psychology and behavioural science, 
the field of business management has been the origin of much of the subsequent research with Peter 
Senge's The Fifth Discipline and Chris Argyris's On Organizational Learning being two of the most 
important books.36 These works, Senge in particular, have suggested that a learning organisation 
will systematically consider its own structures and experiences, tailoring them towards its ultimate 
goal. It will also facilitate individual learning and incorporate it into the wider organisation. Limited 
                                                                                                                                                                  
31; 'Major General W.C.G. Heneker: A Divisional Commander of the Great War' in Matthew Hughes and Matthew 
Seligmann, Leadership in Conflict (London, Leo Cooper, 2000) pp.54-67 
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35 Ibid. 
36 Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (London, Century Business, 
1992); Chris Argyris, On Organizational Learning (Oxford, Blackwell Business, 1999 [2nd ed.])  
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'mental models' will be replaced with an open culture of exchange that encourages personnel within 
the organisation to direct their efforts towards a communal goal, be that long term or transient. 
Many of these points have been picked up and developed and will be discussed later. They have 
also gained some traction in the field of war studies. Both John Nagl and Richard Downie in their 
respective studies Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife and Learning from Conflict have used 
organisational learning theories to frame and measure their conclusions about US and British 
militaries.37 Nagl went further, claiming the British Army in Malaya was a ‘learning organization’ 
owing to its organisational culture and strong ties to the local populace.38  
 
Despite these attempts at an inter-disciplinary approach, the concept of a learning organisation is far 
from accepted within the social sciences and the idea itself should be challenged. As one inter-
disciplinary critique from the field of education states:  
 
[O]nly a minority of organisations would or could call themselves learning organisations. Amongst 
those that have so labelled themselves, there are substantial variations in practice and 
experience…Further, there is the question of whether learning organisations actually do any better at 
their business than comparable 'non-learning' organisations.39 
 
These criticisms cannot be dismissed lightly. The successful parts of a learning organisation may 
differ depending upon the internal and external pressures of the institution under examination and 
its ultimate goal. Furthermore, as Downie has noted, when the concept is applied to historical 
examples it can be difficult to draw the appropriate generalisations for those unfamiliar with the 
                                                 
37 John A. Nagl Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (London, 
University of Chicago Press, 2005) p.11; Richard Duncan Downie, Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military in 
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Soup on Myself pp.xi-xvi. 
39 Christina Hughes and Malcolm Tight, ‘The Myth of the Learning Society’ in British Journal of Educational Studies, 
Vol. 43: No. 3 (Sep., 1995), pp. 290-304, p.299 
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specific cases.40 This criticism can be taken further, the very process of attempting to draw 
generalisations inherently obscures the intricacies and complexities of the context and environment 
under study. Nonetheless, this does not completely render theory useless; it can help explain why 
certain structures succeeded where others failed. One such study that has managed to successfully 
fuse theory and history into a compelling analysis is Robert T. Foley, Stuart Griffin and Helen 
McCartney's '“Transformation in contact”: learning the lessons of modern war'.41 In linking broad 
ideas, historical evidence and modern relevance the three authors have managed to practically apply 
theory without sliding into ahistorical judgement. 
 
There is no unified discipline dedicated to the evaluation of low-level experience or soldiers' 
performance. The term battle wisdom itself was coined to describe a period of top efficiency before 
combat exhaustion set in.42 This notion of adjustment is a useful one and ties to larger themes such 
as the utility and motivational benefits of the primary group. The concept of the primary group 
stems primarily from the work of the 'Chicago School' of thought, so named after the intellectual 
hub that formed around the University of Chicago in the early and mid-twentieth century. While the 
origin of the concept of the primary group can be traced to the work of Charles Cooley around the 
turn of the twentieth century, the first applications of it in a military setting came shortly after the 
Second World War.43 Samuel Stouffer, Samuel Marshall as well as Edward A. Shils and Morris 
Janowitz pushed the idea of primary group cohesion in a military context.44 They posited that it was 
the face-to-face bonds between small groups of soldiers, usually no larger than the company in 
terms of military unit level, which drove motivation, and also disintegration once these bonds were 
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destroyed. The idea has remained a compelling one to this day but has come under some scrutiny as 
other aspects such as training have been considered. Hew Strachan's 'Training, Morale and Modern 
War' is one such article that has challenged the conclusions of those early sociologists and 
historians. The paper questions the viability of maintaining levels of effectiveness and cohesion in 
periods of high attrition like those experienced during the Normandy Campaign in 1944.45 While 
not discounting the value of the primary group completely, Strachan recognises the role of training 
as a standardising procedure that prepared the troops for war. A middle-way can be found between 
Strachan and the Chicago school's views. Chapter four addresses the importance of the primary 
group not simply as a support mechanism but an active catalyst for learning. The “mucking-in” 
schools where chums spread methods of survival and improved tactics or techniques among 
themselves show that training did not cease once the men left the parade ground.46 Chapter three 
looks in more detail at training and its relationship to discipline and shows that unlike the German 
army which Strachan contends 'lacked any coherent system of tactics', the 32nd Division's were 
acutely responsive to the type of warfare they faced even if the lessons themselves were not always 
as up-to-date as they perhaps should have been.47 
 
Leadership theory has by far the biggest body of literature related to it, but can broadly be reduced 
to a number of key theories: transformational leadership, transactional leadership and Grint's 'arts' 
of leadership. James MacGregor Burns originally developed the theory of transformational leaders 
in his 1979 book Leadership.48 The crux of his idea was that some leaders could transform 
institutions through force of personality and inspiration. These he set against transactional leaders 
who achieved their goals through incentivising co-operation. The former, Burns suggested, worked 
                                                 
45 Hew Strachan, 'Training, Morale and Modern War' in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41: No.2 (April, 2006), 
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through charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation. When the leader possessed these features 
they could shape and change organisational structures driving greater achievements. These ideas 
were taken further by Bernard M. Bass who removed the idea that leaders had to be one or the 
other; good leaders employed different methods depending on the circumstances.49 This idea of 
contextual leadership has been picked up by Keith Grint, in The Arts of Leadership. His model 
listed four aspects of leadership: identity, strategic vision, organisational tactics and persuasive 
communication.50 These criteria were designed to consider leaders at all levels of authority, but not 
all are relevant for this study. As such, identity and communication have been assessed in relation to 
the case study of Major-General C. Shute in chapters five and six while the other two areas have 
been ignored. One of the key developments in contextual leadership theory is the understanding that 
different problems required differing leadership solutions. Stemming from the work of Horst Rittel 
and Marvin Webber, problems have been conceptualised in different ways. 'Wicked' problems are 
those with no simple or immediate solution, where one problem only leads into another one, and 
another one; the issue of poverty is given as an example.51 In contrast 'tame' problems are those that 
can be worked through by applying correct management procedures.52 The mathematician seeking 
the solution to an equation is an example of a tame problem. Grint expanded the original theory 
with an additional criterion: 'crisis'. When a crisis strikes it would require an immediate and often 
autocratic style of leadership to effect an immediate response to the problem.53 These are useful 
ways of assessing the difficulties facing leaders in the Great War and as such have been used in the 
case study of Shute with some slight modification in chapters five and six. By employing theory to 
explore organisational, practical and leadership functions without casting judgement these disparate 
fields can contribute to a broader level of historical understanding of learning during the Great War. 
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The divisional level of command then remains an obscure area of study requiring more detailed 
analysis of processes, structures and developments during the war. This work fills the gap and adds 
further weight to the growing scholarship on the operational improvements that occurred within the 
British Army during the First World War. This is not only a piece about what changes occurred to 
improve the chances of victory but also about how these changes came about. To adequately answer 
this a broad if traditional approach to source material has been taken. The bulk of the material has 
been drawn from the surviving divisional documents in the WO 95 series at The National Archives 
Kew. These are numerous and fairly full accounts of the war from a number of different command 
level perspectives. Battalions, brigades, corps, army and support arms' papers have been consulted 
to corroborate the divisional record or furnish greater detail where applicable. Official files only tell 
a partial story, so in addition private testimony has been consulted from various different archives: 
the Imperial War Museum, Lambeth; the Liddle Collection in Leeds and the Liddell Hart Centre for 
Military Archives, London have provided the main bulk of these personal testimonies. The Perth 
and Kinross Council Archive, Scotland, has provided an untapped seam of evidence for the 32nd 
Division's performance during the war in the form of private letters sent to Major-General William 
Rycroft. These letters have produced further questions that go beyond the scope of this study. 
Material dealing with promotion, veteran roles in battle memorialisation and British involvement at 
Salonika are present in the papers but had little scope for development here.54 Any research building 
on the conclusions of this piece would do well to probe further into this collection. The CAB 45 
papers at the National Archives provide an interesting set of letters from serving soldiers that often 
directly address what is only implied in official documents. Careful use of such testimony has been 
made. With such sources there is a tendency to see gossip as gospel and wherever possible 
corroborating materials have been found to justify the inclusion. Owing to the difficulty in finding 
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evidence of incidences of disobedience or individuals consenting to an order but evading its 
implementation (henceforth consent and evade), sources outside of the 32nd Division have been 
consulted on occasion. The question of how relevant such acts are to the organisation as a whole 
should therefore be addressed while providing a far larger evidence base. Gary Sheffield's 
methodology as used in Leadership in the Trenches has therefore been followed for chapter four.55 
By consulting a wide range of memoirs a broad range of incidences of battle wisdom, scrounging, 
consent and evade and outright disobedience have been found. Coupling this broad approach with 
close textual analysis this work, like Leadership in the Trenches, should offer angles of insight into 
existing works that other histories might not have previously considered. One of the key strands of 
argument in this work is the consistency of principle from the pre-war ethos or doctrine through to 
the end of the war, updated only to adjust to the new context but never overhauling the central 
points. To demonstrate this a wide range of pre-war manuals, pamphlets, and instructional books 
have been consulted. These have then been compared to the doctrine published during the war to 
build up a picture of intellectual change. The implementation and views of the leadership have also 
been analysed and demonstrate that far from pointless 'brazier kindling' tactical manuals had real 
and lasting effects on performance. 
 
Learning at the divisional level was a complex process of interlocking factors, which at any one 
time could shape different aspects of the organisation. In 1916 poor leadership hamstrung 
command. In 1917 structure greatly improved while battle wisdom continued to be shared around 
the lower levels. The final year of the war saw a decline in certain respects but overall improvement 
had been sufficient for this to outstrip the equivalent German learning process. 
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Command, Structure and Learning : Edwardian and Modern 
 
The structure and organisation of the division was an integral part of the learning process. The next 
three chapters will look at how the division changed between 1916 and 1918 in response to the 
experiences and pressures of battle. This first chapter will look in detail at the Edwardian approach 
to structure and command. This will be evaluated against the theoretical best-practices as outlined 
by modern learning theory which is covered in the last section. Chapter two is a detailed case study 
of 1 July 1916 and chapter three considers Anglo-French liaison and further lines of development in 
1917-1918. Within these chapters the aspects of the organisation such as planning, communications, 
and appraisal will be analysed to assess how the division developed over the course of the war and 
whether it can rightly be considered a ‘learning organisation.’ 
 
These first three chapters make the case that the BEF, and the division in particular, was an adaptive 
organisation; self-reflective and open to change. Nevertheless, the changes implemented at the 
divisional level were often evolutionary in character and ultimately many of the principles outlined 
in Field Service Regulations Part I (1909) held true, and were reflected in structure, at the cessation 
of conflict in 1918. Communications proved to be problematic through the entire war. The 
inexperience on the Somme led to overemphasis on communication systems in the rear areas which 
proved less important than those between units going forward. These deficiencies were recognised 
and communications networks became more sophisticated but ultimately the fundamental problems 
would persist until the war ended. Chapters two and three will look at how leaders attempted to 
overcome the absence of information caused by the fundamental communications problem. 
 
Traditionally structure has been viewed as an unchanging top-down imposition; chapters one to 
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three will challenge this idea and demonstrate how divisional commanders were often responding as 
much to pressure from the bottom up.56 The structural organisation of the division had a strong 
network set up for information gathering through post-action appraisal which facilitated the process 
of learning at divisional headquarters (DHQ) and above. Nevertheless it would be too simplistic to 
paint this as a binary choice between bottom-up and top-down; it was a combination of pressure 
from below and interpretation of the broader lessons higher up. The consequence was that while the 
DHQ could often adjust its own internal structure, for example when extra brigades were 
temporarily detailed, there were instances where structural change was prompted from above to 
adjust to broader operational requirements.57 Some historians have bucked the trend and recognised 
that top-down imposition was not always the case in practice. Sheffield and Todman’s (eds.) 
Command and Control on the Western Front is one such volume, which greatly advanced the 
historiography in the area of Command, Control, Communications and intelligence (C3I) while also 
assessing how the inner organisation of the BEF changed to better conduct offensive operations.58 
Moreover, the wider field of war studies and international relations has, in the last twenty years, 
assessed the character of structural change, culture and learning within militaries, evaluating what 
factors maximised the effectiveness of certain armies when faced with unfamiliar circumstances 
such as counterinsurgency warfare or operations other than war.59 This renewed interest is perhaps a 
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consequence of the current military situation, which has led some such as Downie and Nagl to look 
at historical examples to draw contemporary lessons or suggest policy. Chapter one has no such 
goals, but will use the theories drawn from these works of social science to help develop a greater 
understanding of the history.60 
 
This section will first assess the intellectual influences that shaped the organisation of the division 
and British Army prior to and during the First World War. The second section will then look at 
modern models and analytical theories and put forward a set of key questions that will provide a 
means of evaluating the success of the 32nd Division as a 'learning organisation'. 
 
1.1 Ethos, Command and Structure. 
 
Doctrine and Ethos 
 
The structure of the British Army was shaped by its culture, social make-up and intellectual values. 
It had a 'unifying philosophy', what Albert Palazzo has termed ethos.61 This obviated the need for 
formal doctrine in the British Army which historians have unduly focused upon, Palazzo argues: 
 
Historians have been shortsighted in their insistence on doctrine and perhaps could have probed 
more deeply to determine whether it is possible for an army to base its intellectual structure on a 
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foundation other than doctrine.62 
 
Precisely what constitutes doctrine and whether the British Army had any form of it prior to 1914 
remains a point of discussion for historians. Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham defined 
doctrine as:  
 
[…] the definition of the aim of military operations; the study of weapons and other resources and 
the lessons of history, leading to the deductions of the correct strategic and tactical principles in 
which to base both training and the conduct of war - “Sans doctrine les textes ne sont rien”63 
 
They concluded that the British lacked a formal doctrine, combined-arms co-operation was ignored 
and fire-power misunderstood.64 Palazzo draws on Jack Snyder and John Gooch's work to flesh out 
the description of doctrine, leading to a definition based upon standardisation and uniformity of 
lessons being taught throughout the army.65 His conclusion is that no formal doctrine existed, 
although he is more positive regarding the British Army's capacity to change. More recently this 
view has been challenged by Stephen Badsey and latterly Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly 
who have observed that definitions and expectations were contextually different during the 
Edwardian period to such an extent that historians cannot hope to find 'doctrine' in its modern 
form.66 These authors avoid the binary choice of ethos or doctrine: 'Rather than being expressed in 
any formal manner, much military doctrine throughout the centuries has fallen within the wider 
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concept of military ethos or culture'.67 Standardised practices used for training were never likely to 
be present in the Edwardian army but there was an understanding that certain principles of war and 
command needed to be articulated. The doctrine of the Edwardian Army can be located in the 
publication of these principles.  
 
One of the corrosive effects of the ambiguity, or supposed absence, of doctrine has been the 
flourishing of the idea that the Edwardian Army was rigid, unthinking and insular. Citing evidence 
from the Army Review, Palazzo claims: 'The British army did not encourage self-criticism, and it 
lacked the formal mechanism for its members to perceive and debate flaws, except at the price of 
their careers.'68 Certainly some dissenting voices may have been drowned out by the chorus of 
traditionalists, but to extrapolate from this that the culture of the army was closed to inquiry and 
self-criticism is far too sweeping a generalisation; if anything the opposite was true.69 In the years 
preceding the First World War forums such as the Royal United Services Institute saw a number of 
important military debates puncture the parochialism of the Victorian and early Edwardian army. 
The tactical organisation of the infantry battalion shifting from eight smaller companies to four 
larger ones was debated by officers such as Reginald Kentish and Ivor Maxse at the RUSI and in the 
pages of its journal.70 This was not an isolated discussion. The cavalry were engaged in a debate 
over the very essence of their function and composition. Douglas Haig and Lord Roberts appeared 
on the opposite sides of the issue. Haig favoured a versatile cavalry arm proficient in both mounted 
and dismounted combat, while Roberts was the leading proponent of 'mounted infantry'.71 The 
politics, personalities and intricacies of the debate are covered well in Stephen Badsey's Doctrine 
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and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880-1918 and it is not necessary to go into detail here, but it 
should be recognised that both the cavalry and infantry company debates were touchstone issues for 
the broader themes the British military were grappling with in the wake of the Boer War.72 They 
were not the only two debates either, lower level infantry tactics such as the implementation of 
extended order were also flashpoints for discussion and were regularly viewed through the prism of 
colonial and Boer War experience.73 The integration of modern weaponry, the utilisation of fire-
power, how infantry should array themselves in a fire-swept battlefield and the remaining utility of 
shock in modern war are aspects that lay at the heart of the debates. By addressing these themes 
through doctrinal discussion it is hard to maintain the line of argument that the British Army did not 
encourage self-criticism, or was an insular organisation that was out-of-touch with the realities of 
modern war. On the contrary, it tackled the important issues of the day head-on. The degree that 
these arguments correspondingly improved the army is only now beginning to be addressed by 
works like Bowman and Connelly's The Edwardian Army, Nikolas Gardner's Trial By Fire and 
Spencer Jones's From Boer War to World War, but it promises to be a fertile avenue of future 
research.74 
 
Field Service Regulations Part I: Operations 1909 
 
The British Army had a doctrine of a kind, but it also had an ethos. Colonial experience and 
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political reform encouraged an increasing professionalism in both the structure of the armed forces 
and the calibre of the officer corps; significantly contributing to the broader ethos.75 In turn this 
promoted an approach to doctrine which favoured stating broad principles over giving prescriptive 
directions. A firm, if occasionally operationally vague, intellectual foundation was established.76 
This section will look at Field Service Regulations: Part I (FSR I) as the embodiment of the British 
Army's ethos and assess how it established the army's command structure and the principles it 
disseminated. Moral factors and the question of handling fire-power were both prominent themes 
while the principle of decentralisation and sound communication were bedrocks for the command 
system laid out by the document. 
 
Tim Travers has generally depicted the doctrine debate as a choice between fire-power and morale 
(or the human battlefield). This is not a fair reflection of the manuals at the time, nor as the cavalry 
and infantry tactical debates show, was it a fair reflection of the ethos of the army. By quoting JFC 
Fuller's post-war recollection of envelopment being the dominant lesson of FSR I, Travers advances 
the argument that British doctrine was typified by the human battlefield dominating over fire-
power.77 He builds the case further by citing Infantry Training (4-Company Organization) 1914 of 
which he suggests the General Staff were blinkered and prone to underestimate the effects of fire-
power. It is valuable to challenge these in turn. There is certainly some merit in Fuller's contention 
that FSR I 'was envelopment, more envelopment and always envelopment.'78 Under Chapter VII - 
The Battle, section 103. General Principles (for the attack) [italics as in the original] the second 
point covering identification of the enemy's weak point concludes: 'The moral effect of an 
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envelopment which threatens an enemy's line of retreat, and enfilades his front, is always great.'79 
The wider context of advocating the application of maximum force at the decisive point does 
mitigate the criticism somewhat, but as shall be seen with planning, envelopment certainly was an 
important lesson. The question is whether this focuses on a neglect of fire-power in favour of 
morale and human factors? If, as Travers contends, 'the problem […] was to convert the British 
army from a fundamental belief in the human battlefield, to a belief in […] manpower and fire-
power' then at least in principle FSR I was leading the call for change.80 There can be no argument 
that the human element was there: 'The advance of the firing line must be characterized by the 
determination to press forward at all costs.' but taken in its broader context it is immediately 
followed-up by an emphasis upon mutual co-operation and winning the fire-fight to facilitate 
forward progress.81 
 
When once the firing line comes under effective fire, its further advance will be greatly assisted by 
covering fire from the rear, and by the mutual support which neighbouring units in the firing line 
afford one another. All leaders, down to those of the smallest units, must endeavour to apply, at 
all stages of the fight this principle of mutual support. Aided in this way the infantry will fight its 
way forward to close range, and, in conjunction with the artillery and machine guns, will endeavour 
to gain superiority of fire.82 
 
The combination of artillery and small arms fire-power was understood to be a key component of 
the modern battlefield. In the hierarchy of importance morale elements took precedence but to 
contend that ignorance of fire-power pervaded the doctrine, at least as written in FSR I, is to read it 
in a very partial manner. 
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A similar point can be made for Travers's second doctrinal citation Infantry Training (1914). In 
attempting to support the notion of new technologies being shoe-horned into existing modes of 
thought Travers suggests that the machine gun was critically compared to the rifle for inaccuracy 
using a double standard. Yet once again the broader context is neglected. Before any drawbacks are 
pointed out the section establishes the strengths and general characteristics of the weapon: 
 
A machine gun in action requires a frontage of about two yards. From this narrow front it can deliver 
a fire equal in volume to that of about 30 men firing rapidly, the frontage required for the latter being 
at least 15 times as great. It is therefore easier to find a concealed position for a machine gun than for 
the number of riflemen required to produce an equal volume of fire.83 
 
Further strengths are then given: its ease of use; similar effective range to that of the rifle; fire 
concentration comparative to standard riflemen given the same number of rounds; and ease of 
manoeuvre. These are impartially set against four drawbacks: its vulnerability when moving, its 
mechanism suffering 'temporary interruption' (jamming), the revealing noise disclosing the position 
of the weapon and crew as well as Travers's summarised point that errors in aiming can be 
compounded by its high rate of fire at long distances. The following pages go on to give further 
details of the strengths of the weapon and certain principles of use including defensive fire from 
concealed locations, all-round traverse and supporting infantry in a wide range of terrain types.84 In 
one respect Travers is correct; the machine gun was integrated in a fashion consistent with ways of 
thinking at the time. This was not fundamentally wedded, doctrinally at least, to a human centred 
battlefield, rather it drew upon the principles of FSR I and the ethos of the British Army and 
stressed its role in fire-and-manoeuvre and decentralised leadership.  
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A machine gun commander should be given definite orders by the commander of the body of troops 
to which he belongs, as to what is required of him, but he should be allowed as much freedom of 
action as possible in carrying out these orders, and should be kept informed of all changes and 
developments of the situation which may affect his action. Initiative and enterprise are essential to 
the effective handling of machine guns.85 
 
 
Travers's conclusions are not wholly without merit. The divergent opinions of military thinkers on 
how best to cross the fire-swept battlefield highlight the difficulties all the European armies faced in 
the build up to the First World War. 86 Rather than epitomising parochialism the doctrinal materials 
demonstrate an army that was taking its craft seriously and engaging with the issues of the day. 
Fire-power, combined-arms and the human battlefield were all seen as critical and featured far more 
heavily than some have given credit for. The British Army understood and was attempting to deal 
with the large tactical questions. Despite conflicting messages stemming from the Boer War and 
Russo-Japanese War, the General Staff managed to create a framework of principles into which 
rapid developments could be incorporated without fundamentally altering the core military 
principles.87 The next section will build upon this conclusion by looking at the command system 
advocated in FSR I. 
 
Command systems are not synonymous with leadership and, as Gary Sheffield has noted, it is 
helpful to differentiate between the two.88 Command systems are the managerial structures that 
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direct and apply military force towards the intended goal.89 It is also useful to recognise that control 
is a linked concept to command. Control is the ability to direct, organise and co-ordinate military 
force.90 While these terms are more modern in their origin their conceptual importance was not 
ignored within FSR I. If Sheffield's criteria for effective command are accepted, that is a clear plan, 
good communications and flexibility to handle Clausewitzian 'friction', then FSR I enshrined 
principles that promoted it.91 The command principles in FSR I do not follow a listed structure in 
this order, instead it follows the rough chronological outline of a campaign: first establishing the 
basic characteristics of force composition and capabilities; then outlining modes and methods of 
communications; which is followed-up by principles of movement by sea and land such as the 
embarkation of troops by rail; thereafter quartering and billets are dealt with.92 The first four 
chapters outline the basic preparatory information any commander would need to know before 
embarking on campaign: what are the forces, how should they communicate; how do they get to 
where they are needed and what to do once they are in-situ.93 The final six chapters concern battle 
itself and are where the commanders could find the principles of attack and defence in various 
differing circumstances. When the document is taken as a whole there are numerous useful 
principles relating to planning.  
 
The first, and arguably one of the most important, principles relating to sound planning can be 
found in the second part of Chapter I: 'The full power of an army can be exerted only when all 
its parts act in close combination, and this is not possible unless the members of each arm 
understand the characteristics of the other arms.'94 The principle of combined-arms co-operation 
would remain fraught with practical difficulties well into the Great War, but as an idea its 
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importance was understood long before any German set foot in France or Belgium.95 In terms of 
preparing and positioning forces the advice given was sensible, albeit focused upon manoeuvre, but 
generally became obsolete with the onset of trench warfare on the Aisne in 1914:  
 
A force when deployed loses much of its power to manoeuvre as a whole; as a rule, therefore, the 
columns should not leave their march formations until the commander has formed his plan of battle, 
or until the action of the advanced troops shows that deployment is necessary.96 
 
These practical foundations were useful but commanders needed to couple these with principles for 
the actual plans for battle. Contrary to Bowman and Connelly's contention that the principles of war 
were not defined, this sort of advice based on principle runs through the entire document. Chapter 
VII – The Battle section 102. Deployment for Action provides numerous recommendations for the 
would-be commander; it is worth looking quoting at length on the subject of envelopment to 
challenge Bowman and Connelly’s interpretation: 
 
In the case of very large armies, or of an army which possess a decided superiority in power over its 
antagonist, the development of fire effect is usually facilitated by aiming from the outset at the 
envelopment of one or both of the enemy's flanks. This may be done by continuously extending the 
front as the enemy's dispositions are discovered until his line is overlapped, or by a converging 
movement of two portions of the army, so timed as to bring both simultaneously to the battlefield. 
Few methods are more effective than the latter, when successful, for it combines the advantages of 
enveloping attack on the battlefield with a convenient division of the army before the battle (Sec. 
23). Converging movements however, demand the most skilful timing and complete arrangements 
for inter-communication, for any failure may lay the divided parts of the army open to the risk of 
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defeat in detail by an enterprising enemy.97 
 
It may not be in the expected format of a list but this passage provides tangible advice on the 
benefits and drawbacks of manoeuvring an army for envelopment. The principle of envelopment is 
at the centre of the recommendation reminding commanders of an effective way or bringing their 
force to action while also noting the drawbacks. It is difficult to really see how this principle could 
be further developed without the inclusion of prescriptive examples or glossary definitions. This 
manner of advice is built upon later in the same chapter: 'The moral effect of an envelopment which 
threatens an enemy's line of retreat, and enfilades his front, is always great.'98 Envelopment is not 
the only principle described but serves as an adequate example that commanders facing the prospect 
of deploying their forces and creating a battle plan were not left without guidance. 
 
Advice on good planning was given in stages: it was the responsibility of the commander to first 
understand the forces at his disposal, and then further principles relating to the expected build-up to 
a campaign and progression into battle were provided. In Chapter VII 'The Battle' recommendations 
were made on methods of bringing about decisive action, but an overlooked aspect of FSR I is the 
practical expectations for planning both offensive and defensive battles that are laid down. These 
were not limited to platitudes regarding the offensive spirit but contained clear and important points 
a commander must consider before action: 
 
2. The commander of the force and subordinate commanders will be guided by the following 
principles in framing orders for an attack:- 
i. A definite objective or task should be assigned to each body of troops, the actual limits of 
frontage being specified as far as possible. 
ii. The direction of the attack to be made by each body of troops should be distinctly stated. 
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iii. Most careful arrangements should be made to ensure that attacks intended to be 
simultaneous should be so in reality. 
iv. The choice of the manner in which the task assigned to each body of troops is to be 
performed should be left to its commander.99 
 
Aside from being one of the few areas where a list approach is taken, the recommendations 
emphasise all the key criteria of good command and control: defined planning, clear communication 
and flexibility in approach. These principles are echoed in the Preliminary Measures for the 
defence, albeit with a greater emphasis on information, flexibility and shirking the list format.100 If 
there is a criticism to made of FSR I it is that important principles are often difficult to distinguish 
from broader points. This can be seen in the section of Chapter VII quoted above, advocating 
planning, communications and flexibility. These are elements considered important in their own 
right, but which often become subsumed within broader points. This is the case with both 
communications and flexibility. Chapter II Inter-Communication and Orders sets out the framework 
and methods to maintain good communications, in principle, yet within this is a regular stress upon 
flexibility and freedom of command for subordinates – or the man-on-the-spot principle. Part 12 
Operation Orders is a good example of this. The section starts with a clear outline of what it is: 
'Operation orders deal with all strategical and tactical operations, such as marches, protection, 
occupation of quarters, reconnaissance, and battle.'101 Shortly thereafter flexibility was doctrinally 
enshrined:  
 
An operation order should contain just what the recipient requires to know and nothing more. 
It should tell him nothing which he can and should arrange for himself. The general principle is that 
the object to be attained, with such information as affects its attainment, should be briefly but clearly 
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stated; while the method of attaining the object should be left to the utmost extent possible to the 
recipient, with due regard to his personal characteristics.102 
 
This was good advice and offers a fairly close approximation to what today would be known as 
'mission command' or Auftragstaktik. Often the British Army has been accused of an over-
centralised approach to war. Zabecki and Gudmunsson have both critically compared the British 
and French systems negatively against the German methods, Zabecki wrote:103 
 
The Allies generally tried to centralize both planning and execution at the highest levels, which in the 
end robbed subordinate commanders of all initiative and made it almost impossible to exploit rapidly 
tactical opportunities as they arose.104 
 
This criticism is not fair. Doctrinally both the British and French Armies understood the value of 
decentralising command; implementation was the problem.105 This is not to say the British Army 
had a flawless system in place. While communications and flexibility were enshrined how this 
would actually function on the ground and at what level of command a subordinate could 
reasonably exercise initiative remained vague. The guidance given by FSR I centred on the 
circumstances and justifications for amending and altering orders.106 This was helpful but its lack of 
specifics compromised its utility. While it was relevant for officers, there was no clear indication as 
to the level to which this freedom extended. At the heart of the issue lay the problem of reconciling 
the risk of inviting destruction by obeying impractical orders, irrespective of circumstance, and of 
countermanding them in the light of conditions on the ground which may have potentially harmed 
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neighbouring units who were reliant upon co-ordinated action. This conflict remained unresolved at 
least until 1916. Major James Jack, notably a regular officer, faced this predicament on 1 July 1916: 
 
With evidence pointing in opposite directions the strain of deciding where one's duty lay was very 
great. On the one hand, was it pure madness to take my companies forward? On the other, what 
would be said of the 90th (2/Cameronians, Scottish Rifles) were they in any manner to desert 
comrades on the battlefield or evade making an effort to carry out at least part of their orders?107 
 
This conflict is essentially part of what Clausewitz called 'friction'.108 In an information vacuum and 
deprived of reliable information the junior commanders were being asked to make impossible 
decisions without full knowledge of the consequences of their actions. This dilemma will be 
explored more thoroughly later and the evolution of decentralisation considered, but in terms of a 
command it is important to recognise that this was not always a case of individuals against a system 
but it also encompassed factors such as duty towards fellow soldiers. The system itself gave 
significant leeway to officers exercising initiative and significant protection from higher 
commanders. Question marks remained over how relevant this was at all levels of command, as 
Jack's experiences show, but at the most fundamental level communications and flexibility were 
enshrined in doctrine. 
 
It is possible to argue that FSR I was deficient because it lacked prescription leaving many without 
a clear idea of the best practice within a defined context. It is not reasonable to argue that it failed to 
explain its principles. Guidance could be found on planning: force capabilities, movements, and 
approaches to battle. Intertwined with these was a regular stress upon the importance of 
communications and flexibility in command. Sheffield's main criteria for good command can be 
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found in FSR I but imperfectly so. Doctrinally the British General Staff established a set of 
principles that were well-suited to the army they were to be applied to. Professional soldiers were 
expected to be able to exercise the initiative required for decentralised command to work in battle. 
FSR I and other manuals raised the issues of fire-power and co-ordination of arms, but usually set 
them alongside moral factors. There were always likely to be problems implementing principles on 
the ground but at its most basic level the British Army had a framework which enshrined 
appropriate command lessons in a system that would be vindicated by victory. 
 
1.2 Modern Frameworks 
 
This section will look at the debates and questions within the social sciences regarding the learning 
organisation idea and highlight important concepts from which to judge the structure of the Division 
between 1916 and 1918. 
 
The social sciences have long recognised that to understand organisational learning a number of 
subsidiary questions must be explored, for example: how does individual learning feed into 
organisational learning? How does the ‘learning curve’ concept link with it? Can organisational 
learning benefit from unofficial methods of practice?109 On the whole, historians and strategic 
theorists alike have ignored these questions in favour of comparing models and theoretical 
hypotheses.110 In fact, most have failed to answer the most fundamental question: What is an 
organisation?111 R.E. Grice Hutchinson, a 32nd Division chaplain to the artillery, highlighted the 
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problem of homogeneity within institutions in relation to his job serving the spiritual needs of his 
flock: ‘the nature of its organization was entirely different from an Infantry Brigade.’112 This was 
not only meant in a structural sense, although he covers that, but also a cultural one: ‘Each [battery] 
was entirely separate in character and far more independent of one another. The Unit [sic] to the 
Infantry Chaplain was the Battalion; to me it was the battery or section of the column.’113 
Hutchinson went on to observe that there were different types of men serving in different capacities 
under his stewardship, broadly split by their jobs and work practices.114 This has implications for 
how any learning structure is considered. Whereas the social science literature has mainly 
concerned itself with commercial or educational fields – where sub-division is less marked – war 
studies has viewed organisations as homogeneous wholes. In this instance there are justified reasons 
to consider the overall divisional ‘organisation’ as consisting of smaller constituent organisations. 
These may each have their own culture, and could justifiably be considered singularly in their own 
studies. Thus, any model or set of theoretical benchmarks used to evaluate the 32nd Division has to 
be sensitive to the various cultures within the divisional structure. To explore the culture of each 
constituent arm would warrant a study unto itself, but this chapter will lay down how well the arms 
interacted, and evaluate how the division was able to deal with these sub-organisations. 
 
It is now worth looking in more detail at some of the questions posited by the social sciences and 
noting how they affect any judgement on the divisional structure's effects on learning. One of the 
main problems facing any theory of organisational learning is dealing with the paradox that 
collective learning amounts to more than individual improvement, yet it is contingent upon the 
individuals' progress.115 The problem is essentially Aristotelian in nature: the whole (organisational 
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learning) is different from the sum of its parts (individual learning). Daniel H. Kim offers a solution 
to this problem, suggesting that ‘mental models’ are created by individuals and are drawn from their 
own acts of individual learning. He draws on the work of Senge to describe these ‘mental models’:  
 
Mental models represent a person’s view of the world, including explicit and implicit 
understandings. Mental models provide the context in which to view and interpret new material, and 
they determine how stored information is relevant to a given situation.116  
 
These ‘mental models’, it is contended, are improved by individual experience and as the mental 
model becomes more explicit it affects other individuals. Thus a shared model arises. Collective 
learning therefore stems from these individual and shared ‘mental models’. Kim’s argument has 
some merit; he convincingly argues that ‘mental models’ aid the formation of subjective pre-
conceptions influencing behaviour and consequently learning.117 Nonetheless, the idea is over-
complex and it is unclear how it differs in any meaningful way from the idea of organisational 
culture, itself a disputed term, or ethos.  
 
In many respects the war studies literature has been clearer with regards to ‘mental models’ and 
organisational cultures. Nagl’s exploration of the concept in the British and American armies is 
central to his notion of a learning organisation.118 Yet as has already been noted, when culture is 
analysed divisions begin to become evident. A more satisfactory answer perhaps lies in the work of 
John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, who have synthesised a large range of prior work to form a 
more cohesive theory of 'communities-in-practice' to explain how sub-groups and individuals can 
contribute to wider organisational learning. They argue that organisations often perceive the work 
done by their employees as ‘thin’ or ‘canonical’, that is to say they see a set of instructions devoid 
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of the complexities that the practicalities of the task may entail. In reality organisations are 
comprised of employees who form their own ‘non-canonical’ methods of achieving their goals, 
which they learn through a combination of observation, experience, and collective dialogue. As 
groups of workers interact and tackle different problems they form a 'community-of-practice' 
operating under a shared ‘non-canonical’ method, which places collaborative discussions at its very 
heart.119 This has the key advantage over the straight-forward cultural argument; it explains how 
sub-groups, with markedly different cultures and practices, within an organisation, such as the 32nd 
Division, were able to interact; Brown and Duguid note: ‘If their [large organisations] internal 
communities have a reasonable degree of autonomy and independence from the dominant world 
view, large organizations might actually accelerate innovation.’120 They go on to temper this by 
recognising that it is only possible when organisations avoid ‘swinging wholesale from one 
[organisational] paradigm to another.’121 As will be explored further in chapter four, the notion of 
disobedience and the exercise of initiative was not alien to the men of the BEF. It played an 
important role in bridging the gap between effective actions in real-world conditions (‘non-
canonical practice’), and official doctrine, standard operating procedures (SOPs) or best practices 
(‘canonical practice’). Charles Douie of the 1/Dorsets was temporarily assigned to an entrenching 
battalion before joining his unit in the line towards the end of 1915. He remarked upon seeing the 
men work:  
 
I realised that they were not digging in the manner prescribed by the Field Service Regulations, but I 
could not bring myself to tell a Durham miner, who had completed his task in much less than the 
scheduled time, that he knew nothing about digging and that I would show him the correct way.122 
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Douie recognised the divergence between the official ‘canonical’ practice and the ‘non-canonical’ 
methods employed by those with pre-existing civilian expertise. The fact that there was never any 
clearly prescribed method of digging in FSR I or II does not really matter.123 Douie understood that 
approved (canonical) methods were not binding when non-canonical practices were superior. 
Moreover, the principles he was inculcated with through the ethos of the army and FSR I 
encouraged him to use his own initiative in the matter.124 Ultimately, when looking at both 
individual learning and the benefits bestowed by unofficial practice, the Brown-Duguid model of 
communities of practice offers a more practical framework. 
 
The communities-of-practice idea can be elaborated upon by drawing from the literature of 
educational studies. Ikujiro Nonaka and Georg von Krogh have noted that knowledge does not 
simply equate to information, but ties firmly into a belief structure. They make an important 
distinction between types of knowledge, tacit and explicit, in turn adjusting the ‘canonical’ and 
‘non-canonical’ distinction made by Brown and Duguid. Tacit knowledge is ‘unarticulated and tied 
to the senses, movement skills, physical experiences, intuition or implicit rules of thumb’ while 
explicit knowledge is: ‘uttered and captured in drawing and writing’.125 While debate still exists 
over the validity of Nonaka and von Kogh’s theories,126 they highlight a key problem with the 
historiography: many have assumed that doctrine equated to action.127 Doctrine, although linked to 
the more tacit ethos, is still, in its most basic form, explicit knowledge: a written set of principles to 
guide the conduct of the military forces. This does not operate within a vacuum; it must draw-upon 
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and complement the existing tacit knowledge of those serving – the ethos. Doctrine then cannot be 
divorced from ethos just as explicit, canonical knowledge should not be separated from tacit, non-
canonical knowledge. The Stationery Service (SS) manuals and pamphlets published by GHQ over 
the course of the war changed the structural organisation of the platoon and division but 
fundamentally held true to the pre-war principles in FSR I and ethos of the army at the time.128 The 
manuals were seen as providing something additional rather than overriding the existing 
principles.129 If subsequent doctrine ran against the knowledge and experience of those on the 
ground it risked circumvention, as can be seen with Douie and later with Fourth Army Tactical 
Notes. Learning models dictate that those organisations which can best encapsulate the tacit 
knowledge of the communities-of-practice within the formal literature are best positioned to 
encourage learning and maintain high standards of practice. Ultimately a dynamic exists between 
what theorists have labelled non-canonical practice and what in this paper is termed battle wisdom, 
and the formalised canonical practices which have been explored within the Great War literature.130 
The next chapter will look at how the command structure aided or hindered learning by looking at 
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Chapter Two 
Structure on the Somme, A Case Study: 1 – 16 July 1916 
 
The 32nd Division’s internal bureaucratic structure in 1916 was conducive to learning but the 
operational environment caused a number of problems which were never fully solved. This chapter 
will use the case study of the division's employment during the Battle of the Somme to look at how 
its structure facilitated the learning process and analyse what changes were made after combat 
operations to improve the overall performance of the formation. It will cover three areas: 
preparation, execution and appraisal. 
 
The Somme was the first major battle the 32nd Division were involved in and as such provides the 
analytical starting point for any evaluation of the learning structure of the formation. Nevertheless, 
before looking at how the structure operated during the planning, conduct and appraisal stages, it 
must be noted that the organisation was not new. The war had already been going for twenty four 
months prior to 1 July and as such developments had already taken place. It is not within the remit 
of this study to provide a full analysis here, but it should be noted that the experiences of 1915 were 
mixed. The Battles of Neuve Chapelle, Second Ypres, Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos as well the 
Dardanelles and Salonika expeditions had placed severe strain on the resources of the armed forces. 
The rapid expansion of the army and significant casualties had led to the 'de-skilling' of the BEF; 
rightly or wrongly there existed a perception that the quality of the pre-war army was no longer 
present. William Robertson felt the problem stemmed from a lack of preparation and a paucity of 
'trained leaders'.131 Haig shared his views: 'I have not got an Army in France really, but a collection 
of divisions untrained for the field.' clarifying after the war in his typescript diary: 'The actual 
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fighting Army will be evolved from them.'132 In May he discussed the situation with Clemenceau, 
the French Prime Minister at the time: 'My divisions, I told him, want much careful training before 
we could attack with hope of success.'133 1915 was not a wasted year. The set-backs brought about 
changes in high command, GHQ and the staff, artillery organisation as well as tactical methods 
which contributed to the overall organisational learning of the BEF.134 Yet the Battle of the Somme 
was the biggest endeavour the British Army had attempted in its long history. Many of the 
personnel including the commander-in-chief had changed and it would be an entirely new 
experience for those formations who had not yet been in a major battle to date, of which the 32nd 
Division was one. 
 
2.1 Planning 1 July 1916 
 
The following section will look at the learning structure during the planning phase of the Battle of 
the Somme and what impact this had on learning within the division. For the 32nd Division planning 
for the Somme began in earnest on 7 March 1916 after an Army conference at X Corps HQ in 
Toutencourt.135 Their task was to capture the village of Thiepval and the adjacent Leipzig Spur 
before pushing onwards towards Mouquet Farm. This was in Horace Smith-Dorrien's words 'the 
hardest nut to crack in the whole line'.136 Yet despite a four month preparatory period the biggest 
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criticism levelled at Major-General William Henry Rycroft, GOC 32nd Division, after 1 July was his 
over-working of the infantry. Major Austin Girdwood, G.S.O. II 32nd Division was to remark after 
the war ‘The real cause of the failure of the 32nd Division is that the wretched Infantry were literally 
exhausted long before the day of the attack.’137 The picture that emerges from the records is one of 
delegation, inexperience and over-cautious planning exacerbated by a monumental engineering task 
requiring significant work to be conducted by the infantry to make up the shortfall in labour. The 
32nd Division was a microcosm of the wider army: overworked infantry, delegation of planning to 
specialists and a task too large for the available resources. While historians like Prior and Wilson 
have criticised the inconsistencies in planning for 1 July with some justification, the decisions 
become more understandable in light of the ethos of men like Rawlinson and Rycroft.138 They both 
faced similar problems at differing levels of command and handled them in a remarkably similar 
fashion: by avoiding micro-management and centralised plans. They both made the same mistakes, 
neither was able to 'grip' their subordinates and make important decisions when it mattered. The 
dissemination of good ideas in the lead up to 1 July remained limited as a consequence. 
 
If the success of the 32nd Division at the Battle of the Somme was judged by feats of engineering 
then there is little doubt they would be considered a success. In four months the division as a whole 
managed to complete 15 major works including: the digging of 19.65 miles of trench for telephone 
wires (of which 11.25 miles was 6 feet deep; 8.4 miles 4 feet), the re-filling of these trenches; ‘the 
completion of a water supply system throughout the front lines’; the erection of 28 bridges for 
artillery tracks as well as ‘numerous bridges for infantry’; and the construction of ‘additional 
sidings on the trench tramways to Thiepval and Authuille Woods.’139 While the division's three 
Royal Engineers Field Companies (206, 218, 219) would have carried much of the burden of the 
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more advanced constructions, the infantry were regularly called upon to shoulder a significant 
proportion of the manual labour needed.140 This was in addition to the carrying parties and fatigues 
needed to keep the front line defences maintained. In terms of direct effects upon combat 
performance the over-working limited opportunities to train, and did little to improve morale 
amongst the soldiers. Charles Clifford Platt, describing the supervision of fatigues, was only half 
joking when he described the lot of the 'common or garden infantry subaltern' as the 'rottenest job in 
the world'.141 If Girdwood's account is accepted the effects of this over-work were serious: 'the men 
and officers lost heart and were simply worn out physically and morally.'142 This testimony warrants 
further scrutiny. Girdwood was removed from his position as GSO2 on 16 July 1916 to assume 
command of the 11/Borders according to his letter to the official historian: 'Naturally I got myself 
disliked and the proof is in the fact that after the disaster which I had foretold had occurred I was 
given command of a Battalion to get me out of the Staff Office.'143 This has led Peter Simkins to 
conclude that 'all was not well in the command and staff echelons of the division.'144 On the basis of 
Girdwood's removal and the tumult within the division this is a fair conclusion, but new archival 
evidence suggests that Girdwood's relationship with Rycroft was more cordial than he revealed to 
the official historian.  
 
In early 1917 Rycroft sent a letter to Girdwood, then commanding the 11/Borders, 97 Brigade, 32nd 
Division. The letter does not appear to have survived but Girdwood's reply has. The opening line 
hints at a certain distance between the two men, but a certain cordiality upon reconnecting:  
 
I was so pleased and surprised to get your letter today and to hear all your news. I often thought of 
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writing to you but refrained as you have such numbers of friends in France and I know how busy you 
always are.145 
 
Girdwood proceeds to give a fairly full account of the attacks the division conducted after Rycroft's 
removal in November 1916 and notably asks for his help in getting a promotion: '[…] if you could 
put in a good word for me at G.H.Q. I should be grateful for ever.'146 The possibility that Girdwood 
was marshalling allies for his own career advancement is a realistic one but he was not afraid to 
reflect fondly upon Rycroft's tenure and raise a fundamental difference of opinion regarding staff 
work: 
 
All the old hands still talk of you when we meet and recall the happy days we had under your 
command. I often think of a conversation I had with you about only quick + rapid thinkers and 
writers being any good for Staff. I did not agree at the time and have watched many of the rapid type 
come to bitter grief through being rapid. If they have had practical experience they are all right but so 
many of that type have propelled themselves upward by their peers that they have not had time to see 
things. 
 As C.O. I have seen the Staff from both ends and I know quite a lot about it now. The quick 
fellow is always very sketchy and the results of his orders are often totally different to what he 
thought they would be.147 
 
If Girdwood was attempting to curry favour with Rycroft for a recommendation then one might 
venture there were better ways to go about it. The letter reveals that there were fundamentally 
different views within DHQ on what type of person made a good staff officer. As a cavalryman it is 
unsurprising that Rycroft would favour the quick thinking, fast-acting type, although some care 
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must be taken to accept Girdwood's alternative unthinkingly. The issue of promotion was a sore one 
with Girdwood at this time, and he appears to be taking aim at over-promoted staff officers who 
haven't experienced the war first hand as much as offering a genuine alternative approach. 
Irrespective of their rival views on staff, the letter suggests that Rycroft and Girdwood's relationship 
was not as frosty as might be expected from his letter to Edmonds. There were differences but care 
should be taken not to read too much into these. The fact that Girdwood felt comfortable enough 
sharing his disagreements with Rycroft only six months after his removal indicates that DHQ might 
not have been quite as troubled or closed to views than later evidence has suggested. This was not 
the end of their correspondence and Rycroft would later write to Girdwood congratulating him on 
his promotion to commanding a brigade to which a gracious reply was sent on 5 December 1917.148 
The more cordial relationship does not invalidate the criticism of Rycroft as an inconsiderate 
commander so it is worthwhile looking in more detail at the validity of the claims and how culpable 
he really was. 
 
Rycroft should be absolved of some responsibility for the over-working of the infantry. In March 
1916 the 32nd Division faced a gargantuan task of preparing from scratch both the front line and rear 
areas for a major attack. There was no buried cable system, gun positions needed to be dug, bridges 
over the Ancre improved and supply infrastructure developed. The planning for such works was not 
subject to one man's oversight but the product of the consultative ethos enshrined in FSR I, which 
promoted delegating decisions into the hands of the respective branches of the army that were 
logically best placed to oversee the work. Corps and division delegated the planning for specialist 
systems to the specialist arms. Yet on this occasion the branches lacked experience of a battle of this 
magnitude and many erred on the side of caution; the consequence for the infantry was ‘far too 
much digging and most of it was quite useless and haphazard.’149 The consultative process can be 
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seen in the organisation through the establishment of the field artillery's communications network: 
 
There was no system of buried cables in existence and so a suggested scheme was drawn up by 
Divisional Artillery and forwarded to Corps Signals for sanction. The original scheme was modified 
and placed under the control of an Officer of the Divisional Signal Co.150 
 
The resulting plan involved centring the communications on the Artillery Group HQs (Brigades 
under a new name, of which there were two) while the Observation Exchange (one per artillery 
group) enabled observation posts to contact the Artillery Group HQ if lines between the battery or 
front line were severed.151 The reasons for this decision were understandable. Communications 
were rightly prioritised, but it resulted in much more work for the artillery and infantry fatigue 
parties, engineers and signallers. The issue was not one of principle but of poor prioritisation. 
Observation Exchanges proved to be unnecessary and complicated.152 On the other hand, lines 
between the Artillery Group HQ and front line dugouts which remained unfinished: ‘were of the 
greatest value and should have been first to be completed.’153 This was not the only problem; by 
centring the communications on the Group HQ any shell-fire that affected this hub had a 
disproportionate effect on the subsidiary batteries. Both of the 32nd Division's Artillery Groups 
escaped this fate on 1 July, but the marshy ground of the Ancre proved problematic for a number of 
batteries of the 32nd Division’s Left Artillery Group. The topography meant that lines could only be 
buried to a depth of 2ft with 4ft sandbag breastworks to offer further protection. Lt-Col Ponson J 
Sheppard, OC 155th Brigade Royal Field Artillery and 2nd in command of Left Group recalled the 
difficulty maintaining communications with some of his batteries on 1 July: ‘by midday there was 
no communication – all the lines being cut. Communication was established during the afternoon, 
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but it was very precarious, the lines being continually cut.’154 This account was corroborated by 
Major R. B. Warton of 155th Brigade RFA who was told by runner that '155th Bde H.Q. Was 
temporarily out of action owing to shell fire...'155 Owing to limited shelling of Warton's battery 
communications were maintained with the front line.156 
 
Retaliatory shell-fire was not the only problem. The technical requirements of the new exchanges 
added a further level of complication to what was already a confusing network of lines and wires. 
The 32nd Division’s artillery report observed:  
 
As the system was only completed just before operations, R.A. operators did not have an opportunity 
of thoroughly learning the lines and test boxes. This was a great drawback when repairs became 
necessary.157 
 
The inexperience of building from scratch an adequate communications network in a limited time 
on a scale hitherto unknown by the 32nd Divisional Artillery and signals staff unquestionably led to 
errors. The scale, training and prioritisation proved to be an issue. The topography was out of the 
division's control, but it also added to the difficulties on the day. Nevertheless, despite the troubles 
the overall conclusion of the 32nd Division's CRA, Brigadier-General J.A. Tyler, was: ‘The system 
on the whole worked very well.’158 This was not wholly without foundation, for aside from the 
155th Brigade RFA communications largely held up, gun emplacements and dumps were adequately 
located and Observation Posts established. Tyler also noted the significant contribution of labour 
that his own batteries made in preparing for the attack. In this the 32nd Division were aided by a 
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strong mining contingent within the 155th Brigade RFA and indeed the X Corps more widely.159 
Nonetheless, Tyler's report mentions nothing of the working parties that were still required for 
digging the cable trenches; while preparing the infantry's front line positions was a significant job 
on its own.160 Additionally the division required 102,900 artillery and mortar shells, 2,600 boxes of 
small arms ammunition, 6,000 Stokes bombs and 35,000 No.6 Mills Grenades brought in to fill the 
ammunition dumps.161 Girdwood was correct to point out the difficulties facing the infantry in the 
preparatory phase leading up to 1 July, but to solely lay the blame at the feet of Rycroft is unfair. By 
following the principle of delegation to the specialists he avoided dictating on matters where he 
lacked personal expertise. The size of the task and the general inexperience of those within the 
specialist branches meant there was simply too much to do given the time and the resources. 
 
Decentralisation was mirrored within the other branches of the Division as well as at Corps and 
Army level in keeping with the ethos of the organisation. In 1916 this did not always function as 
intended, as the experience of 97 Infantry Brigade demonstrates. As Andy Simpson has observed 
conferences were a crucial forum for the consultation process.162 During April 1916 Rycroft 
regularly visited his brigadiers and the basic plan was laid out.163 The content of these conferences 
would largely depend upon the pressing topics of discussion at that particular time. Nevertheless 
they followed a general pattern as Brigadier-General J.B. Jardine (97 Infantry Brigade, 32nd 
Division) recognised of a conference held by Henry Rawlinson, GOC Fourth Army: ‘As was the 
custom it took the form of the senior officer asking each brigadier in turn what he noticed worthy of 
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remarks & criticism.’164 Meetings and conferences were part of a broader framework of 
discussions, and inspections and informal ‘pow-wows’ became a part of the everyday life of an 
officer within the BEF.165 In February 1916, a relatively average month, the commanders or general 
staff officers of the 32nd Division conducted 48 discussions, inspections, or conferences that were 
notable enough to record in the War Diary.166 Every day discussions took place regarding the 
running of the division. Conferences were thus a vital part of the communications infrastructure of 
the division. 
 
Evaluated against modern theory the practice of consulting subordinate commanders allowed senior 
leaders to draw upon the 'communities of practice' and tacit knowledge of those at the lower levels 
of the army. In practice the utility of this was hampered by individual perceptions, biases and 
scepticism. In the conference with Rawlinson, that probably took place on 4 May 1916, Brigadier-
General Jardine explained his views that the infantry should follow the protective barrage within 
30-40 yards and expect some casualties from their own shells.167 This, he recalled, was met with a 
degree of scepticism.168 An understandable response at first glance, but Jardine's advocacy was 
based upon his own observations of the Japanese forces (to which he was attached) during the 
Russo-Japanese War.169 The lessons he carried through from the Battles of Sai-Ma-Chi, Yu-shu-lin-
tzu, and Mukden were reinforced by the raids conducted in the months leading up to the main attack 
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on the Somme. Indeed, Jardine's own report on the action at Yu-shu-lin-tzu and the Russian lines at 
Makura-yama offers an interesting parallel to his approach on 1 July:  
 
In attacking the enemy's left one battalion climbed the hills north of the neck B, while the other 
quietly and undiscovered reached the dead ground in front of Makura-yama before dawn and lay 
down and waited. As dawn was breaking (just before 5 a.m.) the Japanese reached the neck and 
rushed the advanced trench at B, which only contained a weak piquet.  
 
The parallels were not limited to creeping up to the Russian positions before launching an attack. 
With the Russians now aware of the Japanese presence a rush for the important tactical ridge line 
ensued: 
 
It was a race as to who would crown the ridge first; the Japanese from B, the Russians from their 
camp. The Japanese did it, but only by the shortest of heads, for several of the enemy were actually 
within ten yards of them when they reached the top of the slope.170 
 
The result was serious for the Russians who were unprepared, had lost the high ground and were in 
disarray. While the circumstances on the Western Front were much less fluid and the distances 
greatly reduced, Jardine recognised that the principle was essentially the same. This lesson was 
reinforced by the experiences of raids the first of which, carried out by the 97 Brigade's 17/HLI, 
employed Jardine's familiar method: 
 
For twenty minutes our shells flayed the German front line, and under this arch of shrieking 
explosives the battle party crawled right up to the rim of the bombardment. What wire remained 
uncut was blown to fragments by a torpedo, and when the barrage lifted and came down behind, the 
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raiders jumped into the enemy's trench and set to work.171 
 
He understood that the best way to save the lives of his men was to win the race to the parapet. He 
knew that there would be loss but 'it was worth it.'172 Despite this strong foundation for his tactical 
choices Jardine was suspicious of the motives behind the scepticism of his tactical approach: 'I 
fancied – of course I may have been wrong – that there was a little bit of unconscious prejudice 
against my ideas, being a cavalryman.'173 Moreover upon explaining that the method was 'what the 
Japanese did', he was told '“Oh, the Japanese” in rather a sneering way.'174 Realistically it was 
unlikely that Rawlinson's view was motivated by any prejudice against a cavalryman's ideas. Major-
Generals Sir Oliver Nugent, GOC 36th (Ulster) Division and Sir Ivor Maxse, GOC 18th (Eastern) 
Division, both employed similar tactics in assaulting the Schwaben Redoubt/Crucifix positions and 
the Pommiers Redoubt/Montauban Ridge positions respectively.175 To his credit Jardine accepted 
the impression of cavalry prejudice may have been wide of the mark, but whatever the rationale 
behind the sneering scepticism the fact remains that Rawlinson did not alter Jardine's plans. He 
allowed the man-on-the-spot to use his own tactics. He did not wholly embrace and promote these 
alternative ideas. While he allowed a great deal of tactical variation, the Fourth Army Tactical Notes 
distributed in May 1916 only accounted for small parties of Lewis guns to be pushed forward into 
No Man's Land.176 It is clear that in the build up to 1 July Rawlinson was employing a decentralised 
command structure which facilitated the application of individual experience. Tacit knowledge 
existed and could be employed but it was not disseminated across the wider organisation. 
                                                 
171 John W. Arthur and Ion S. Munro (eds.), The Seventeenth Highland Light Infantry (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce 
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173 Ibid., 13 June 1930 
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Armageddon (1996) p.301 
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2.2 Structure and Command during the Battle 
 
The following section will assess how well the command system and structure was able to respond 
to the pressures of battle as it unfolded on 1 July 1916. It will be shown that fundamentally the 
correct principles were being employed but the execution was flawed.  
 
At 7.30am on 1 July the two leading infantry brigades of the 32nd Division, the 96th under the 
command of Brigadier-General Clement Yatman, and the 97th under Brigadier-General James 
Jardine assaulted the village of Thiepval and the Liepzig salient. On the right of the divisional line 
the 17/HLI had crawled out into No Man’s Land where they awaited zero close to the 
bombardment. Once the guns lifted they stormed the Leipzig Redoubt on the tip of the salient. This 
would be the division's only meaningful success on the day. Yatman’s 96 Brigade was less 
fortunate, despite also lying in No Man’s Land (although 60 yards further away than the 97 
Brigade.) The leading waves of his battalions (15/LF and 16/NF) were caught in the open by the 
hidden machine gun emplacements in Thiepval.177 Elements of the 15/LF, the left battalion, were 
reported to be making good progress through Thiepval but reports remained tentative and imprecise. 
As the day wore on this confusion would prove costly and expose the serious frailties of the 
decentralised command system. The 97 Brigade’s early success on the right of the line could not be 
built upon and the situation in the Leipzig salient continued to be precarious. Enfilade fire from 
Thiepval on the left and the strong-point of the Nordwerk to the right kept the assaulting troops 
firmly pinned down and rendered supply difficult. 
                                                 
177 TNA, WO 95/2395 96 Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 21 June 1916, '96th Brigade Operation Order No 37' p.6; pace 
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the strength of the positions faced and weight of fire arrayed against them. TNA, WO 95/2395 96 Infantry Brigade 
Headquarters, 1 July 1916, 7.30am. 
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Meanwhile the battalions of 14 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Charles 
Compton, being held in reserve, were ordered to reinforce the struggling leading brigades. Even 
reaching the front lines proved difficult and many were killed in Authuille Wood by machine gun 
fire. At the end of the day, the Leipzig Redoubt was held but no further gains were made. The mixed 
fortunes of the various units within the 32nd Division offer an opportunity to analyse how the 
division’s structure adapted to both crisis and defence in the confusion of battle. It will be argued 
that the inexperience of some front line commanders coupled with poor intelligence and an artillery 
organisation that lacked structure were all critical reasons for failure on 1 July. Nevertheless, some 
perspective should be maintained, and while this section is generally critical of the structure the 
performance also demonstrated that a system was in place which would adapt to new challenges 
quickly in future.178 
 
The biggest command problem facing the General Rycroft and his staff of the 32nd Division on 1 
July was the issue of communication and once the battle was under way it became very difficult to 
alter owing to the size of the battlefield, unreliable forms of communication, and the confusion of 
conflict. The impact that poor communications could have was pointed out by Wyn Griffith 
(15/RWF): ‘A General without a telephone was to all practical purposes impotent – a lay figure 
dressed in uniform, deprived of eyes, arms and ears.’179 Despite the four months of preparation, and 
detailed communication orders, on 1 July, Rycroft could do little to stamp his mark on the battle. 
The problems he faced were essentially intelligence issues; how could DHQ gather accurate 
                                                 
178 Primary narrative of events drawn from: TNA, WO 95/2368 32nd Div. General Staff, 1 July 1916 and appendices, 
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179 Wyn Griffith, Up to Mametz (London, Severn House, 1981; orig. 1931) p.185 also quoted in Griffith, ‘Tactical 
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information about the battle as it unfolded? In principle the ethos of decentralisation should have 
compensated for the neutering of senior command; in practice uncertainty seeped back from 
brigade, poor decisions were made and co-ordinated action became almost impossible. On 1 July 
the command system failed. The trouble centred on the uncertainty of the fate of the 15/LF and the 
re-bombardment of Thiepval. By 8am reports reached Brigadier-General Yatman that the infantry of 
the 15/LF, 96 Brigade, had penetrated into the east of Thiepval and good progress was being 
made.180 This was supported later by Lt McRobert reporting from the Coniston Observation Post at 
9.22am that British troops were seen moving forward east of Thiepval twelve minutes earlier.181 
Further reports from artillery, and possibly aerial observers trickled in.182 By late morning Rycroft 
and Yatman were faced with an uncertain number of the leading two companies of the 15/LF, in or 
isolated near the eastern edge of Thiepval.183 The scattered information regarding the leading waves 
of the 15/LF coloured Yatman's decisions throughout the day and the results were disastrous. When 
plans were set to attempt to flank the village from the north he dissuaded Rycroft and Lt-Gen. Sir 
Thomas Morland, X Corps Commander, from re-bombarding the forward positions in the village as 
well as the fortified Thiepval Château. Instead the shelling focused on the strong-points to the south 
and east until the outcome of the proposed flanking attack was known.184 This deprived the 
companies of the 16/LF and 2/RIF of effective artillery support and the result was a costly 
failure.185 Thiepval remained unsuppressed throughout the day and wrought a terrible toll on the 
neighbouring 36th (Ulster) Division.186  
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This was not simply a case of bad leadership. The actions of Rycroft and Morland demonstrate the 
system of decentralisation in action. The uncertainties of battle led Yatman to make a number of 
important decisions which went unchallenged by the senior commanders. Decentralisation as 
understood according to FSR I privileged the decision of the man-on-the-spot, but it did not entirely 
promote the removal of higher command from the decision-making process. A balance needed to be 
struck between stifling, impractical intervention and allowing subordinates the freedom to act in the 
most appropriate manner according to local circumstances. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
there was a paralysis of command on 1 July. A more decisive corps or divisional commander might 
have overruled Yatman's fears on the hard calculation that the risk of shelling two companies in 
trenches was better than sending at least four in to attack without sufficient artillery support. The 
learning system relied upon experience, and it would take more days like 1 July before commanders 
would understand the balance between intervention and delegation. Ultimately the flexibility of the 
system undermined the exercise of leadership. This was Clausewitzian friction at its most 
destructive. 
 
For 96 Brigade the command system failed, but this did not mean there were no successes. The 
planned use of the artillery before and on 1 July was a consultative task between GHQ, army, corps 
and division, but in the wake of the Battle of Loos corps had become the integral level of 
command.187 This largely made sense; corps had larger staffs, access to the aerial intelligence and 
could co-ordinate artillery action across divisional boundaries. The move however, has also been 
criticised for proving too inflexible and detached artillerymen from the troops they were tasked with 
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supporting.188 The criticism of poor infantry-artillery liaison is not a new one nor is it unfair, but on 
the 32nd Division’s front despite the centralising shift in organisation, the realities on the ground 
were not as quite as inflexible as the paper organisation would suggest.189  
 
It was generally the case that the 32nd Division's artillery resources received orders from X Corps on 
1 July.190 Yet, recognising the barrage was moving off ahead of his troops, Brigadier-General 
Jardine liaised with Lt-Col Cotton commanding 32nd Division Right Artillery Group and arranged 
for two batteries to be brought back to protect the gains. Some confusion remains over precisely 
who ordered the change in fire-plan. Edmonds in the Official History, suggested it was an order 
from Brigadier-General Jardine but prompted by Lt-Col Cotton's reports from his observation 
post.191 Jardine's post-war letter to Edmonds corroborates this suggesting a re-write to an earlier 
draft of the Official History: ‘The Brigadier therefore ordered him to take two batteries out of the 
barrage and switch them to the defence of the Leipzig Redoubt already captured.’192 Yet the 
divisional records were more mixed. According to DHQ it was Lt-Col Cotton’s initiative:  
 
Lieut-Colonel Cotton, the officer commanding the Artillery Group with 97th Brigade, hearing from 
his O.P.s [Observation Posts] that the Infantry were unable to keep up with the Artillery lifts…rightly 
drew back the fire from some of his batteries from their pre-arranged objectives and thereby enabled 
the 97th Brigade to hold on to the captured trenches.193 
 
The testimony of Major E. Pease Watkins (161st Brigade, RFA) casts further doubt on Edmonds's 
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version, suggesting the observation of the front line was being carried out by Lt J.W. Buckley (161st 
Brigade, RFA).194 This supports DHQ's account. It seems likely that Cotton first raised the issue 
with Jardine after getting reports from his observation posts, and should probably be given the 
credit for the positing the idea. Nevertheless, given that Jardine held seniority of rank and the 
infantry's concerns tended to take precedence over those of the artillery, the decision would have 
been taken on the brigadier's authority.195 There appears to have been further precedence for this in 
the 32nd Division's Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) War Diary. At 8.20am it was recorded that: 
'Infantry Brigadier informed O.C. Left Arty Group that programme could be departed from as attack 
was prospering elsewhere.'196 It is possible that this entry was depicting the events on the right of 
the line involving Cotton and Jardine, although the justification for departing from the plan was 
different. That the entry was also amended at least once certainly brings into question its accuracy. 
Nonetheless, it does confirm that bold Infantry commanders could exercise that man-on-the-spot 
initiative with positive results. Irrespective of the intricacies of the situation, what is clear is that 
Jardine did not feel he had authority and sanction to take such action: 'This was of course, strictly 
contrary to orders but I believe, & some one [sic] later on told it me, that at G.H.Q. my action was 
quoted as being a case when orders should be disobeyed!'197 The actions of Cotton and Jardine 
demonstrated that both the spirit and the letter of FSR I were still very much in practice. Moreover 
it received warm praise from Rycroft who highlighted the initiative in his report to Corps, which 
indicates that the system had much more flexibility and was more open to ideas than some of the 
historiography has supported.198 Gary Sheffield’s observation with regard to infantry tactics could 
be employed for the structural system more widely: 'The problem lay in the execution, not doctrinal 
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So far the examples have concerned the positive and negative sides of decentralisation at the 
brigade level of command, but what about lower down the chain at battalion level? As chapter four 
will demonstrate the lower ranks were happy to disobey orders on occasion, but under the stricter 
conditions of a large structured battle the opportunities to do so were limited. Those that could 
diverge from plans and orders tended to be the battalion commanders and despite the ethos and 
spirit of delegation these men, on the whole, tended not to break from their instructions. The 
supporting battalions on the right of the 32nd Division's line demonstrate this. Sometime between 8 
and 8.30am, thinking all was going to plan, the 11/Borders, reserve battalion of 97 Brigade, 
debouched from their forming-up positions in Authuille Wood only to be caught in the open by 
heavy machine gun fire from the German positions.200 Shortly after (8.45am) the 1/Dorsets, 14 
Infantry Brigade proceeded through the wood but were also hit on an artillery bridge near 
Dumbarton Track following in the footsteps of the Borders:  
 
I came to a bridge over a defile which our plan of attack required us to cross, and examined it with 
interest. Its span was less than ten yards. A few days later the bridge, marked with unerring accuracy 
by the German machine-gunners, was heaped with our dead and wounded so as to be almost 
impassable; and a platoon forty-eight strong on one side emerged with a strength of twelve.201 
 
In the 'Report on Operations' the debouchment is covered without significant criticism or praise. It 
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was an act prompted by the uncertainty of what was occurring in front of them.202 Nevertheless, 
Rycroft was much more candid and critical of his battalion commanders in his General Diary: 
 
The 11th Borders, which seeing that the right was held up should have been kept back in 
AUTHUILLE WOOD, debouched into the open about 8.40 a.m. and immediately came under heavy 
machine gun fire from enemy works in front of the left Brigade of 8th Division…The 1st Dorsets, the 
leading battalion of the 14th Brigade was held up, should have remained under cover but also 
debouched into the open, followed later by the 19th Lanc. Fus.203 
 
Despite the principles of FSR I it is clear that some commanders did not wish to countermand the 
orders to advance. The 1/Dorsets did at least exercise a certain degree of initiative in the tactics they 
employed. Upon seeing the danger at the edge of Authuille Wood attempts were made to find an 
alternative route but they were prevented by 'barbed wire and other obstructions'.204 When they did 
leave the position they moved in sectional rushes; casualties were still heavy. Things got worse. The 
19/LF followed up the 11/Borders and the 1/Dorsets as ordered and the first waves incurred heavy 
casualties until Lt-Col Graham (OC 19/LF) co-ordinated with the Trench Mortars to drop a smoke 
screen, then using covering fire from Vickers and Lewis guns they advanced in platoon rushes.205 
Graham's quick thinking actions are deserving of praise, although his battalion should not have 
pushed forward. Communications were a major part of the problem and it would take until 10.30am 
before word would reach the other two reserve battalions that they were to maintain their positions 
in the wood. Decentralisation of command should have mitigated the communication problems. 
That it did not demonstrates that, in spite of strong support in doctrinal terms and through ethos, not 
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all felt they could break from orders without letting their fellow soldiers down.206  
 
Were the orders themselves to blame then? Did they adhere to the command principles of FSR I? 
On the one hand there certainly was some emphasis placed upon co-ordinating actions between 
brigades, the 14 Infantry Brigade Operation Orders reading: 'Very intimate liaison will be 
established between the rear Battalion of the 97th Inf. Bde. and the 1st Dorset Regt.'207 This did not 
fundamentally breach FSR I's guidelines on good planning, in fact the division and brigade orders 
both followed the central principles of outlining the task, the direction, the timing and leaving the 
subordinates the freedom to employ their own tactics. DHQ's Operation Order dated 18 June 1916 
outlined the intention of the attack and the objectives, giving specific locations and boundaries, 
before covering the actions of the neighbouring divisions and artillery.208 None of these were 
particularly prescriptive, if anything they were too vague. The intention of the attack was stated 
simply as: 'to attack the enemy with the utmost vigour and determination.'209 Further into the 
document a hint of prescription can be found. Under point '9. The Infantry Tasks' the troop 
dispositions were stated clearly:  
 
The assault of the 96th and 97th Infantry Brigades will be delivered by two assaulting columns in each 
Brigade, each column being composed of one Battalion formed up in depth of a front of 2 
platoons.210 
 
Nevertheless, this is still well within the parameters set down by FSR I and as both Jardine and 
Yatman demonstrate there was still plenty of tactical latitude tolerated. This approach to Operation 
Orders was repeated at brigade level with subordinate units being given definite objectives but no 
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tactical approaches were explicitly laid out.211 That is not to say none were given at all. As has been 
shown, both Jardine and Yatman advanced into No Man's Land before zero but they did not 
enshrine this in their Operation Orders. Thus, if the expectations of the divisional and brigade 
GOCs were weighing upon the minds of battalion commanders it was not imparted through the 
written orders. Given the frequent conferences and discussions this is not particularly surprising, 
and certain lines in the after-action report hint at spoken, rather than written rationales which had 
the potential to influence battalion commanding officers: 
 
As it was considered essential to the success of the operation of the 14th Brigade that there should be 
no delay in assaulting the German second line after the capture of the MOUQUET FARM and 
MOUQUET SWITCH Line by the Reserve Battalion, the 97th Inf. Bde. Orders were given that the 
head of the Right Column was to follow this Battalion (11th Border Regiment) at a distance of 500 
yards.212 
 
Understanding that speed was of the essence and with the situation unclear in front of them the 
1/Dorset's actions become more understandable, if still in error.213 In the end, all three battalions 
(11/Borders, 1/Dorsets, 19/LF) suffered heavily and only fragments made it into the newly captured 
positions in the Leipzig Salient.  
 
The fates of the three battalions contrast with that of the 2/Manchesters. They were required to 
advance in support of the jumbled fragments of the 97 Brigade in the Leipzig Redoubt, but rather 
than follow the route along Dumbarton Track they pursued an alternative. Upon reaching the bullet-
swept bridge the CO of the Manchesters, Lt-Col 'Corky' Luxmoore, asked a nearby Trench Mortar 
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Battery (V.32) what was going on ahead:  
 
“I don’t really know, Sir,” said the Sergeant, “but Jerry’s simply mowing them down at that gap at 
the bridge. They’re marching through in fours, Sir, and dropping as fast as they get though the gap.” 
“But isn’t there any other way?” stormed Corky. [Luxmoore’s nickname on account of his cork leg] 
“Yes, Sir,” said the Sergeant, “round by Rock Street,” and away stormed Colonel Corky. Later I 
heard that the Manchesters had attained their objective, but they had gone through our own line first 
and not through the gap.214 
 
The 2/Manchesters were further aided by Captain W.W. Smith who was with his company in Rock 
Street Trench and provided information about the three battalions and suggested the alternative 
route via Rock Street and Bury Avenue up to the front line.215 Luxmoore ordered the route 
reconnoitred and once found clear it was used. While Luxmoore’s personal liaison and 
reconnaissance were factors in the decision to alter the route to the front line, the decision was 
significantly easier for him to make having both the benefit of forewarning and an opportunity to 
liaise with brigade. Brigadier-General Compton had at 9.30am ordered the two rear battalions of the 
14 Brigade to stay in position in Authuille Wood, while the 2/Manchesters had also been in contact 
with elements of the 1/Dorsets and 19/LF.216 Consequently when Luxmoore visited Compton at 
10.30am and orders were given to advance in support of the 97 Brigade they were aware of the 
potential danger that faced them.217 Through communication and reconnaissance the 2/Manchesters 
managed to avoid the heavy casualties incurred by the 11/Borders, 1/Dorsets and 19/LF. The 
2/Manchesters further challenge the notion of isolated arms working alone. Integration was not 
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seamless, but liaison between the trench mortars showed that different branches of the army could 
work together. Co-operation could occur at all levels within the division be that through the 
contravention of the artillery fire-plan or guiding an infantry unit around a particularly dangerous 
part of the line.  
 
The command system on 1 July failed. Decentralisation led to an abdication of responsibility at 
division and corps. At the lower levels battalion commanders stuck fairly rigidly to plan with the 
minor exception of the 2/Manchesters. They were given a significant degree of tactical autonomy as 
demonstrated by Lt-Col Graham of 19/LF's usage of trench mortar smoke screens and covering fire. 
The system would have supported the battalion commander who refused to push his unit forward 
under the conditions which the 1/Dorsets, 19/LF and 2/Manchesters faced. Yet, criticism of this 
level should be limited. Battalion commanders were operating in the toughest of circumstances; 
there was little clear information, confusion was rife and co-ordination difficult. Orders were 
crafted in such a way as to provide the appropriate information necessary for the subordinate 
formations and units to plan their attacks without undue meddling from above. That said, these were 
not perfect and vagaries would have done little to embolden the lower ranks. Moreover the tone was 
set in the conference discussions as much as the written orders. The one silver lining, where the 
command system worked, was in the co-ordination of the Right Artillery Group and 97 Brigade. In 
breaking from the planned barrage Cotton and Jardine significantly improved the situation for the 
troops in the captured Leipzig Salient. It would be tempting to conclude that this suggests the 
system and principles were wrong, but given the errors made it should be clear that it was the 
execution rather than the principle that failed on the day. 
 
2.3 Appraising Battle 
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So far it has been shown that the command system was poorly implemented on 1 July. Did they 
learn from this experience? This next section will focus on how well the division handled the 
analysis of the actions that took place on 1 July and in the days following. The utility of modern 
theory helps the historian in this respect; for the structure to be considered useful to learning it must 
draw upon the 'non-canonical' lessons of the front line feeding them into future 'canonical' practice. 
The command system and leadership style employed could seriously interfere with the feedback 
process. This section will show that despite a fairly well designed feedback structure that drew upon 
the candid experiences of those at the lowest levels, the effectiveness could be seriously hampered 
by authoritarian command methods such as those employed by General Sir Hubert de la Poer 
Gough. 
 
In the days following 1 July the 32nd Division's feedback process began. Officers and men were 
consulted, reports were written and questions were asked. The bureaucratic result was a series of 
narratives at each level of command that highlighted the sequence of events as best as could be 
discerned and attempted to draw out the salient lessons. Thus, battalions wrote accounts for brigade, 
who then analysed these and compiled a report of its own to be sent to the divisional staff, 
sometimes along with copies of the battalion reports.218 The division then brought these together to 
form its own divisional report to be sent to corps; this continued until it reached GHQ. In principle 
this was a sensible and robust method of sharing the vital details of a unit or formation's actions in 
battle. Nevertheless there were problems which will be looked at later in this section. 
 
The unit and formation war diaries also played an important role in the feedback process. There is 
little evidence that they were read at higher formation HQs, but they provided a record of what had 
occurred giving the reports a point of reference for timings – if diligently recorded. This was not 
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always the case. The contrasting accounts of the 11/Borders and 16/LF on 1 July demonstrate the 
variable quality of the source. The only significant narrative in the diary of the 11/Borders was: 
'Zero time 7.30 am Battalion advanced from assembly trenches at 8am and came under very heavy 
Machine Gun Fire suffering over 500 casualties.'219 This compares unfavourably with the 16/LF's 
three page narrative.220 What war diaries did do was keep a record of day-to-day events, conditions, 
casualties, reports, orders and often opinions for each discrete unit and formation within the BEF. 
The original purpose of such a move was conceived as didactic in character from the outset of the 
war, as Field Service Regulations Part II: Organization and Admin (1909) (FSR II) laid out: 
 
1. War diaries are confidential documents; their object is twofold, viz. :- 
i. To furnish an accurate record of the operations from which the history of the war can 
subsequently be prepared. 
ii. To collect information for future reference with a view to effecting improvements in the 
organization, [sic] education, training, equipment and administration of the army for war.221 
 
A number of copies would be made, and once compiled on a monthly basis, they would then be sent 
up the chain of command. Eventually the war diaries were sent to G.H.Q., to be forwarded to the 
War Office at which point they became permanent records of units’ movements, operations and 
methods.222  Doctrinally war diaries were envisaged as an integral part of the post-war appraisal 
system of the British Army and their role in the formulation of both the official histories and some 
divisional or regimental histories has been demonstrated.223 But evidence suggests that they played 
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a bigger role than this during the war, aiding diligent new commanders to familiarise themselves 
with the service history of the formation or unit they were joining. The personal papers of Major-
General Thomas Stanton Lambert, held at the Imperial War Museum, include a significant 
collection of war diaries and official reports from the 32nd Division, a sizeable proportion dating 
from 1917 covering their service during the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line in March 
and April, operations on the Belgian coast near Nieuport in July and on the Passchendaele ridge in 
December, all of which pre-dated his service with the Division, which only began on 29 May 
1918.224 Although it is possible that he received these papers after the war, their existence alongside 
official papers from his own time in charge suggests that they were the GOC's copy and were 
retained by the divisional staff and passed on to each new commander. While it is impossible to say 
with certainty where these files came from, their existence confirms that at the very least Lambert 
took an active interest in the past successes of the Division. The focus on the major engagements 
suggests that this was done with the aim of evaluating planning, performance and lessons. Of 
course, this could be a unique occurrence within the 32nd Division and may simply reflect a set of 
commanders who took their responsibilities seriously, but it would be entirely within the keeping of 
the ethos of the British Army and purpose of the documents themselves if this practice of handing 
down war diaries was more widespread; indeed it would be surprising if this did not occur. 
 
Alongside reports and diaries were lesson learnt files.225 At various stages, generally prior to or in 
the wake of a notable action, formations would reflect upon the recent events and disseminate 
lessons learnt reports that promoted successful practices and advice for commanders.226 These 
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reports were not drawn solely from the Division's experiences. Prior to the 32nd Division's return to 
the Somme in October 1916, after being withdrawn to the Cuinchy and Cambrin sector in mid-June, 
Rycroft disseminated a memorandum to the infantry brigades and engineers. This document 
contained a blend of lessons from the division's experience in July and tactical developments made 
on the Somme while they were training, refitting and line holding between mid-July and early 
October. The most notable of these is recognition of the role the creeping barrage now played in 
offensive operations: 
 
All ranks must be made to understand clearly that the considerable success which has been achieved 
in recent operations is almost entirely due to the infantry following close behind a rolling barrage. 
 Details of the barrage to be made for this Division will be communicated as soon as possible. 
Meanwhile troops should be trained to work up close to a barrage rolling at the rate of 50 yards in 
the minute across the open. It has been proved by experience that in the case of villages the barrage 
should roll right through and should not halt in the village. The pace of the rolling barrage barrage 
[sic] passing through a village will probably be 25 yards per minute; troops detailed to proceed 
through to the immediate objective on the distant side of the village must follow this barrage closely, 
the clearing up of houses and cellars being left to the special mopping up parties.227 
 
While the Division was away they did not conduct any major attack and raids carried out, such as 
that by the 16/LF on 11 September 1916, used an intense bombardment followed by a box 
barrage.228 The lesson then had to be one that had progressed up the chain of command to GHQ and 
then been disseminated down to Division, or transferred laterally through formation channels. The 
rest of the report is realistic about the difficulties in maintaining forward communications and 
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emphasises an organised system of runners to address the issue. The idea of 'Moppers up', that is 
troops specially detailed to clear enemy dugouts and isolated posts after the first wave had pushed 
further forward, are also highlighted as important. This is notably three months prior to the 
publication of SS 135 Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action (December, 
1916) which enshrined the practice in doctrine.229 At the formation level, lesson learnt reports were 
the first word on the evolution of tactical methods within the army. The BEF was responsive to the 
experiences of battle and demonstrate that even when formations were deprived of it lessons could 
be taught and disseminated effectively. At its most basic level lesson learnt reports demonstrate that 
the BEF was able to draw upon the non-canonical practices of the front line and react accordingly 
bringing them into its prescribed methods. 
 
It is worth looking now in more detail and the process of formulating post-action reports and the 
broader system of appraisal. Before the war FSR II laid out eleven points a good report should 
cover. These included relative strength of the opposing forces, time of action, orders issued and 
received, context of the important phases of battle, the movements of neighbouring units, follow-up 
actions and casualties sustained.230 In reality the reports very rarely hit all eleven criteria, casualties 
were not easy to gauge in the immediate aftermath of battle and rarely were the 'names of the 
superior officers of the enemy engaged' known to those on the front line and nor were they 
particularly relevant at the lower levels.231 Instead reports generally consisted of a narrative of 
events interspersed with important features of note. For example, the opening up the Sanda sap 
close to the Leipzig Redoubt was highlighted in the report from the 97 Brigade to the divisional 
staff describing it as a ‘godsend’ benefiting both supply and communications.232 Consequently the 
overall divisional report reflected the sap’s benefit but added further detail on the unit responsible 
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and the work’s completion time: ‘By 4.30 p.m. a trench connecting the Russian Sap which had been 
driven from our lines to within 40 yards of the enemy front trench was sufficiently completed by the 
17th Northumberland Fusiliers to give cover. This proved of inestimable value.’233 The procedure 
for reports may have been set down prior to the war but fundamental workings of the system were 
developed during the conflict. Prior to the outbreak of the Somme numerous raids were carried out 
on the German positions opposite the 32nd Division. After each of these the officers involved were 
tasked with writing up their experiences and drawing out the important lessons. This provided vital 
experience working with the bureaucratic system. On the night of the 5/6 May, for example, the 
15/LF carried out a raid on the German positions. In the after-action report, feedback was given on 
the enemy’s tactics. It also identified how well new equipment worked in battle:  
 
b. The enemy counter bombardment which did not start until 12.45 a.m. was placed on our trenches 
opposite our point of entry into their trenches…  
e. The protection afforded by the steel helmet was exemplified in several instances.234 
 
The narrative also offers a valuable insight into the feedback process at brigade level and above. 
The original report stated: ‘In one dug out which was entered all the occupants were wounded and 
as the British Army is not composed of low class Huns no bombs were thrown.’235 Although, the 96 
Brigade's report has not survived it is possible to tell from the account in the war diary and the 
divisional intelligence summary that such commentary was removed from any further reports.236 All 
that was subsequently mentioned was that dug-outs were bombed. The process was there to filter 
out unnecessary information as much as it was to promote valuable lessons.237 
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The after-action reports in the wake of 1 July varied in character depending upon which arm 
produced them. The reports by the CRA, Brigadier-General Tyler, and the Trench Mortar Batteries 
followed a template which did not include any substantial narrative; rather, it focused on the 
technical aspects of the guns, reliability and planning.238 The Trench Mortar report noted: ‘The 
general design of the Heavy T.M. Emplacement brought out by the 4th Army School of Mortars was 
adhered to and found quite satisfactory. Several minor changes however were found to be 
necessary.’239 The report goes on to list the minor changes, building upon some of the findings of 
the Medium Trench Mortar Batteries. This is significant for two reasons: much of the feedback on 
the effects of the artillery on the day was given in the infantry brigade reports, and second the 
technicality of the feedback demonstrates an open dialogue between those teaching best-practice 
and those implementing it on the ground. There clearly existed a willingness within the BEF as a 
whole to adapt ‘canonical practice’ (i.e. that which was taught in the Fourth Army School of 
Mortars) to what effective, non-canonical practices were being carried out on the ground. Both the 
artillery and the trench mortar reports demonstrate a much greater emphasis on practical 
adjustments to improve the quality of the shooting and minimise the workload for the Divisional 
Ammunition Column, Royal Engineer Companies and the assigned work parties.240 
 
On 2 July the X Corps was transferred to Sir Hubert Gough’s Reserve Army along with the VIII 
Corps.241 This had immediate ramifications for the 32nd Division. 75 Brigade were attached to the 
32nd Division, transferred temporarily from the 25th Division. The purpose was to launch an attack 
with 14 Brigade to expand on the lodgement made into the Leipzig Salient early in the morning on 
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3 July. The attack made very limited early gains but these were unsustainable and it ended in 
complete failure with severe losses.242 It was a classic case of order, counter-order, disorder as plans 
were changed four hours prior to the originally planned zero and two before the preliminary 
bombardment.243 In the immediate aftermath of the failure an inquisition began, highlighting both 
the strengths and weaknesses of the feedback system. The guns had barely stopped firing when 
Gough demanded answers. A memorandum from 32nd Division to 75 Brigade was sent the same 
day: 
 
1. The Army Commander wishes to be informed on the following points:- 
a. Where did units incur their losses? 
b. How were units driven back? Was it by bombers or by enemy attack across the open? 
c. Once the troops were in the German trenches, how was it that the enemy machine-guns did any 
execution?244 
 
The reports produced demonstrate the real drawbacks of the system. They relied upon the honest 
and straight-forward appraisal at each level, and this was not always forthcoming. Rycroft's account 
of the 3 July was one such report although not his first. As has been shown already the 32nd 
Division's 'Report on Operations' refused to criticise the 11/Borders and 1/Dorsets for their 
debouching from Authuille Wood on 1 July despite Rycroft's personal unhappiness with the 
decision.245 His report on 3 July differed in approach. Rather than avoid criticism, Rycroft offered a 
critique on the conduct and employment of 75 Brigade, without overtly attributing any blame. 
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Where errors are pointed out Rycroft emphasised the mitigating factors facing 75 Brigade and its 
battalions. The usage by 2/S.Lancs and 8/S.Lancs of a trench reserved for evacuation which caused 
significant confusion and delay was tempered by recognition that: 
 
The desire to use HARLEY STREET may have been due to it being mentioned at my Hd.Qrs. That it 
might be possible for the 75th Brigade to arrange for its use, as although told off as an evacuation 
trench it has been at times used for troops moving up into the line.246 
 
This was a fair and honest appraisal that attempted to play-down the errors made by the 
subordinates and it is particularly noteworthy that no one individual was picked out as having 
suggested the trench could be used. This lack of specifics continued when Rycroft attempted to 
shield Brigadier-General Jenkins, the 75 Brigade commander, from some of the criticism he faced 
after the débâcle. 
 
There can be no doubt that Brigadier-General Jenkins [commanding 75 Brigade] was confronted 
with many difficulties, as the trenches which he had to take over from troops of the 97th and 96th 
Brigades were unknown to him and his Officers. His difficulties were augmented by the fact that the 
trenches, including communications trenches, had been very severely damaged and in places blocked 
by heavy enemy artillery fire.247 
 
The defence extended to his own staff. Once again Rycroft chose to use vague language even when 
accepting that some of the blame lay with the 32nd Division: 
 
I believe that every possible assistance was given by my Staff and that of my Brigades but without 
doubt mistakes and delays did occur, to such an extent that even if orders had not been modified the 
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75th Brigade would not have been in a position to carry out its original orders.248 
 
In truth Rycroft was far from happy with the performance of all his staff. On 15 July 1916, 
reflecting on the period of action, the war diarist remarked: 'The value of an untrained GSO3 in 
active operations of this kind is very small.'249 This was initialled by the GSO1, Lt-Col Wace. In an 
ironic twist the GSO3 Major C.C. Wallace remained in his position longer than Rycroft, lasting until 
15 December 1916 when he was invalided home.250 Change did occur, and as previously noted, 
GSO2 Major Austin Girdwood was promoted out to command 11/Border regiment and was 
replaced on the same day by the 32nd Division's former GSO3 Major P.S. Rowan.251 
 
Reading between the lines of the report, it becomes clear that Rycroft saw the utter impracticality of 
the last minute change in plans and the disorganisation it caused to the artillery, infantry and ailing 
communications network. He reserved his last comment to hint at this: 
 
Presuming that it [75 Brigade] had got into its allotted positions in sufficient time to carry out the 
original attack, I am of opinion [sic] that under the conditions existing it would have been impossible 
to get the change of objective communicated to the lower formations of the units, namely company, 
platoon and section commanders.252 
 
In the post-war era the 32nd Division’s GSO1 Lt-Col Wace was more candid about the true feelings 
of the staff: ‘it was another of Gough’s mad ideas. Gough was furious then with our Divn, and with 
Rycroft + me in particular. He ‘threw’ the unfortunate Jenkins, but couldn’t fix blame on us.’253 
Wace was not alone, Lt-Col Cotton's report observed that grave apprehension clearly existed prior 
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to the attack: '[…] late at night a strong representation was made to 32 Div GSO as to the extreme 
improbability of a successful attack under the conditions then existing'.254 Cotton went on to 
recognise that any reservations mattered little; given the chaos of the situation any cancellation 
orders were unlikely to reach their recipients in time.255  
 
The vagaries, concealed criticisms and caveats were aimed at indicating the pervading feeling of 
where the blame lay, while also seeking to minimise the damage done to commanders like 
Brigadier-General Jenkins but this protection did not wholly stem from a sense of self-preservation. 
Rycroft was willing to honestly accept blame when he felt he was responsible for it. In a separate 
report to X Corps of the artillery action taken on 3 July he took responsibility for the change of 
plans which led to the cessation of the intense bombardment between 3am and 3.15am by the Right 
Artillery Group: 
 
I reproach myself for having authorised any modification of the intense period 3.a.m. to 3.15.a.m. 
But wish to put on record that I should under no circumstances have sanctioned any change had I 
known my Artillery was to cease firing at 3.15.a.m. 
 
The command of the artillery had essentially decentralised to the divisional level owing to poor 
communications and late orders from X Corps. Rycroft in this instance was a victim of 
miscommunication between DHQ and Right Artillery Brigade. Nevertheless, no action was taken 
against him and realistically it was not a major contributing factor to failure in light of the many 
other problems. Importantly it demonstrated that Rycroft was willing to accept responsibility in the 
reporting process; a crucial benefit to the overall system but perhaps less so for his own career. 
Within the wider organisation this was not always repeated and obfuscations, half-truths, and 
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outright lies were occasionally woven into reports.256 Nevertheless, the 32nd Division's reporting 
process here suggests that this tended to be at the lower end of the spectrum with caveats and veiled 
criticism as opposed to half-truths and outright fabrication. 
 
Behind the act of reporting was the relationship between officers. The relationship between Rycroft 
and Gough soured after the action of 3 July. Lt-Col Wace wrote after the war that 'He was terrified 
of Gough.’257 The impact of this was lasting:  
 
[…] Rycroft knew he'd “got it in for us”, + when at Bethune we got orders to go back to the Somme 
in October he turned to me + said wryly that this would be his undoing unless we went to Rawly's 
Army! So he just hadn't the kick in him to stand up to Gough, when all initiative was taken out of his 
hands.258 
 
Rycroft was right to feel a sense of foreboding at the return of the 32nd Division to Gough's Reserve 
Army. Three days after the fighting near Beaumont Hamel he was removed from his command. He 
was not the only commander to have suffered under Gough's command, and by the 10 September 
1917 Haig realised there was a problem, writing in his diary:  
 
General Kiggell reported that he is afraid that some of Gough's subordinates do not always tell 
Gough their true opinion as regards their ability to carry out an operation. I therefore decided to go 
tomorrow to see the GOC V Corps (General Fanshawe) with reference to the small attacks prepared 
for the 13th.259 
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Neill Malcolm, Gough's Major-General, General Staff, had recognised the problem shortly after 
Rycroft's removal in November 1916: 'I am afraid that Hubert is inspiring rather an atmosphere of 
fear in his subordinates, making them shy of expressing their opinions & perhaps forcing them into 
acts against their better judgement.'260 At the centre of the issue lay Gough's autocratic command 
style. This has been well covered in the literature and the evidence from the 32nd Division does not 
challenge this pervading view.261 There was a silver lining to this inquisitorial top-down approach; 
32nd Division were pushed into establishing in detail how they were using certain infantry support 
weapons.  
 
On 3 July 1916 Gough requested details on the use of Stokes mortars and urged their full use in the 
defence of the Leipzig Salient. DHQ got a reply from 14 Brigade the same day answering the Army 
Commander's request.262 Rycroft was not satisfied with the response thus bringing to his attention 
an area for immediate improvement.263 Similarly Gough saw that successful tactical employment of 
weapons like rifle grenades used in conjunction with bombing parties were inconsistently applied 
amongst his two corps. A memorandum forwarded through VIII and X corps, dated 8 July 1916, 
referenced the successful employment of rifle grenades in the capture of Mametz and Fricourt. The 
document went on to advocate firing over the heads of bombing parties to effect a 'barrage' of sorts, 
pre-empting by seven months the advice to use rifle grenades to 'open a hurricane bombardment on 
the point of resistance' distributed through SS 143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for 
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Offensive Action, 1917.264 Rycroft accepted the memorandum's recommendations adding the note 
on 9 July 1916: 'This must be exploited make sure rifle grenades are available + in hands of 
troops'.265 The realities of the Leipzig salient rendered this tactic impossible owing to a lack of 
accuracy and too great a range for the close quarters fighting. This information was passed back up 
to DHQ within four days of the recommendation in a note written by Captain L.W. Kentish, Brigade 
Major of 14 Brigade.266 DHQ took this feedback seriously; the note was read and initialled by the 
G.S.O. II Major A. Girdwood, G.S.O. I Lt-Col E.G. Wace and G.O.C. W. H. Rycroft himself. In the 
early days of Gough's command his hands-on style produced a flurry of reports and paperwork 
looking into what went wrong and how best to improve the situation in the Leipzig Salient. 
However flawed this may have been, at the most basic level it produced lessons. Yet it did so at the 
expense of the established command system, depriving subordinates of the autonomy to act 
independently by fostering an environment where orders could not be easily challenged. 
 
To summarise, it has been suggested by a number of authors that the Somme was a landmark 
moment in the development of the learning process of the BEF.267 The experiences of the 32nd 
Division do little to challenge those conclusions, but the Somme was not the start of it, the 
fundamental principles were already enshrined within the army. Those principles were not perfect, 
but the flaw lay mainly in their faulty employment rather than the core values themselves. The 
feedback system drew lessons up from the front lines although the type of content, reliability and 
accuracy of reports largely depended upon the context and service arm writing. They were subject 
to the frailty and idiosyncrasies of human interaction, this being exacerbated by the autocratic 
leadership style of Gough who must shoulder much of the blame for the failures after the first day. 
                                                 
264 Ibid., July 1916, S.G. 142/1938 July 1916; SS 143, Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, 
1917 (February, 1917) p.8 
265 Ibid., July 1916, 'S.G. 142/1938' July 1916.  
266 Ibid., July 1916, 'GI 8', 13 July 1916 
267 See Sheffield, Forgotten Victory (2005), The Somme (2003); Philpott, Bloody Victory (2009), Paddy Griffith, Battle 
Tactics on the Western Front (1994); Christopher Duffy, Through German Eyes: The British & The Somme 1916 
(London, Orion Books, 2006) 
 88 
Gough's micro-management did have a positive effect driving the integration and appreciation of 
new tactical methods. These would find their way into army-wide doctrine by February 1917 but 
prior to that formations were reflecting on their own and other's experiences and disseminating the 
lessons back down the chain of command through memoranda and lesson learnt reports. The 




Perfecting the System 
 
This chapter will show how the 32nd Division developed their command system and learning 
structure after their experiences in July 1916. It will cover two key areas: liaison with the French 
between 1916 and 1918 and the structural improvements made in the last two years of the war. It 
will be indicate that while liaison was far from perfect there is evidence that the British were willing 
to evaluate and learn from their allies. Furthermore in 1917 and 1918 the 32nd Division developed 
their doctrine, sought to improve training, and effectively decentralised command. Appraisal 
structures improved throughout 1917 but declined in late 1918 with a change in leadership and 
evolving battlefield conditions. 
 
3.1 Liaison with the French 1916-1918 
 
The issue of tactical liaison between the French and the British Armies has been generally 
overlooked in the historiography. The political, strategic and operational aspects of co-ordinating 
with the French have had far more coverage than the tactical level.268 This is in part owing to the 
relative paucity of source material and its unconnected, disparate spread across various low-level 
files. There has been some scattered analysis. William Philpott's Bloody Victory remarked of 
Britain's post-Somme codification of offensive methods: 'While rarely acknowledged, the new 
tactics owed much to France's methods, as well as to Germany's defensive tactics.'269 This position 
is supported in places by Paddy Griffith's Battle Tactics on the Western Front particularly in the 
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discussions relating to Leffargue's influence on British tactical thought.270 A complete study of 
Anglo-French liaison is impossible here, instead this section will offer some initial insights into the 
relationship at the tactical levels of the respective armies. The BEF and indeed the 32nd Division 
were not wholly opposed to learning from the experiences of their allies; the relationship would 
remain fractious and easily undermined by the difficulties of communicating via intermediary 
liaison officers. 
 
The contrasting fortunes of 1 July for the British and the French armies prompted analysis of the 
differing operational and tactical methods employed. The main driver for this was Captain Edward 
Spiers, the liaison officer for Rawlinson's Fourth Army attached to Marie-Émile Fayolle's Sixth 
Army, who on 2 July wrote a report dissecting the reasons for the French success.271 Spiers sent this 
report straight to Lt-Gen. Sir Launcelot Kiggell, Chief of the General Staff at GHQ who 
subsequently disseminated it down the chain of command to the brigade level. This all happened 
within four days and on 6 July it reached DHQ 32nd Division where it was passed around all three 
infantry brigades, the CRE and the CRA. By 8 July all five subordinate commanders in the 32nd 
Division had read it.272 The report itself reflected the greater emphasis the French Sixth Army had 
placed on methodical, overwhelming artillery preparation and counter-battery fire. The role of 
liaison between levels of command, successful mopping-up, and well-handled reserves were also 
regarded as pivotal to the success of the French.273 Many of these principles were already well 
accepted within the BEF and the major criticism that can be levelled at Spiers is the lack of detail 
beyond the general precepts that the report contained. For example Spiers wrote:  
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The value of the thorough bombardment of villages is exemplified by the example of the XXth 
Corps. They insisted on only bombarding the edges of CURLU, with the result that it was only taken 
in the evening and that out of a total casualty list of 700 for the Corps, 400 were suffered in the 
village.274 
 
This was hardly a revelation to the 32nd Division, or X Corps's artillery, who had expended 
significant resources attempting to subdue Thiepval during the preparatory bombardment phase.275 
The issue was one of artillery density and not simply sustained targeting. The report did provide 
some insights that did more than confirm existing lessons. The emphasis on counter-battery fire as 
the first of the French successes listed drew attention to what was a certain failing of the X Corps 
preliminary plan. The corps had devised a counter-battery plan for Z day but there were very limited 
resources assigned in the preparatory phase; the priority fell below that of harassing fire and wire 
cutting.276 The BEF on the Somme would gradually develop more refined counter-battery methods, 
although this document was only one of many sources arguing for its increased role.277 This was not 
the most important point taken out of the report by Rycroft. His annotations demonstrated that 
Spiers's report focused his thoughts on his own actions on 1 July: 'Our lifts were on experience 
strong [sic] much too quick.' The idea of the tempo and pace of the advance was evidently at the 
forefront of his mind; he underlined Spiers's observation that the French Sixth Army 'made itself 
especially felt in preventing a headlong advance...' The lesson on French liaison between formations 
and artillery would later find an echo in Rycroft's lesson learnt report of the 27 October 1916, and 
while this is hardly conclusive proof of an open exchange of ideas, what the report clearly did do 
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was promote reflection on important principles within the division.278 
 
In the winter of 1916/1917 there was an active attempt made to learn more about the French tactical 
methods. The 32nd Division, now in the V Corps and out of the line near Canaples, sent 27 officers; 
8 from each brigade plus the three Brigadier-Generals, to Corps HQ on 14 December 1916 to hear 
Major-General John Shea deliver a lecture entitled: 'French system of attack from trenches'. The 
content of the lecture has not survived but Shea commanded the 30th Division on the immediate left 
flank of the French on 1 July. The division achieved notable success through an effective 
preliminary bombardment, counter-battery fire and infantry waiting in advanced positions at 
zero.279 Shea was also present in a party of British officers who visited Chalons near Verdun in 
November 1916 and so was well placed to comment on their methods.280 It is unlikely that Shea's 
fundamental lessons differed significantly from Spiers's, in August he wrote to A.A. Montgomery, 
Major-General, General Staff Fourth Army, outlining that the tactical principles in attack were 
'battering of his trenches, shattering of his moral, the most detailed orders well understood, simple 
assembly, good direction, and a short distance over which to assault.'281 However, the focus of the 
British party that had visited the French line in winter had centred on the increasing specialisation 
of French platoons.282 It seems reasonable to suggest the infantry’s ability to get forward under its 
own fire-power would have formed an important strand of Shea’s talk to V Corps. Once again it is 
unlikely there was much disagreement with such commonly held principles; the difficulty was in 
the execution. The inter-allied co-operation was not limited to lectures. On 4 January 1917 Lt-Col 
Arthur McNamara, 32nd Division's GSO1, spent four days with the French Army at Verdun.283 
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Alistair Geddes has identified that a number of British officers wanted to see the tactical 
developments that were being mooted by Major-General Shea and others in the winter of 1916.284 It 
is likely that McNamara can be added to the list of officers sent to the French sector to see how their 
infantry companies were organised and employed. When this is considered alongside the doctrinal 
developments that were taking place at this time, such as the authoring of SS 143, it is clear that 
French tactics used in 1916 were highly influential upon the BEF’s development. 
 
This interest and co-ordination between the 32nd Division and the French would become important 
between February and June 1917. After launching a successful attack on Ten Tree Alley near Serre 
on the Somme on 10 February 1917 the 32nd Division was moved to the far right of the British line 
in the Domart - Le Quesnel sector. They were taking over from the French 29 Division d'Infanterie 
(DI). Rather than effect the relief in one swoop and endanger the line through unfamiliarity with the 
new positions and key defensive points, the 32nd Division first sent advance reconnoitring parties.285 
These generally went in 24 hours ahead of their units and were met by the commandant of 29 DI.286 
Furthermore, the relief was not carried out in one day. The 32nd Division's leading brigades initially 
went in under the command of the 29 DI for two days: 24-26 February. This gave 14 Brigade and 
96 Brigade an opportunity to familiarise themselves with the front line and its notable topographical 
features, strong-points as well as any existing defence schemes. The upshot was a hassle free 
extension of the British line southwards. Nevertheless, this was not done without complaint. 14 
Brigade noted in their war diary that the: 'Condition of trenches very bad.'287 These sentiments were 
shared by Austin Girdwood, at this time commanding 11/Borders, 97 Brigade, who wrote: 'We had 
a tricky time after taking over from the French. It was very wet + cold and the trenches were blown 
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to bits and full of mud.'288 Despite this, until the Germans began their withdrawal to the Hindenburg 
Line positions on 14 March 1917, the co-operation between the French left and British right 
operated in much the same fashion as an internal boundary line between formations. On 12 March 
1917 the divisional artillery co-operated with a French raid, firing 527 18 pdr shells and 210 rounds 
from the 4.5inch howitzers. A machine-gun barrage of the roads and communication lines also took 
place. Four days later orders were issued for the 32nd Division's artillery to co-operate with the 
neighbouring French 62 DI.289  
 
It did not always go as smoothly as 12 and 16 March. With the withdrawal under way and IV Corps 
in pursuit accidents occurred. On 20 March 1917, the 32nd Division received a 'Report that one of 
our cyclist patrols had been shot by a French patrol in DOUILLY'.290 This was the exception rather 
than the rule. Despite cancelling their co-ordinated attack on l'Épine de Dallon, originally scheduled 
for 1 April in tandem with the 32nd Division's attack on Savy, the French assisted with an artillery 
barrage and the establishment of liaison posts.291 Through a combination of liaison reports, aerial 
observation and unit to unit contact the co-ordination between the French and British during the 
German withdrawal remained strong.292 
 
The effective co-ordination between the 32nd Division and the various DI on the French left did not 
always go quite as smoothly later in the war. On 11 August 1918, the last day of the Battle of 
Amiens, a report was sent by Captain C.B. Falls to the Chief Liaison Officer of French First Army. 
The report criticised the 32nd Division for supposedly arranging an attack on the German positions 
at Damery at 7am which did not go in until 9.30am; delays which led the neighbouring 126 DI to 
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suffer significant casualties from shellfire after holding their first objective positions for two hours 
in their co-ordinated attack.293 This report found its way onto the desk of A.A. Montgomery, CGS 
Fourth Army the following day and he immediately wrote to 32nd Division's Commander, Major-
General Thomas Stanton Lambert. The letter highlights Montgomery's tactful and diplomatic 
approach to the issue. He recognised the potential political problems that could be caused if Falls's 
accusations proved to have foundation, so rather than handle it using official channels he kept it 
hidden from Rawlinson and instead attempted to rectify the situation himself. The letter is worth 
quoting at length: 
 
If correct this report is disquieting, as such failure in liaison between the flank Divn of our army + 
the French will cause hard feeling. 
Could you enquire into it + find out why the French were not informed that your attack was 
postponed. 
If the fault did lie with your staff could you go personally + see the French about it. 
I have not said anything about it to army commander, but I know he will be very upset if the liaison 
is not good + the French have cause for complaint for any failure on our part.294 
 
Despite this secretive approach, Lambert ended up discussing the issue with Rawlinson on the 
morning of 13 August where the events were explained. In addition to this discussion Lambert 
wrote to Montgomery later that day: 
 
I was as much distressed as any one could be when I heard that it was thought by Genl. MATHIEU 
that there had been any failure as a result of lack of proper liaison, especially as I have been in action 
so many times now alongside the French Army, though I have not met Genl. MATHIEU personally. 
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The facts however are not at all as stated by FALLS. I enclose a statement of what occurred.295 
 
The accompanying report gave a full and frank account of events relating to the liaison. In planning 
the attack on 11 August, Lambert indicated he expected the zero for the next day's attacks on 
Damery and Parvillers to be between 8am and 9am. Initial discussions with the 32nd Division's 
brigadiers led to an earlier 4.20am start time being set and sent out in 'Operation Order 189'. Owing 
to delays it was found to be impossible for 14 and 97 Brigades to be in position and ready to launch 
the attack at the original start time. Owing to a change in the location of the French 129 DI's HQ 
neither the original 'Operation Order No.189' nor the news that the start time was to be delayed 
reached them before they had issued their own orders. The French orders made no mention of their 
action being in anyway contingent upon those of the 32nd Division.296 Lambert argued that their 
start time of 5am was likely based on his verbal communication that the 32nd Division's attack 
would be delivered between 8am and 9am. At the heart of the problem lay the issue of what 
indication Lambert gave before the orders were published, and this was never recorded. 
Nevertheless the surviving documentation, the 'Operation Order No 189' and the French 'Ordre 
Particulier No 8/OP' and '9/OP' do support Lambert's version over Falls's. What is more certain is 
that Falls was unaware of the heavy fighting the 32nd Division were engaged in on 11 August. His 
letter called into question the determination of the 32nd to carry out its attack.297 Lambert rightly 
pointed out the heavy casualties 14 and 97 Brigades had sustained and that he had effectively 
committed his remaining force to improve the position at the front.298 Lambert was understandably 
aggrieved: 
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After you have read what I have written I hope you will agree that FALLS owes an explanation to 
my Division. No one has seen this correspondence but McNAMARA and myself. No one else need 
see what he writes, but I cannot think that it is the duty of a liaison officer to allow such ideas to get 
into the head of a French Commander (and apparently almost to encourage them) behind my back.299 
 
The 32nd Division's GOC concluded his letter by informing Montgomery that he had visited General 
Mathieu and explained his side of events. Beyond this letter there was no further correspondence 
preserved.  
 
The incident demonstrates that liaison even in 1918 was a fractious and difficult task. What was 
perhaps an honest mistake or miscommunication had ramifications that prompted Montgomery and 
Lambert to bury the paperwork relating to the event. Rawlinson was evidently brought into the loop 
in a conference but the issue itself was handled between Montgomery, Lambert and Mathieu. The 
file containing the letters depicting the event had a note on the front: 'Private correspondence to be 
kept in case the subject should ever crop up again – Not to be referred to in any history unless 
absolutely necessary. TSL.'300 There were clearly some matters that were knowingly withheld from 
the historical record by their omission from the war diaries, and no hint of this breakdown in liaison 
can be found in any of the 32nd Division’s official documents held at the National Archives. Did this 
weaken the system of appraisal? In this instance it is difficult to see how open discussion would 
have benefited anyone. A French General casting doubts upon the sacrifices made by a British 
division and a liaison officer who was, perhaps unknowingly, overstepping his remit would have 
only increased the already uneasy working relationship. Despite this temporary breakdown, liaison 
was generally functional, but mutual suspicion existed within the two armies well into the last year 
of the war. Tactical appraisal of French methods certainly occurred, and brought with it some 
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significant benefits, yet this was generally a complementary influence that reinforced existing 
British lines of thought. The liaison in 1917 worked effectively during a period of rapid forward 
movement, but it was a fragile system which could easily be strained by fratricide or a single officer 
with the wrong idea. 
 
3.2 Divisional Structure and Learning in 1917 and 1918 
 
After 1916 change in the divisional command and learning structure was one of refinement not 
overhaul. The principles of decentralisation to the man-on-the-spot had been right in theory but 
poorly implemented in practice. 1917 would mark a significant improvement in this respect. A large 
part of this improvement can be attributed to new personnel who were more willing to make 
decisions when necessary.301 Artillery which had hitherto focused on destructive bombardments, 
wire-cutting and interdiction greatly improved its counter-battery focus.302 The challenges of 
positional and semi-open warfare in 1918 placed strains upon the system, but ultimately it held 
together. This section will first look at the doctrinal changes that occurred in the winter of 
1916/1917 and assess how well these were implemented, while considering the issue of training 
alongside it, before looking more broadly at whether the decentralised command system was 
improved. The effects of structural change in 1917 and 1918 will be assessed, after which the 
artillery's improvements and the feedback system's refinement will be scrutinised. 
 
Doctrine and Training 
 
In December 1916 SS 135 was published and disseminated throughout the BEF. This later went 
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through one amendment in August 1917 and two significant re-writes in January 1918 and 
November 1918. As has already been shown in the previous chapter, many of the lessons inculcated 
in SS 135 were already being advocated by the formations on the ground. Nevertheless it is worth 
looking at the evolution of this document as evidence of the BEF incorporating the non-canonical 
lessons from the front into its broader doctrine. As stated earlier, the more prescriptive doctrine 
published in the form of manuals and pamphlets was not intended to supersede FSR I, rather it gave 
more firmly prescriptive guidelines on how best to prepare and train a division for offensive action. 
That the essence of FSR I was preserved can be seen in the guidelines given for the employment of 
reserves: 
 
The man on the spot is the best man to judge when the situation is favourable for pushing on, and 
higher Commanders in rear must be prepared to support the man on the spot to the fullest extent by 
adjusting the movements of the Artillery barrage and bombardment and by continually pushing 
forward Reserves.303 
 
Furthermore, the manual went on to address the rushed renewal of offensives which had little 
chance of succeeding without adequate preparation; a major issue on the Somme: 
 
In the case of a total failure, where pressure from the flanks has failed to improve the situation, it is a 
waste of men to put in fresh troops, hurriedly, to make another assault without any further Artillery 
preparation, or to attempt a second attack with troops who have already failed. Where an attack has 
failed after the most careful preparations have been made, it is not reasonable to expect that a second 
attack launched without any further preparation is likely to succeed.304 
 
The ill-co-ordinated attacks such as those conducted by the 16/LF on Thiepval on 1 July were now 
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opposed in doctrine. Where there was partial success the manual emphasised reinforcement and 
attacking on the flanks.305 This advice remained in place throughout the various war-time iterations 
of SS 135 and was highlighted in the Kirke Report in 1932.306 Another key area where British 
doctrine rapidly caught up with practice was on the issue of infantry-artillery liaison. Brigadier-
General Jardine's method of the infantry waiting closely behind the curtain of shell fire became a 
tenet for the BEF: 
 
Success in recent operations has been due, more than to anything else, to the Infantry keeping close 
up to the Artillery barrage, and entering the enemy's trenches immediately the barrage lifts from 
these trenches, and before the hostile garrison have time to man their defences.307 
 
This policy suited 1917; 'the zenith of destruction' as Jonathan Bailey memorably described it.308 
Nevertheless at the end of the year the section was expanded to add greater emphasis on the 
infantry's ability to progress using its own fire-power: 
 
It can never be possible to guarantee that every machine gun emplacement shall have been destroyed 
prior to the assault, however thorough the work of reconnaissance may have been, and however 
accurate the artillery fire. 
 At the same time, the barrage may fail, and the infantry must at once resort to their own 
weapons to continue the attack.309 
 
This advice tallied well with the increasingly sophisticated guidance being given to commanders at 
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the lowest tactical levels. As shown in the Somme case study, the BEF were making concerted 
efforts to incorporate and utilise new forms of infantry fire-power. Rifle grenades, Stokes mortars 
and Lewis guns were seen even in 1916 as pivotal to the infantry's ability to push on against an 
entrenched enemy. This was increasingly enshrined in doctrine. SS 143 Instructions for the Training 
of Platoons for Offensive Action, 1917, published in February 1917, reorganised infantry sections 
into rifle, bomb, Lewis gun and rifle grenade specialisms reflecting the added fire power available 
to the infantry.310 
 
It has been shown that the recognition of the utility of the bomb, Lewis gun and rifle grenade pre-
dated 1917, but when it came to the actual implementation of the new organisation within the 32nd 
Division there was a significant delay. The manual was published and distributed on 7 February 
1917 but it would be 21 April before the 32nd Division had a chance to fully implement it across 
their three brigades.311 The division's involvement in renewed attacks on the Somme in early 
February, line holding in late February and in the pursuit of the German withdrawal to the 
Hindenburg Line gave them little time to switch to the new organisation. The division did attempt to 
bring in aspects that did not require a period out of the line to train new specialists. The new attack 
formation was laid down in a divisional order on 26 February along with instructions that it was 'to 
be practised by companies, and by Battalions, and thoroughly understood by all officers and 
N.C.Os.'312 Thus, when it was implemented differed between brigades. In 14 Brigade, 5/6/R.Scots's 
records suggest that they began at least preparing for the process of reorganisation once they were 
relieved on 6 April 1917. Three days of training followed on 9, 10, and 11 April. During this time 
the battalion focused on the training of specialists, close order drill under platoon commanders and 
conducted a practice attack.313 On 23 April, 5/6/R.Scots began a further period of training focusing 
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on the organisation of companies, platoon drill and 'standard form of attack'. The training of 
specialists was also continued.314 This latter period was specifically earmarked by the division to 
implement SS 143's prescribed organisation. The divisional order instructing the collective training 
of specialists in line with the manual's principles was sent on 18 April 1917.315 14 Brigade's war 
diary confirms this was carried out: 'The [training] scheme adopted insured that all ranks were with 
their Coys until 11am when specialist training commenced. Units had to reorganise and train in 
accordance with O.B. 1919'316 The other two brigades also implemented the new organisation at the 
end of April with 96 Brigade beginning on 23 April and 97 Brigade starting their training period on 
20 April.317 It is easy to see doctrine like the SS pamphlets as marking immediate watershed points 
when processes were changed, but in practice this was not wholly accurate. It took nearly two 
months for the 32nd Division to implement the new platoon structure in its entirety. Specialists 
needed training and enough time had to be found to suitably equip and practice in the new 
organisation. The new attack formations were distributed sooner and would play a part in the 
capture of the guns near Francilly-Selency by 2/Manchesters on 2 April 1917.318 That the 
implementation was delayed testifies to the division's heavy involvement in operations in early 
1917, but also that central doctrine was implemented on the ground. It took time but it did shape 
operations. 
 
Training was a central component of implementing doctrine, so it is worth looking at what the 
division focused on when it trained. Despite manuals like SS 135 and SS 143 promoting new 
methods and tactical approaches the fundamental principles of training remained generally 
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TNA, WO 95/2392 2 Battalion Manchester Regiment, Appendices 
317 TNA, WO 95/2395 96 Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 20 April 1917; WO 95/2399 97 Brigade Headquarters, 23 
April 1917 
318 TNA, WO 95/2392 2 Battalion The Manchester Regiment, 'Handwritten Report', p.2 The report gives details of 
rushes and flanking movements entirely consistent with SS 143, Instructions for the Training of Platoons for 
Offensive Action, 1917 (February, 1917) pp.8-9 
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consistent. The 32nd Division and its brigades have left a record of a number of their training 
schemes, conference discussions and memoranda. From these it is possible to see certain changes 
and consistencies. Training altered at key moments to address the operational changes but the 
building blocks upon which these changes were made remained fundamentally the same. The pre-
war principles along which training was organised were laid down in Infantry Training, 1914. The 
general principles laid out in this manual can be split into three different parts: 
 
i. The development of the soldierly spirit. 
ii. The training of the body. 
iii. Training in the use of rifle, bayonet and spade.319 
 
By developing the 'soldierly spirit' the British Army could rely on its troops to be able to 'bear 
fatigue, privation, and danger cheerfully'.320 It was also expected to 'imbue him with a sense of 
honour; to give him confidence in his superiors and comrades; to increase his powers of initiative, 
of self-confidence, and of self-restraint.'321 It was pointless developing these alone, so pre-war 
doctrine demanded that physical training be conducted to 'develop in the soldier a capacity for 
resisting fatigue and privation.' In much the same fashion as FSR I, it is easy to see this as 
supporting Travers's idea of the 'psychological battlefield' yet the importance of fire-power 
remained as integrally tied to the soldierly spirit and physical capacity as in other military manuals: 
 
The soldier should be made to understand at all periods of his training how the various parts of his 
course of instruction fit him for his duties in war. In particular, the close connection between 
musketry and manoeuvre must be emphasised.322 
 
                                                 
319 General Staff, Infantry Training, 1914 (4-Company Organization) (London, HMSO, 1914) p.1 
320 Ibid., p.2 
321 Ibid., p.2 
322 Ibid., p.3 
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This was greatly developed later in the manual where fire control discipline and formations were 
discussed.323 These basic principles of training emphasising mind, body and skill were fleshed out 
through practical discussion of how training was overseen in peace and in war. The latter half of the 
manual covers a number of the principles required in war, very much akin to FSR I's approach. In 
the first half of the manual the process of splitting the year between individual and collective 
training was set forth.324 Upon the outbreak of war circumstances demanded that this be replaced by 
a rapid system of training over ten weeks that developed basic skills and building up towards unit 
and formation training.325 This still reflected the fundamental split between the individual and the 
collective but in a much more condensed time frame. The dual approach would be the basis for 
much of the divisional training between 1916 and 1918 in 32nd Division, although the distinction 
became blurred. During the April 1917 training period that implemented the SS 143 organisation, a 
period of intense collective training, an hour and a half each morning was spent developing 
individual skills either through physical training, musketry or bayonet fighting.326 In terms of 
collective training a far greater emphasis on tactical understanding was made. In 1916 tactical 
schemes were used to test officers on their tactical understanding.327 These continued to be an 
important method of tactical development but in 1917 a greater emphasis was placed on confronting 
officers with unexpected situations.328 With the BEF switching to a defensive stance in the winter of 
1917-1918 the 32nd Division found itself having to rapidly familiarise itself with defensive methods. 
DHQ laid out the principles that the formation was to train along: interlocking strong-points, 
defence-in-depth, no retirement under any circumstances from strong-points, and local counter-
                                                 
323 Ibid., pp.122-130 
324 Ibid., pp.7-8 
325 Peter Simkins, Kitchener's Army: The Raising and Training of the New Armies, 1914-1916 (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1988) p.296 
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327 TNA, WO 95/2368 32nd Div. General Staff, 6 September 1916 
328 TNA, WO 95/2397 2nd Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 24 April 1917; WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, 
July 1917, 'Notes on a Conference Held at 32nd Division Headquarters on 27th, July 1917', Appendix 35 
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attacks once the enemy had been checked.329 The lack of understanding of ‘elastic defence in depth’ 
will be covered later, but here it is worthwhile noting that tactical training was closely mirroring the 
operational realities the army found itself in, and as a result increased in significance. 
 
Despite more closely defined tactical advice as the conduct of the war evolved, the fundamental 
principles were never truly eclipsed. In January 1918, the 32nd Division commander, Major-General 
Cameron Shute, sent a training memorandum to his brigades. It read:  
 
On different parts of the front, officers and men have latterly in some cases failed to grasp the 
enormous stopping power of the Rifle and the Machine Gun in the hands of determined men. 
Positions have been abandoned and the garrisons have surrendered when they could perfectly well 
have held out till relieved by the counter-attack. 
 The traditions and exploits of British Infantry must be explained to all ranks. 
 It is want of confidence in themselves and in their weapons – not want of courage – which is 
the trouble.330 
 
The idea that tradition and 'soldierly spirit' would bolster the fighting performance of the men in 
battle was never discarded; it remained a core principle in doctrine and practice.331 The building 
blocks of the training system for the 32nd Division were the three general principles as laid out in 
Infantry Training, 1914. These did not remain in isolation. In the same fashion as FSR I's principles, 
they were built upon using the practical experience of combat. As the tactics, weaponry and 
operational conditions changed so too did the aspects stressed in training. After the experiences on 
the Somme in 1916 the 32nd Division established a temporary divisional training 'school' at Ferfay 
                                                 
329 TNA, WO 95/2371 32nd Div. General Staff, January 1918, 'Defensive Training' 
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providing courses of instruction for men and officers away from their units.332 This was one method 
of circumventing the lack of time to train when the formation was required to do front line duty. The 
courses varied but 'musketry' and 'physical training + bayonet fighting' were regular, short duration 
options. In addition to these: Lewis gunnery, cookery, bombing, Stokes mortars, anti-gas, sniping, 
field engineering and an 'Officers [sic] Course, General Instruction' were available.333  
 
The mix of specialist and practical tutelage reflected an increasing need to make training more 
practical and tailored to the weapons that were being used. It is difficult to track what specific 
guidance was given on these 32nd Division courses but surviving field pocket books of soldiers 
suggests mnemonics played a large role in the more technical courses of instruction. Clifford Platt, 
19/LF was taught fire-control with the mnemonic ROARS:- 'Range (always first), Object, Aim 
(point of), Rounds (number of), Speed (rapid or “fire”)'334 Similar methods were used outside of the 
32nd Division, Captain G. A. Potts (11/LF, 75 Brigade, 25 Division) used a lettering system to 
remember key concepts 'Appreciation of the Situation' under initials: OMFWRITECP he had object, 
orders, military situation, factors bearing on the situation, weather – ground; rivers roads affected, 
Relative strength – guns, machine guns, rifles, initiative, and information including sources and 
what is not known, terrain and time of year; crops and open or closed country, enemy object, 
courses available, and plan.335 While it lacked the punch of ROARS it was a similar method of 
remembering key pieces of information. For other technical courses such as the Lewis gun or 
musketry the weight of the gun (both loaded and empty) were given as well as the sustained fire 
                                                 
332 School is how DHQ described it, but it is a confusing term. While DHQ set-up the training area along the lines of a 
school they differed significantly in one key respect: GHQ, Army or Corps schools ran through active operations 
while divisional areas closed once the formation moved. They ran classes/courses of instruction which generally 
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333 TNA, WO 95/2368 32nd Div. General Staff, 22 July 1916 – 14 October 1916; see particularly: 12, 14 and 20 
September 1916 
334 IWM, 78/62/1, Lt C. L. Platt, Pocket Book, July 1915 
335 IWM, 94/23/1, Captain G.A. Potts, Pocket Book, 13 November 1917 
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capabilities, field of fire at 1000 yards, and most effective employment.336 The courses set had an 
overall outcome. For the musketry course the aim was to 'make a war shot' which required 
obedience to fire orders, without reloading, fire at all set targets and kill on command, all done at 
the range of 350 yards.337 This was a sensible system that melded practical and technical 
experience, while the setting of a desired outcome gave the training a defined benchmark for 
success or failure. At the other end of the spectrum were courses such as the visual observation 
course. The programme of tuition has survived for 11-17 January 1918 course, and was constructed 
in a sensible fashion blending lectures and practical experience. It began with an introductory 
lecture on observation, with lectures later on the first day covering telescopes and protractors. This 
was broken up by two hours practice in the construction of observation posts. As the course 
continued the range of skills were broadened bringing in lectures on taking bearings, the use of the 
prismatic compass, report writing, map making and contours. These were coupled with practical 
exercises on testing and using compasses, night work, sketching maps, and observation practice. 
The course was concluded with a revision lecture and a final observation practice.338 This sensible 
mix of practical and theoretical helped to avoid boredom which was increasingly becoming a 
concern. In February 1918 the detailed report on a raid carried out on the night of the 18th/19th 
February south of the Houthulst Forest concluded: 'In the above connection it may be mentioned 
that drill and practice out of the line for attacks is apt to be overdone and that men get stale and their 
enthusiasm wanes if kept waiting too long for the day.'339 While the specific effects of anticipation 
and planning were different the fears stemmed from the same problem of apathy towards training. 
Courses and preparation needed to be engaging lest they fail to bring about any noticeable 
improvements. Nonetheless, the amount of training that needed to be done meant some courses 
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would not be a success. 
 
The results of these training courses were not always as positive as would have been hoped for by 
DHQ. James Murray, an instructor for the HLI reserve units who would later serve with 17 and 
15/HLI in 32nd Division, wrote after the war: 'Many a time, after I became an instructor, I was 
greatly puzzled at how difficult it was to teach seemingly intelligent men.'340 He was not overly 
impressed by the quality of marksmanship on the Western Front either. When discussing the reason 
he never used his talents in the front line he commented that fire-orders had to be given otherwise 
positions were given away, but he suspected an ulterior motive: 
 
There was a great deal of truth in the reason proffered, but my own conclusion is the authorities 
knew ammunition would only have been wasted. The vast majority of men could not have hit a barn 
door at fifty yards, far less hit a man.341 
 
The issue of musketry was raised in a divisional conference in January 1918, suggesting Murray's 
conclusions probably had some merit:  
 
Musketry. Men must have confidence in their rifles not only at 50 or 100 but at 400 yards. 
 
Men must be taught Rapid Fire. 
 
Men must realise the power of the rifle and that a few determined men can hold up any attack. 
 
The first duty of a soldier is to shoot at a target that he can see, and not call for Vickers and Lewis 
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341 Ibid., p.150 
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Guns that have their allotted tasks.342 
 
This problem had deeper origins. On 20 July 1917 DHQ sent a memorandum out to all brigades 
pushing for better musketry results. Tedium was a significant enemy: 'During all musketry 
instruction whether it takes place on the range or parade ground the mens [sic] interest must be 
stimulated.'343 The memo went on to discuss basic principles and set a standard of expectation for 
the division: 'a good shot can kill a man at 1,000 yards a fair shot at 500 yards.'344 The solution to 
boredom was imagination and competition, in January 1918 DHQ recommended: 'Training must be 
made more interesting. More imagination and enterprise required. Construction of Strong Points in 
the snow. Snow-ball battles.'345 Additionally platoon competitions were practised.346 The idea of 
competition as a means of motivation has been considered more fully, and in its most extreme form, 
in chapter six. 
 
Irrespective of the success or failure of musketry standards, marksmanship, physical drill and 
bayonet use remained core components of divisional training throughout the war. They were no 
longer the central aspect, as the war progressed so too did the methods. Specialisms gained greater 
prominence, especially after April 1917 while the practical aspects of training took on a far larger 
role than the moral based principles that existed pre-war. Doctrine in the BEF between 1916 and 
1918 filled the gap between practised methods tested on the ground by experience and standardised 
methods to be employed across the Army. These often took time to implement owing to practical 
factors but they show the BEF to be an organisation that reacted to the experience of its soldiers. 
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Training followed a similar pattern to doctrine in that it was initially drawn along principled lines 
which were developed throughout the war to incorporate new methods. Moral aspects retained their 
importance throughout the war but were supplemented by increased emphasis on tactics and 
specialisms in both a collective and individual sense. The overall effectiveness of training is 
difficult to discern but the evidence suggests that the 32nd Division's musketry never hit the 
expected level required by its commanders. Training courses were sensibly constructed, while 
officers employed a number of intelligent methods of learning the materials both inside and outside 
of 32nd Division. The issue of boredom remained a concern, but there was an increasing emphasis 
on finding imaginative and interesting methods to puncture it. Overall, doctrine and training fits 
broadly into the wider pattern of doctrine and organisation. Pre-war principles remained at the heart 
of recommendations but as lessons were learnt new, more prescriptive aspects were taught 
alongside the core ideals. 
 
Improvements in Decentralisation 
 
The command system on 1 July 1916 was paralysed by the inability of the senior commanders to 
make a timely decision in a dispassionate fashion. Swayed by the opinions of Brigadier-General 
Yatman, and the scraps of supporting evidence, repeat assaults were attempted that stood little 
chance of success. A few isolated commanders felt comfortable exercising their initiative and 
altering pre-set plans but on the whole most did what they could within the boundaries of the orders 
received. Under Gough the 32nd Division was subjected to a commander of a completely different 
disposition. Rawlinson's delegation was replaced by Gough's micro-management, which led Lt-Col 
E.G. Wace, GSO1, to conclude 'Rycroft did not in effect command the 32nd Div that day!' He was 
referring to the 32nd Division's attack on the Munich and Frankfort trenches on 18 November 1916, 
which was conducted using all four battalions of 97 Brigade. The principle of delegation to the 
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man-on-the-spot evaporated for the 32nd Division under Gough. Some gains were made but the 
attack ended in the costly isolation of British troops in advanced positions in the German lines cut 
off from supply and rescue.347 Brigadier-General Jardine was under no illusions what had led to the 
failure to achieve at least one of the objectives set: 'I am of opinion [sic] that the important objective 
of the 2nd K.O.Y.L.I. Would have been taken and held had I possessed a reserve in BEAUCOURT 
trench, but my orders were to put my whole Brigade into the attack.'348 After the failure of 18 
November the leadership of the division was gutted: Major-General Rycroft was removed and 
replaced by Major-General R.W.R. Barnes on 21 November, Brigadier-General Compton 14 
Infantry Brigade was transferred to 111 Infantry Brigade, being replaced by Brigadier-General 
Seymour on 22 November 1916; Brigadier-General Yatman was relieved of his command on 24 
November being replaced by Lt-Col A.E. Glasgow (8/R Sussex) and E.G. Wace was replaced as 
GSO1 on 27 November 1916 by Lt-Col A.E.McNamara (Queen's), formerly GSO2 9th Division. 
Glasgow's appointment was temporary and on 4 December 1917 he was replaced by Brigadier-
General L.F. Ashburner, while Major-General Barnes returned to Britain sick to be replaced by 
Major-General C.D. Shute on 19 February 1917.349 It was an inauspicious end to what had been an 
annus horribilis for the 32nd Division, but in spite of the wholesale changes the division did make 
significant improvements in which decentralised command played an increasingly important role. 
 
It is not necessary to go through each engagement that the 32nd Division undertook after the 
personnel changes, but there were a number of occasions that demonstrate the increased ability of 
the 32nd Division to handle and utilise the decentralised command structure. When the German 
MarineKorps Flandern launched the spoiling attack, Operation Strandfest, near Nieuport on 10 July 
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1917 97 Brigade came under heavy attack. The artillery fire and sandy terrain meant that 
communications were quickly severed. Rather than attempt to control the flow of battle directly 
authority quickly passed down the chain of command. Shute delegated command over the use of 
one battalion of the division's reserve brigade to 97 Brigade's Brigadier-General Cyril Aubrey 
Blacklock.350 He called upon this reserve but actions in the front line were largely being co-
ordinated by Lt-Col Girdwood, CO 11/Borders. It was Girdwood who heard first at 7.45pm that the 
Germans had launched an attack. Rather than delay and gain confirmation from brigade he 
immediately ordered two companies of 17/HLI who had been sent up in support earlier to prepare a 
counter-attack.351 The 11/Borders launched local counter-attacks with some initial success but they 
were steadily driven back to the third line positions thereafter. Meanwhile the third company of 
17/HLI was delayed moving up to the front but once it arrived attacks were made through the night 
until the 11/Borders had regained the second line.352 The 32nd Division 'Report on the Operations' 
reserved special praise for the actions of Girdwood and his troops:  
 
The troops which carried out this attack had been exposed to intense shell fire all day. The 
reinforcing company had lost over half its numbers in moving up through the enemy's barrage, and 
the organisation of a counter-attack in the turmoil of the bombardment and necessary confusion of 
the battle was not easy. 
 
Despite these conditions the troops advanced from NASAL TRENCH [third line] towards NOSE 
SUPPORT [second line] with great determination and considerable skill. They advanced 
methodically under their own covering fire, and the enemy encountered between NOSE SUPPORT 
                                                 
350 This is covered in greater detail in chapter six. For delegation down to brigade see TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. 
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96th & 97th Bdes. The battalion in question, from the division’s reserve brigade, was the 16/NF. 
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and NASAL TRENCH fell back before them carrying their wounded away with them.353 
 
The battalion managed to hold the third line, Nasal Trench, but could only establish posts in the 
second line.354 The actions were a marked contrast to 1 July 1916. With only a defence scheme to 
guide his actions Girdwood managed to co-ordinate a number of counter-attacks that stabilised an 
incredibly difficult situation. The use of covering fire from Lewis guns and Stokes mortars allowed 
the infantry of the 11/Borders and later the 17/HLI to advance using their own fire-power. The 
doctrine of SS 143 was being put into practice. 
 
The improving trend towards decentralisation would continue into 1918. At 2 am on 3 April 1918 
two battalions of 14 Brigade and one of 96 Brigade launched an attack on the village of Ayette 
south of Arras. At zero the 31st and 34th Division's artillery, under the command of Brigadier-
General J.A. Tyler - 32nd Division CRA, fired a 'slow' creeping barrage on the village of Ayette.355 
There was no preparatory bombardment; the maintenance of surprise was considered vital. 
Meanwhile the heavy artillery of both IV Corps and VI Corps co-operated, bombarding the rear 
areas for the duration of the attack with both HE and gas. Additionally machine gun barrages were 
organised. At zero the attacking companies swept through the village while the rear waves 'mopped 
up'. The attack on the village was a complete success. Ayette was garrisoned by a battalion of 
German infantry and a machine gun company and it had been captured by 5 Companies with an 
average strength of 85 men. The success came at the cost of 126 men but it paled in comparison to 
the German losses which were approximately triple that total.356 Many of the Germans were 
initially caught unprepared in their cellars and dug-outs, but quickly rallied to provide significant 
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resistance in places. At two levels the brigade played a key role in the organisation and conduct of 
the attack. Primarily the job of co-ordinating the preparations fell on Brigadier-Generals F.W. 
Lumsden V.C., commanding 14 Brigade and A.C. Girdwood, commanding 96 Brigade.357 As 
15/HLI's war diary made clear: 'The arrangements for artillery and M.G. Support were most 
carefully made by 14th Inf Bde and these arrangements made known to all ranks.'358 Moreover, 
Lumsden consulted Lt-Col V.B. Ramsden commanding 15/HLI who had a significant say in the 
methods employed on the day.359 On the ground the troops also exercised considerable initiative. 
When a machine gun held up the final consolidation of the village, 15/HLI committed their reserve 
company and with the extra weight of fire were able to flank and rush the position.360 The role the 
junior officers and NCOs played in the battle was highlighted by both Lumsden and Shute in their 
reports: 
 
The success of the operation was, in my opinion, entirely due to the dash, determination and fine 
fighting qualities displayed by the three attacking Companies of the 15th H.L.I., and especially to the 
way in which the leading platoons of these Companies carried out the role allotted them, namely to 
push right on to the final objective, close under the barrage, dealing only with machine guns or 
enemy posts directly obstructing their advance, and leaving all mopping up to be carried out by the 
rear platoons.361 
 
This was a classic example of 'infiltration' tactics. It is not just the tactical sophistication that is 
worthy of remark. The lower level leaders on the ground proved able to handle unexpected 
complications in a rapid and successful fashion. The quality of leadership by officers is alluded to in 
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the account of Captain J.G. Stephen who recalled the Ayette attack after the war: 
 
On his return [from Brigade] Colonel Ramsden reported this interview [with Lumsden] in detail at a 
meeting of all his officers and invited suggestions starting with the most junior officer who proposed 
2.15am as zero hour as he had never heard of an attack starting near that time, and it seemed to be 
about the greatest difficulty in keeping alert and therefore the best time to effect surprise. Also the 
light that morning would have been very suitable at that hour. This met with universal approval.362 
 
While the accuracy of the source can be brought into question, the consultative process depicted is 
suggestive of the greater degree of competence found at the lower levels by 1918. Irrespective of 
whether Stephen gave the junior officers too much credit for coming up with the planning ideas, the 
very act of remembering demonstrates the greater confidence in their capabilities at this stage of the 
war.  
 
It would be too easy to depict this development as the cause of the more consistent successes, but 
1918 saw a general decline in quality at these lower levels as the attrition of the Hundred Days took 
hold.363 Nonetheless consultation became a method of encouraging good practices and promoting 
initiative among the junior officers and NCOs. After the 32nd Division was engaged in the last two 
days of the Battle of Amiens and later in subsequent Fourth Army operations near Péronne and 
Mont St.Quentin, Major-General Lambert, then commanding the division after Shute's promotion to 
V Corps, reflected upon the lessons learnt: 
 
The greatest service that junior Officers and N.C.Os. can give is to be constantly on the look-out for 
chances of pushing on, of marking down enemy Machine Guns, etc, of rounding them up and of 
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putting forward suggestions for future action or for improving their position. We want to avoid “set-
piece” attacks with barrages, or at least to keep them till we have definitely located a really strong 
line of resistance, something beyond a few Machine guns and a few hundred infantry.364 
 
Decentralisation had reached a point where subordinates felt involved with the decision making 
process. The pre-war ideal of fulfilling the obligation and duty of the order only in the 
circumstances where it was actually applicable and correct to do so were being realised. The decline 
in troop quality in 1918 did pose a problem at the tactical level, which was addressed in lesson 
learnt reports. Yet even with this decline, in the final major engagement of the war 96 Brigade was 
content to radically change its orders to cross the Sambre-Oise canal using the neighbouring 14 
Brigade's bridges instead of attempting to force the crossing at a much greater cost of life.365 It is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that a core part of the problem with the command system in 1916 
was the personnel. Decentralisation of command and control when used later in the war was much 
more effective. Even as the quality of troops declined in summer-autumn 1918 the inclusiveness 
and consultation made the likelihood of subordinates exercising their initiative far greater. 
 
Structure and Assessment 
 
This final section will look at how the 32nd Division attempted to improve its feedback procedures 
and adapted to structural issues. The division proved to be able to rapidly adjust its structure in a 
limited manner without too much disruption, yet when larger reorganisations occurred problems did 
arise. The feedback system remained largely intact and subject to the same problems as in 1916. 
Nonetheless, measures were taken to furnish more accurate specific information and the calibre of 
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analysis saw a marked improvement in the subsequent years. 
 
In April 1917 the 32nd Division were without a Pioneer battalion. 17/NF were railway specialists 
created out of volunteers from the North-Eastern Railway and as part of a stuttering trend towards a 
more rational approach to labour allocation they became a Railway Construction Battalion in 
October 1916. They were briefly replaced by the 1/12 Loyals between November 1916 and January 
1917 but by the time the German withdrawal occurred in mid-March the division was faced by an 
advance over desolated terrain and no pioneer battalion to handle any of the repairs. The solution 
reached by division was the creation of a 'Labour Company' for each infantry brigade. DHQ laid out 
specific criteria for the furnishing of these companies: 
 
The Officers chosen should be Officers who have shewn little aptitude in a fight, but must be capable 
of commanding the Company and superintending work.  
 The men selected should be those who for one cause of another are no use in the front line, 
and who would welcome employment further back. 
 These men will be made to understand that any failure on their part  to work hard will entail 
their returning to the front line.366 
 
This was a sensible move responding to a deficiency in capability by withdrawing the worst men 
from the front lines. The rationale was clearly stated to all three brigades and the CRE: 
 
In order to economise the energies of the fighting troops and to save Brigades as much as possible 
from being required to detail large working parties from their best fighting men, it has been decided 
to form a Labour Company in each Brigade composed of men of little value in the front line.367 
 
                                                 
366 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, April 1917, 'G.S. 939/0/5' Appendix 23 
367 Ibid., Appendix 23 
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Structurally the labour companies fell under the auspices of DHQ who would then allot them to the 
CRE. If the infantry brigades wanted their labour for any specific task in their area they would need 
to apply to DHQ for their use. Moreover, these new labour companies had the benefit of being tied 
to both the infantry and the Royal Engineers, each new one being linked to an existing Field 
Company of Royal Engineers. 96 Brigade was supplied rations by 218th Field Company RE, 97 
Brigade the 219th Field Company RE and 14 Brigade were linked to the 206th Field Company RE. 
In principle this organisation was an ad hoc response to a structural problem posed by the 
reorganisation of labour resources inside the army. Nonetheless, the solution reflected the 
willingness to adapt to circumstantial issues and as such should not be condemned. The idea 
reflected the thinking of officers who understood that the quality of fighting men was broad and 
certain men could be employed better in the rear. Lt-Col James Jack, then commanding 2/W. Yorks, 
implemented a similar system when ordered to create 'battle patrol platoons' which were units 
detailed to push beyond the battalion's final objective and seize points of tactical importance. 
Recognising the impracticality he filled the new units with men only suitable for fatigue work and 
so avoided lowering the quality of his existing platoons. In theoretical terms, Jack was using non-
canonical methods to improve the overall efficiency within the battalion.368 Shute and DHQ were 
doing the same although through official channels. Somewhat unknowingly the division had 
incorporated non-canonical practice into canonical orders. The labour companies only lasted until 
September 1917 when the 17/NF briefly returned for a month but as a stop-gap measure it 
demonstrated how reactive the internal organisation of the division could be to its own needs. 
 
This was not the only occasion the division implemented new structures as the circumstances 
demanded. The resumption of semi-open and open warfare during the Hundred Days saw the 
revival of the use of Brigade Groups. The basic structure of the brigade remained the same, but a 
                                                 
368 Terraine (ed.), General Jack's Diary (1964) pp.219-220 
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field ambulance, a company of 32nd Division's Machine Gun Battalion, a company of the Army 
Service Corps and a field company were attached making the formation more self-sustaining.369 
The uptake of Brigade Groups coincided with 32nd Division's move to the IX Corps under Lt-Gen. 
Sir Walter Braithwaite on 11 September, yet prior to this delegation of command was already 
happening between the infantry and artillery. Batteries of the 32nd Division's RFA were pushed up to 
provide close support to the infantry; on 5 September 1918 for example, B battery of 168th Brigade 
RFA gave close support to the infantry crossing the Somme: 'They worked with the Infantry and by 
shelling a Copse which was full of the enemy they were instrumental to the capture of 20 of the 
enemy.' 32nd Division was still under the command of the Australian Corps to which they had been 
attached since 15 August 1918. The increased responsibility and units attached at brigade level was 
largely a product of recognition at the higher levels of command that they were passing between 
different phases of war. On 5 September 1918 the Australian Corps declared that 'open warfare 
conditions' prevailed and delegated command of the 21st Brigade Royal Garrison Artillery down to 
divisional level. This was a marked departure from corps control of the artillery which had 
prevailed since the winter of 1915.370 There is little evidence that in practical terms this delegation 
and decentralisation caused the 32nd Division any great administrative hardship.371 Delegation and 
forward attachment of different arms was not a new phenomenon to the 32nd Division nor the BEF. 
In April 1917 batteries were again pushed forward rapidly to engage the enemy with direct fire 
during the withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line, while the general principle itself hearkened back to 
1914.372 This was not a prescriptive organisation thrust upon the division by a progressive thinking 
corps but a more general trend within higher command that recognised that particular circumstances 
required different approaches. Later during the Hundred Days the division would use more 
                                                 
369 TNA, WO 95/2372 32nd Div. General Staff, September 1918, Appendices passim.; for specific administrative orders 
associated with the new structure see WO 95/2391 14 Infantry Brigade Headquarters, September 1918, 
'Administrative Orders for move of 14th Infantry Brigade to Athies Road', Appendix D 
370 TNA, WO 95/2376 32nd Div. CRA, 5 September 1918 
371 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front (2013) p.208 
372 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, April 1917, 'Report on Operations of the 32nd Division April 1st & April 
2nd', p.17; Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front (2013) pp.231-232 
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traditional means of overcoming more substantial resistance, showing a remarkable level of 
organisational flexibility. 97 Brigade on 1 and 2 October employed creeping barrages in their 
assault on the Chataignies Wood position on the Beaurevoir – Fonsomme Line.373 The attacks 
themselves suffered from German counter-attacks from troops rapidly brought up by motor lorry 
forcing the brigade back. Irrespective of this, the speed with which the formations of the 32nd 
Division were able to switch between operational methods was noteworthy. By 1918 32nd Division 
and indeed the BEF was able to shift its organisation according to the operational needs at the time. 
This did not always guarantee victory, and there were failures. But in spite of that it remains an 
impressive achievement that such development could take place. This development owes much to 
the increased experience of the personnel within the division itself, but it is worth observing that ad 
hoc organisational change had occurred at points previously. The effects of these earlier shifts have 
been touched upon here, but are worthy of a study in their own right.374 
 
The feedback system of the 32nd Division remained relatively static between 1916 and 1918. 
Reports remained of pivotal importance to the evaluation process. The 32nd Division did make some 
amendments to improve the quality of these reports and more effectively analyse what occurred 
once the troops had left the British lines. In 1917 more definite quantitative data was sought 
regarding the effects of the division's actions. After the attack on Savy the effects of the machine 
gun barrage were measured. The German dead were counted and the cause of death assessed. This 
was then conveyed in the division's final report: 'This attack was supported by 36 Machine Guns 
and a large number of Lewis guns. Of the 70 German dead counted in SAVY after the operation 
about 70% had been killed by machine gun fire.'375 This was no guarantee of consistent 
effectiveness but it was a definite progression from unsupported opinion from the front line. This 
                                                 
373 TNA, WO 95/2401 97 Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 1 and 2 October 1918; see also Appendices 
374 The lessons learnt from the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line would be an especially fruitful future area 
of research. 
375 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, April 1917, 'Report on Operations of the 32nd Division April 1st & April 
2nd', p.16 
 121 
process was sustained where possible throughout Shute's tenure as GOC 32nd Division. This reached 
its apogee in February 1918 where the effects of the raid on 18/19 February were listed in detail. 
The German losses were divided into prisoners, bombed in dugouts and seen dead or wounded, 
lying dead or wounded by Artillery or rifle fire, and Germans killed by individuals.376 This was then 
broken down by the two brigades taking part and the disparities explored:  
 
The difference in the casualties from artillery fire seen in the 96th and 97th Brigade areas may be 
accounted for by the facts:- 
(a) That there were many concrete Pill-boxes for the Germans to take shelter in from our 
bombardment in the 97th Brigade area but few in the 96th Brigade area. 
(b) That the area round RENARD FARM is a centre of much activity while the area round 
SURCOUFF FARM is lightly held. 
 
These figures were then contrasted with the 32nd Division's own casualties. This more methodical 
approach was not so much a divisional improvement as it was linked to the style of leadership of 
Cameron Shute. While figures on the German dead were analysed under Lambert's tenure as GOC 
in 1918, they did not form the same bedrock of evidence as they did under Shute.377 That the 
improvement was forged as a result of Shute's personality can be seen in a letter he wrote to 
Edmonds after the war:  
 
I am sending a return of casualties for 6 months which I had most carefully compiled day-by-day in 
32nd Div. The proportion of wounds from arty fire to those by rifle & MG fire make one think. I don’t 
know of any similar return. Please don’t lose it and return when done with[,] as I have no copy.378 
 
                                                 
376 TNA, WO 95/2371 32nd Div. General Staff, February 1918, 'Report on Raids South of Houthulst Forest, carried out 
by 32nd Division February 18th/19th, 1918', p.7 
377 TNA, WO 95/2401 97 Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 2 October 1918. This was probably as much to do with the 
remarkable circumstances as any lasting bureaucratic procedure. 
378 TNA, CAB 45/187 Shute to Edmonds, 10 December 1930. 
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This record does not appear to have survived but its existence is demonstrative of the analytical 
approach the 32nd Division took under his command. 
 
Interviews and information gathering became a key aspect of the feedback system under Shute's 
direction. Staff officers were pushed forward to aid the work of the brigade staffs during the 
German withdrawal. Shute concluded that:  
 
This was found to work well, and having the additional Staff Officer at Brigade H.Q. enabled the 
Brigadier to send his Brigade Major to the Advanced Report Centre or to carry out any other 
reconnaissance or forward work which he might require him to do. It was also an effective method of 
liaison between Divisional and Brigade H.Q. As the G.S.O.2 was fully aware of the Divisional 
Commander's intentions and was able to keep Divisional H.Q. fully informed of the course of 
events...379 
 
These added responsibilities shored up the communications system to a degree, although this was 
never fully solved, while also providing DHQ with reliable information about events at lower 
levels. This approach was complemented by a rigorous attitude to interviews. After the 32nd 
Division's night attack on the Passchendaele ridge on the night of the 2 December 1917 the events 
of the front line were confused and difficult to discern for the 32nd Division's commander. 
Consequently Shute drew on a number of sources of information. During the assault itself 
information was sent about the progress of the attack from interviews with injured soldiers 
conducted at the II Corps's dressing station. The information was of varying utility and sometimes 
contradictory but it was an active attempt to address the communication difficulties and gather a 
clearer picture of events more quickly.380 In the aftermath of the battle Shute attempted to 
                                                 
379 TNA, WO 95/69 32nd Div. General Staff, April 1917, 'Report on Operations of the 32nd Division April 1st & April 
2nd', p.17 
380 TNA, WO 95/2370 32nd Div. General Staff, December 1917, 'Telephone and Telegraph Messages 2nd December 
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disentangle the conflicting messages by collating reports and conducting interviews with officers 
involved in the attack.381 This was not an easy task and the clarity of events remained somewhat 
obscure when Shute came to produce his own report.382 This would be easier when repeated in other 
actions. After the Houthulst Forest raid on the night of 18 and 19 February 1918, Shute conducted 
interviews personally to gauge the loss to the division: 
 
In order to get at a fair estimate of the total losses inflicted on the enemy the Divisional Commander 
personally interviewed all the Officers and men of all the raiding parties and after close investigation 
of their statements the following figures seem a fair estimate of the enemy's total losses.383 
 
This was a time consuming process but the methodical approach provided the 32nd Division with a 
greater idea of how well they had done in the attack, where it went particularly well or badly and 
why. Once Shute was promoted this level of investigation ceased, returning to the original 
consultative style of feedback. Given the tempo of operations during the Hundred Days, it is 
unlikely that this empirical approach to evaluation would have been sustainable irrespective of who 
commanded 32nd Division.  
 
Overall the feedback system was improved although this owed as much to Shute's leadership style 
than it did any broader institutional changes in method. Once he was promoted to V Corps the 
consultative approach returned drawing upon the experiences of DHQ's subordinate formations and 
units. This was perfectly functional and not inherently wrong, for it had the benefit of being a less 
time-consuming process and was almost certainly more suited to the faster tempo of operations in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
1917', 7.08 am & 7.10 am 
381 IWM, 80/10/2, Major-General T. S. Lambert, 'Statement by Lieut. Kerr R.E.; Narrative of Operations 2nd/3rd 
December 1917: 15th. (S) Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers', Appendix questions to H.K. Utterson (commanding 15/LF) 
382 For example the question of whether the 32nd Division had achieved surprise against the German strong-points 
remained uncertain. 
383 TNA, WO 95/2371 32nd Div. General Staff, February 1918, 'Report on Raids South of Houthulst Forest, carried out 
by 32nd Division February 18th/19th, 1918', p.6 
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1918. Without those constraints in 1917 Shute's empirical method was decidedly superior if 
idiosyncratic and atypical of the wider organisation. The final conclusion should rest with the 
simple fact that in both 1917 and 1918 the feedback system was very well suited to the type of 




In conclusion, the British structural system remained largely consistent with the pre-war principles. 
These were not fundamentally incorrect but the misapplication in 1916 was a contributing factor in 
the division's struggles on both 1 July and in later engagements. The lack of experience was a 
significant issue as were the two extremes of leadership. The overhaul in personnel at the end of the 
year, while risking gutting the division of its collective experience, did reap dividends as the new 
GOC Cameron Shute implemented systems that would yield improvements in combat performance. 
Doctrine evolved but did not usurp the pre-war principles. If SS 135 told divisions what to do, the 
pre-war principles instructed them how to think. Training played an important role in implementing 
doctrine but it never quite hit the standards the GOCs 32nd Division expected of it. At the lower 
level core skills like musketry and physical drill remained at the heart of training and efforts were 
increasingly made to make it enjoyable for the men taking part. Tactical schemes were an important 
tool of educating the newer leaders of the army and as the attrition of 1917 and 1918 took its toll the 
consultative approach became an important strand of decentralisation. FSR I's principle of 
decentralisation was upheld in structural terms throughout 1917 and 1918. Many of the battles of 
the Hundred Days were 'soldier's battles' but they could never have been fought as effectively 
without the co-ordination of resources at the higher levels of command. Structural adaptation was a 
core component of this co-ordination and by 1918 the 32nd Division and the BEF as a whole were 
able to adjust their administration to differing requirements in battle. This was not always a success 
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but external factors should not be allowed to undermine the broader judgement that structure had 
reached a level of sophistication that was unthinkable in 1916. Reports were the capillaries that fed 
the analysis of battle from the unit level up to the brain of the army, GHQ. As a means of analysis it 
was a flawed system in 1916, prone to all the flaws of the human condition. These problems were 
never truly conquered but the investigative and empirical approach of Shute mitigated many of the 
drawbacks that reports alone would suffer. The feedback system thus became more expansive at a 
time when it was most useful. In 1918 this system regressed, but the change in tempo would have 
precluded the more rigorous approach anyway. 
 
How good was the divisional command system? By contemporary definitions the command system 
never strayed particularly far from the pre-war principles. On an individual basis there were attacks 
when planning was deficient, communications broke down regularly and flexibility was not 
implemented. Yet in all three areas 32nd Division and the BEF responded to the challenges. Was the 
divisional system conducive to learning? Liaison with the French could be strained at times, but 
there was a willingness to learn from them. Both the French and British were reaching similar 
conclusions about what was needed to ensure success in the attack, and despite the failures of 1 July 
1916 the British were able to rectify many of the problems they faced. Doctrine drew upon the 
lessons originating on the front lines, and while far from perfect it did standardise low-level infantry 
tactics and provide the BEF with a formula for success on most occasions in positional or open 
warfare. Modern theory has vaunted the organisation that can respond to the methods its 
experienced workers apply efficiently on the ground. If the 32nd Division is assessed along these 
lines it could be considered a model institution for its speed in drawing non-canonical lessons and 
disseminating them across the army. At the structural level the organisation was flexible and 
experienced enough to rapidly adjust to differing administrative arrangements and training ensured 
the ethos remained broadly consistent with the most valued pre-war principles. Scholars are right to 
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question the notion of a learning organisation, but what the 32nd Division and the BEF did have was 


















This chapter will look at the concept of battle wisdom and how it affected the learning process. This 
will be done by first exploring what the concept is and how soldiers across the BEF understood it. 
With the theoretical boundaries of the term established, the second section will assess some key 
examples of battle wisdom and the practical implications for learning at the divisional level.  
 
4.1 Definitions and Theory 
 
The term battle wisdom is an ambiguous one. It was originally coined by Roy Swank and Walter 
Marchand in their 1946 article 'Combat Neuroses: the Development of Combat Exhaustion'.384 The 
article considered the effects of combat upon U.S. Army soldiers fighting in the 1944 Normandy 
campaign during the Second World War and observed that for the first ten days the men adjusted to 
the sights, sounds and their own physical reactions to battle. This was the development of '“battle 
wiseness” without which the soldier does not survive to become efficient in combat.'385 Following 
this period, the men reached their maximum efficiency after which combat exhaustion lead to a 
decline in effectiveness. While some of the specifics such as the time-frame of the phases cannot be 
retrospectively applied from the Second World War to the First, the basic concept of a period of 
acclimatisation remains a useful one. Despite this the term has remained relatively little-used and is 
generally considered a component of the wider scholarship on combat exhaustion.386 
 
                                                 
384 Roy Swank and Walter Marchand, 'Combat Neuroses: the Development of Combat Exhaustion', Archives of 
Neurology and Psychiatry, Vol.55: No.3 (March, 1946) pp. 236-247 
385 Ibid., p.238 
386 Richard Holmes, Firing Line [aka Acts of War] (London, Cassell, 2nd ed. 2003; or.1985) pp.214-215 
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A more recent study by Luchow, Gompert and Perkins used the concept of acclimatisation and 
battle wisdom analysing its application to the modern combat environment. They have defined it as 
the soldier's ability to: 'move between formal reasoning and intuitive decision making quickly and 
seamlessly'.387 This definition is too narrow and the work ignores the potential for subversion 
created by battle-wise soldiers. This chapter will argue that battle wisdom is more than the ability to 
make the correct decision in the most appropriate fashion. Rather it draws upon the natural process 
of adaptation to new environments and the drive to improve the individual's or the group's actual or 
perceived chances of survival. This was not always a positive factor and this chapter will look at 
how battle-wise soldiers could undermine the wishes of higher command albeit with the aim of 
preserving the effectiveness of the individual or primary group. This seemingly runs contrary to the 
values ideally inculcated in training: the rejection of certain individual instincts and the fostering of 
a group identity, or a 'collective soul' as J.F.C. Fuller described it.388 But, as will be explored later, 
this did not always lead to inefficiency or failure. In the case of misguided orders battle wisdom 
mitigated some of the potentially negative effects. The dividing line between battle wisdom 
inspiring positive acts of initiative and dangerously subverting the hierarchy and discipline of the 
army is a blurry one where judgement even in an historical sense still largely depends upon an 
individual's values. Battle wisdom straddles the theoretical boundaries of a number of other 
concepts: initiative, experience, self-preservation and anti-authoritarian sentiments. Moreover there 
does not appear to have been any contemporary understanding of battle wisdom as a general 
phenomenon; soldiers seemingly developed it without ever really thinking about it.  
 
Thus there is a need for a more satisfactory definition. Luchow et al. give one in their endnotes, 
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vastly improving on that given in the body of the text:  
 
This notion is the military equivalent of “street-wise.” It implies an intrinsic quality – some people 
will naturally be more battle-wise than others – but like most (if not all) cognitive abilities, it can be 
improved via proper training.389 
 
To be 'street-wise' is an excellent conceptual equivalent. The adaptation, and interaction with other 
individuals and local lessons being laterally transferred is both common to street wisdom and battle 
wisdom. What is street wisdom? It is the ability to adapt and prosper in a range of challenging 
environments. The word conveys more than mere adaptability, it suggests a kind of shrewdness and 
necessity to understand and adhere to the rules of the local environment as opposed to ill-suited 
general orders imposed by a government or central authority. The former may contradict or compete 
with the latter, but where a central authority's rules may be aimed at preserving a moral code or 
maintaining stability, local environments may demand a flexible or pragmatic approach to such 
impositions to ensure survival. If this definition of street wisdom is accepted, then further 
comparisons can be made with battle wisdom. Both, may be characterised by the feeling that the 
general rules are impractical or out-of-touch with the realities on the ground. Furthermore, a 
familiarity with the environment and how it functions is necessary in both instances. The conflict 
between the central authority of GHQ and conditions in the front line, while not ubiquitous, was at 
least fairly common amongst the men of the BEF.390 
 
Social scientists have been ahead of historians in exploring the idea of discord between top-down 
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policies and lower level implementation.391 The work of Steven Maynard-Moody, Michael 
Musheno and Dennis Palumbo, built upon the findings of earlier studies and sought to explore the 
implementation of public and social policy at ground level and how best to ensure it was carried out 
as intended.392 By looking at how central governmental policies translated from policy to practice 
Maynard-Moody et al. observed the difficulty of implementing top-down policies and the conflict 
that can occur with local practices. They note that: 'Street-level workers are an important source of 
innovation, yet most have little formal authority to make programmatic decisions. Their good ideas 
are often ignored by those higher up.'393 The nature of the job ensures soldiers and workers may 
never be completely analogous but the similarities are significant: 
  
Many street-level workers use their influence over policy implementation to serve their own 
interests; they  change policy to make their work easier and safer or to thwart policy with which 
they do not agree rather than to serve the needs of clients or the public.394 
 
While the circumstances and potential repercussions are evidently different between the two, battle 
wisdom and street-level influence stem from the same set of factors. They are linked by an unease 
at systematic orders or policies and the multitude of motivations underlying human action, be they 
self-preservation, pre-war experience, cynicism of authority, or obstinacy. 
 
Tony Ashworth has explored the disparities between the intent of higher command and the realities 
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of its implementation on the ground through his live and let live thesis.395 It is worth briefly 
summarising his ideas to highlight the shared relevance to battle wisdom. Ashworth applied 
sociological approaches to the history of the live and let live system that arose in quiet sectors of the 
line. He explored how and why fraternisation, ritualisation and inertia became normalised on both 
the sides of the front line in certain sectors of the Western Front. This was generally forbidden by 
the High Commands on all sides and ran contrary to the 'offensive spirit'.396 In effect a conflict 
arose with self-preservation and the relative comfort of inertia on one side, and the dangers inherent 
in a soldier doing his duty on the other side. While not necessarily pacifistic, it was circumstantial 
and highly dependent on the personnel involved, something it shares in common with battle 
wisdom.397 A critical aspect of the live and let live system was the element of disobedience. 
Elements of live and let live like the ritualisation of fire (targeting the same areas at set times) 
required wilful neglect of the 'offensive spirit' expected of them by their superiors.398 The 
willingness to operate outside of official channels was common to both battle wisdom and the live 
and let live system. One key difference existed; disobedience was not a necessary pre-requisite for 
an action to be considered battle-wise, as will be demonstrated later. 
 
Ashworth gives suggestions on how these informal systems came into being: 'The basic premise of 
this argument is that the more frequently persons interact with each other, the greater will be their 
sentiments of mutual friendship'.399 The contention, heavily drawing on J. Glenn Gray, is that the 
reciprocal exchange of peace through ritualised shooting, inertia or outright fraternisation 
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contributed to the erosion of the abstract idea of the Germans as enemies in the Manichaean 
mould.400 This was replaced by the 'concrete' notions of similarity which consequently provided 
further stimulus for reciprocity.401 There is little doubt that attitudes to the enemy were not as black 
and white as some commanders may have hoped but they were equally subject to change depending 
on their proximity to the enemy and combat experience.402 Given the range of opinions the 
supposed ubiquity of the live and let live system is difficult to reconcile with the harsh realities of 
war. Ashworth gets around this by suggesting that it was maintained by pressure from within the 
primary group (often the section, but could also include the platoon and company).403 Both the 
notion of the primary group and the variability of opinion towards the enemy are integral when 
explaining why live and let live and battle wisdom existed and spread amongst the troops.  
 
The primary group provided a fertile ground for the exchange of ideas and concepts as Charles 
Carrington noted amongst the signallers: '...privileged people, have a secret life of their own and 
maintain endless conversations full of technicalities and private jokes, with an occupational hazard 
of no small seriousness'.404 Here Carrington's description of 'talking shop' highlights a critical part 
of how battle wisdom was transferred within the primary group. Although the technical world of the 
signallers made it seem alien to the infantryman, the latter had their own private jokes and jargon 
and went through an identical process. Guy Chapman, an officer in 13/RF, recognised that this 
'talking shop' occurred within cliques before the battlefield had been reached:  
 
The ten months' training, which the battalion went through before it reached France, was therefore a 
compound of enthusiasm and empiricism on the part of the junior subalterns and the other ranks. 
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Even now I am amazed at the zeal which induced some of us after dinner to push matches 
representing platoons about the table, uttering words of command in hoarse whispers...405 
 
Chapman later recalled how underpinning this 'enthusiasm and empiricism' lay a rooted desire to 
match the professionals' level. Moreover the use of 'some of us' suggests that a clique formed 
around this binding desire. This is rather speculative but as Brian Bond has observed he revered 
many of his peers and superiors throughout his wartime experience and their ability and 
professionalism played a large role in stimulating his respect.406 'Talking shop' was not confined to 
specialists or the training fields of Britain. Sidney Rogerson wrote of a young Irish officer under his 
command in B Company, 2/W. Yorks after he had requested permission to look for a missing fellow 
officer of C Company: 'I knew they were friends and that it was their habit to forgather for a talk 
and a smoke when work was slack.'407 'Informal trench conferences', to borrow a phrase from 
Rogerson, were a facet of life within the army. When men bonded and cliques formed it was only 
natural that they frequently discussed the shared experience of soldiering. 
 
There are problems with the idea of the primary group as a means of dissemination of information. 
As Hew Strachan has pointed out, when the turnover rate was high the opportunities to form 
cohesive small-groups was diminished: 
 
Thus the small-group argument, which by definition becomes of increasing importance the more 
sustained and vicious the fighting, rests on a paradox: such operations erode the very basis on which 
the unit's morale is said to rest.408 
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Strachan's point is relevant to battle wisdom. If it solely relied upon intimate relationships within 
the primary group it would be absent from units with a high turnover of men or for those who spent 
large periods divorced from their close comrades, such as those on secondments. This does not 
appear to have been the case, as later examples will show.409 Moreover the primary group is not an 
innately beneficial force, as one Brigadier-General observed: 'Many a bad old captain ruins his 
subalterns in the company mess, and in clubs, by his example, conversation, behaviour with 
women, and drinking habits generally'.410 The primary group could be a bad influence as well as 
good. Nevertheless, the positive benefits and manner of transfer suggest that it contributed 
advantageously on the whole. The paradox between the primary group's importance as a catalyst for 
battle wisdom and its absence in certain instances can be resolved when learning theory is brought 
in. Two forms of learning occurred: individual and organisational. Battle wisdom drew upon both. 
Sociological literature has shown that individual proficiency could provide broader benefits for the 
group while communities-of-practice fed into the development of non-canonical methods.411 Battle 
wisdom and the changes to effectiveness it prompted should not be seen as a simple group based 
process but a complex one whereby the individual and shared group experiences facilitated one 
another, but were not always co-dependent. 
  
If the idea of battle wisdom stems from certain innate human traits, these have to be identified and 
examined briefly. Nineteenth century and Edwardian military theory often promoted key traits 
amongst their leaders and led. Carl von Clausewitz, looking at military genius, highlighted some of 
the valued attributes in a soldier.412 He suggested sound judgement based on probabilities, balance 
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of thought – preserving 'judgement and principle' in spite of the 'violence of emotion' (or more 
broadly 'strength of character'), and determination coupled with a willingness to accept 
responsibility.413 While draped in nineteenth century terminology, these requirements would not be 
alien to any soldier on the Western Front. A rough parallel can be seen in FSR I stating the 
principles of 'warfare in uncivilized countries':  
 
Self-reliance, vigilance, and judgement are the chief requisites for overcoming the difficulties 
inherent in savage warfare. Discipline and organization are powerful aids; but unless both officers 
and men are well trained, capable of adapting their action to unexpected conditions, and of beating 
the enemy at his own tactics the campaign will be needlessly long and costly.414 
 
In attempting to convey the differences between warfare in 'civilized' states and 'uncivilized' the 
passage highlights which 'civilized' traits were perceived as valuable in a certain type of warfare. 
Yet it remains surprising that these attributes were not advocated as clearly in a more general sense 
as they were here. Nonetheless by FSR I's broad definition, many officers would find themselves 
embroiled in a certain kind of unfamiliar, 'uncivilized warfare' on the Western Front. Even when 
commenting on general battle FSR I rings a Clausewitzian note: '...skill determination in all ranks to 
conquer at any cost, are the chief factors of success...Half-hearted measures never attain success 
in war, and lack of determination is the most fruitful source of defeat [bold in original]'.415 
While an emphasis on moral factors increased in the years leading up to the First World War, the 
ideal characteristics of good soldiers and commanders remained very similar.416  
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This theoretical ideal provides a partial explanation for the propagation of battle wisdom; by 
emphasising individual judgement, and determination to achieve victory, the army created a fertile 
ground for individualised thought. Cultural and circumstantial factors shaped this. Discipline, duty 
and the expectations of fellow officers and peers could temper the opportunities to act in a certain 
fashion, as has been shown in chapter two's case study of the 32nd Division on the Somme. This 
dynamic was recognised by the novelist Frederic Manning (7/KSLI, 8 Infantry Brigade, 3rd 
Division) who observed that a seasoned Sergeant could 'handle' most officers – manipulating them 
into allowing the lower ranks the freedom to avoid anything too risky.417 Nevertheless there were 
always 'reg'lar pot 'unters' who 'wouldn't be told'.418 The Sergeant's action had its basis in battle 
wisdom, drawing upon the very same attributes the army instilled, the difference lay in what ends 
those characteristics were used for. Gary Sheffield has further demonstrated how complicated this 
process could be, yet notes that the 'army pragmatically moulded such men, by a process of 
education, training and socialisation, into passable replicas of the pre-war Regular officer.'419 
Discipline often varied from unit to unit depending on the class background of the men, the type of 
battalion – Regular, Territorial or New Army – and the specific personnel. Between 1914 and 1918 
a blend of autocratic 'imposed' discipline and auxiliary discipline was carried over from the pre-war 
regular and territorial systems respectively.420 There is evidence to suggest that the 32nd Division 
generally tended to employ the latter territorial model of auxiliary discipline. One RFA driver who 
served in both the 32nd Division and 31st Division commented: 
 
The Sergeant-Major of my previous battery [B Battery ,164th Brigade RFA, 32nd Division] was first-
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class; I never heard him use bad language on parade, but the discipline was far better than in the 
present mob [A Battery, 170th Brigade RFA, 31st Division].421  
 
This was not confined to the RFA. Charles Cordner a company runner in the 2/Argylls, 33rd 
Division, and later 10/Argylls, 32nd Division noted the strict discipline in his former battalion 
contrasted sharply with his new one: 'I found the discipline was not so strict, and many of my own 
company were interested in my experience in another battalion in France'.422 Nevertheless, the time-
frame and personnel played an important part in dictating the model of discipline employed within 
the battalions of the 32nd Division. In late 1915 and early 1916 the 2/Manchesters temporarily 
exchanged a number of officers with 19/LF to improve the quality of leadership in the latter.423 One 
officer attached to the 2/Manchesters wrote home to his parents:  
 
The platoon commander, to whom I am attached is really a top-hole man. He is an ex-sergeant of the 
Guards, + the way he makes those men “jump to it” is really wonderful. The word of command is 
nearly deafening + his “ticking off” masterful in the extreme. Also of course his platoon is an 
absolute model, so I'm very lucky indeed.424 
 
The lesson he took from this short secondment with a regular battalion was that there should be 
shorter hours spent drilling but greater strictness during that time.425 Thus while a degree of 
disciplinary conformity existed between pre-war methods and those within the much expanded 
citizen army, the dynamics of interaction between officer, NCO and ranker varied according to 
circumstance and unit.426 Battle wisdom did not directly depend upon one specific disciplinary 
model but it will be shown that it modified the opportunities for different forms such as consent and 
                                                 
421 IWM, 76/225/1, R.L. Venables, p.95 
422 IWM, 86/86/1, C Cordner, p.16, for earlier 'imposed' discipline see pp.2-4 
423 IWM, 78/72/1, Lt C.L. Platt, 31 December 1916 
424 Ibid., 9 January 1916 
425 Ibid., 9 January 1916 
426 See G.D. Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, (2000) pp.66-68, 73-78 
 139 
evade to arise. 
 
The BEF prized initiative. FSR I's stress on principles rather than prescription was designed to 
avoid stifling initiative in an army that needed to be as versatile as possible.427 The upshot was that 
soldiers found themselves in positions where they could mould military policy in the same fashion 
as Maynard-Moody et al.'s civil servants, police officers and teachers. It is possible that a move 
towards auxiliary discipline contributed to the promulgation of battle wisdom amongst the troops, 
although this remains difficult to verify and gauging the impacts of the threat of severe punishment 
is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
 
So what is battle wisdom? Battle wisdom was the body of knowledge based around experience of 
wartime conditions which was drawn upon when undertaking actions, officially approved or not, 
which could jeopardise the safety of the individual or primary unit (such as the section) in a given 
circumstance. It thus draws upon a number of characteristics and concepts; individual attitudes to 
initiative and experience are pivotal factors while the live and let live system can be considered an 
extreme manifestation of battle wisdom.428 The aspects will be explored more fully later in the 
chapter, but to further define the boundaries of battle wisdom and how it affected learning practical 
examples need to be looked at. Owing to the paucity of sources within the 32nd Division depicting 
transgressions a broader range of materials has been consulted for the first two sections of this 
chapter. The final section on insubordination focuses more directly on the 32nd Division. 
 
4.2 Examples of Battle Wisdom 
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A wet hole is better than a dry surface when shells are coming over.429 
 
The words of Captain Alexander Stewart's (1/SR, 19 Infantry Brigade, 33rd Division), written while 
reflecting on his experiences of the Battle of the Somme, capture the spirit of battle wisdom. 
Common sense it may be, but phrases like this underline the effects of experience on the front line 
soldier; in this case self-preservation trumps comfort. To the common infantryman it would likely 
have been self-evident but these small pieces of 'trench wisdom' contributed to the successful 
adaptation to conditions in the front line. Battle wisdom was influenced by a variety of experiences 
ranging from the trivial – scrounging for souvenirs, cookers and combustibles – to examples of 
outright insubordination. A highly circumstantial picture emerges from the battle wisdom model, the 
changes to combat effectiveness (the overall goal of improvement and thus learning) were varied 
and often dependent on individual personnel, yet broad observations can be made. This section will 
attempt to outline some of the different examples of battle wisdom ranging from the trivial to the 
more severe and offer some conclusions regarding the effects. 
 
Case Study: Scrounging 
 
Many published and unpublished accounts of the Great War have the common theme of scrounging. 
It was not uncommon for soldiers to attempt to pilfer from his local surroundings, neighbouring 
battalions or the bodies of the dead. Perhaps the finest of these accounts can be found in Charles 
Carrington's (1/5 R. Warwicks, 143 Infantry Brigade, 48th Division) Soldier from the Wars 
Returning, who dedicated a small subsection of his book to the Ethics of Scrounging. Direct to the 
point he wrote: 'To be a soldier on active service means to reject the sanctity of life and property.'430 
And this many did, but Carrington was quick to differentiate between its different forms. It was 
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morally just to 'live on enemy rations, make free with their comforts, and seize badges, crests, 
helmets as trophies.'431 Weapons were sought after, as was alcohol. Stewart recalled how one soldier 
climbed over a trench stop to collect a German helmet, while another found a 'jar full of rum' which 
he drank resulting in him 'wandering about all over the place regardless of whether he was shot at or 
not.'432 Carrington sought after a German officer's pistol, while a fellow officer seized a German 
Mauser rifle when he went into action.433  
 
Where prisoners were concerned 'souvenir hunting' could be more direct. When leading a patrol in 
May 1918 Captain E.B. Lord, (15/LF, 96 Infantry Brigade, 32nd Division) captured two German 
prisoners. After sending them back to the British lines with an escort, the sentries reportedly heard a 
brief exchange: “Kamerad”! “Kamerad be buggered, have you got any blinking souvenirs[?]”.434 
When Lord's prisoners arrived back in the British lines they'd been stripped of all portables save 
their 'clothes, waterbottles and watches'. According to Carrington this sort of 'frisking' was more 
common behind the lines: 'we should have scorned to behave so in the front line.'435 On the surface 
it is a tenuous link between battle wisdom and these acts of glorified theft, but the parallels become 
clearer when the social element of scrounging is considered. Carrington described the 'local code of 
ethics' that governed such acts. He recognised to scrounge was: '...a meritorious form of conduct, 
but only on condition that it was socially directed. A man who stole rations of rum, or – worst of all 
– the contents of a private food parcel – from his own section was lucky if not severely beaten 
up.'436 
 
Scrounging was thus an act stemming from the pressures felt within the primary group, and 
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inherently social in character. Moreover there was a tacit acceptance amongst the troops that they 
would, at some point, become the victims of 'scrounging'. J.A. Whitehead was a driver in 168th 
RFA, 32nd Division, and was quickly introduced to the realities of 'scrounging'. When awaiting his 
troop ship in Southampton he was ordered to pack all his extra items in a bag and label it so it could 
be sent home: 'This showed what green-horns we were, as, after our departure, those bags were 
raided by those who had been left behind for home service.'437 This would not be the last time that 
Whitehead was the victim of scrounging, for even in 1918 the situation was much the same. He 
received orders to prepare for a Field Service Marching Order parade and given instructions on 
what items could be taken with him. This required all the extra 'scrounged' luxuries and kit to be left 
behind. With some resignation Whitehead wrote: 'We reckoned that it was a dirty trick, but we had, 
as usual, to stand it. Some other soldiers would enjoy rummaging amongst it all.'438 There was at 
least some solace in knowing other soldiers would benefit from their scrounged materials. 
 
From troop ship to Armistice scrounging was a fact of life within the BEF on the Western Front. 
Through experience, men would learn to avoid hanging on to precious 'souvenirs' they had collected 
from prisoners or the dead: 'I sent home all my old souvenirs last week...nice to have them.'439 one 
officer wrote. This was not always possible and often relied on a trustworthy friend taking the items 
with them when he went on leave, but as George Coppard (6/Queen's, 37 Infantry Brigade, 12th 
Division and later MGC) recognised, this was only a small problem: '[m]any Mauser rifles and 
other weapons must have been smuggled back to England'.440 
 
So far scrounging has been looked at as a general term but to assess the effects it needs to be more 
specifically divided. Scrounging for souvenirs while potentially dangerous to the individual, 
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continued as a practice owing to the exotic gains that could be made.441 Nevertheless, it was not just 
about souvenirs. The hunt for extra resources, rations and luxuries played a pivotal role in fostering 
primary group cohesion, while making conditions more bearable. George Ashurst observed the 
social element of scrounging in both its positive and negative guises. Ashurst was an NCO in the 
16/LF, 96 Infantry Brigade, during the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line in March 1917 
and described how a number of rankers of the 32nd Division had discovered 'a well filled wine cellar 
that had escaped the eyes of the Germans from the start of the war.' Needless to say a number of the 
intrepid explorers who'd discovered the wine were found 'about the village absolutely drunk', while 
a number of others had retreated to billets in a similar state.442 The fact that this was not good for 
unit efficiency was acknowledged by the officers who posted two guards at the entrance to the 
cellar. Alcohol, as in civilian life, was a social lubricant and its scrounging tightened the bonds of 
the primary group. This is evident throughout Frederic Manning's fictionalised account of his 
wartime service, where alcohol and its illicit acquisition is a recurring theme. Manning's main 
protagonist, Bourne, fosters cordial relations with his superiors over scrounged rum rations. While 
the characters of Shem, Martlow and Weeper Smart form his primary group and form bonds under 
in similar conditions.443 Alcohol was a double-edged sword. It could seriously impair combat 
effectiveness within a unit as Ashurt's account suggests, nevertheless it could also strengthen the 
bonds of comradeship and steel the resolve of the men during stressful periods. Manning, who 
experienced troubles with alcohol during his military career, reflected unrepentantly through 
Bourne's descriptions of its effects: 'It has set my blood alight, it has warmed all five senses 
simultaneously. I feel like a human again.'444 The scrounging of alcohol had a dual function, 
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facilitating relations amongst the primary group for those who partook, while temporarily easing 
some of the stress of wartime conditions albeit at the expense of absolute efficiency. 
 
The châteaux, villages and towns of northern France and Belgium provided a rich hunting ground 
for scrounging soldiers. A mystique developed around the search for valuables in particular. Ashurst 
wrote: 'More and more treasure was found – household treasures that had been buried and 
hidden...Buried treasure was the whole topic of conversation.'445 Yet this was little more than an 
exotic break from the everyday search for various items that would ease the discomfort of front line 
or billeted life. The uncertainties of war occasionally made scrounging a necessity. Sidney Rogerson 
was faced with a shortfall in accommodation and noted that: 'we were reduced to looting, or in the 
more picturesque language of the ranks, “scrounging” additional cover.'446 While the benefits of the 
officers' mess may have removed the need for officers to scrounge luxuries, they were aware – and 
often sympathised with – the plight of the ranker. Moreover they understood that experienced 
soldiers, more 'battle-wise', would be the better at scrounging: 
  
With the grim determination of the British soldier, bedraggled men set off with the hearty approval, 
if not the verbal permission, of their officers to see what they could find. I am not ashamed to 
confess that, unofficially, I strongly encouraged the more experienced soldiers – who were therefore 
less likely to be caught! – to scour the dripping countryside for anything likely to improve the 
company's accommodation, and even gave them permission to leave the camp “to visit the canteen, 
sir.” Needless to say, that canteen was never discovered, but other valuable things were.447 
 
Mirroring the magnanimity of Whitehead's loss, Rogerson's Colonel complemented his young 
batman Briggs on his failed attempt to pilfer the battalion headquarters's cooker: “A good boy that. 
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But I'm sorry I could not spare the stove!”448. Charles Carrington's defence of the ethics of 
scrounging offers further evidence that officers were sympathetic to the plight of the ranker when 
the comfort of their men was at stake: 
 
You seize a château to 'put it in a state of defence' by knocking holes in walls...When you are hungry 
and thirsty, are you to leave the food in the pantry and the wine in the cellar? When the order comes 
to retire are you to relinquish Milord's cash-box and Milady's jewels for the Germans who will be 
there in half an hour?449 
 
Any potential moral reluctance to scrounge from the dead was removed when the wounded needed 
aid. Upon being hit in the arm and ankle when attacking Savy Wood with the 15/LF on 1 April 1917 
Captain E.B. Lord's batman, Hopwood, 'borrowed' blankets from two dead Germans. Tellingly 
Hopwood also found time to put some souvenirs in a sandbag for Lord and himself.450 Moreover 
the collection of German munitions and supplies could be used to help put a newly captured trench 
into a state of defence and tend to the wounded.451 
 
Materials and items to keep the troops warm were naturally prized commodities. If blankets could 
not be found then combustibles were. Even in covered billets soldiers sought flammable materials, 
often with the hope of drying their clothes near the fire.452 Local supplies were not always the first 
to be targeted by the soldiers. Supply dumps were a rich source of materials if a section or platoon 
were lucky enough to be billeted close to one. Whitehead recalled: 'I might say that we were near a 
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coal dump, which was just off the railway lines, and, although guards were on duty there 
continually, we found it quite easy to dodge them, and “borrow” some coal.'453 Scrounging for 
temporary comforts was a ubiquitous part of army life in the lower ranks, while the officers' 
sympathies and occasional encouragement fit the paternalism that underpinned officer-man 
relations. The pragmatic necessities of front line life justified the minor looting while any stigma 
was removed by the approval that could be gained within the primary group for a successful coup, 
as long as the victim was distant enough. Expectations existed, sharing was central to the 
experience and stealing within the unit was heavily frowned upon. When someone broke these 
expectations the rest of the primary group could in most cases rely upon a sympathetic ear of an 
officer. Yet often it would be sorted out within the group itself, as in the case of this NCO within the 
168th Battery RFA, 32nd Division: 
 
It was in Villevesque [sic] Wood that our N.C.O. was nobbling us of some of our rations. One day, 
when he was away from our bivouac, we, who had suspected him for a few days, raided his blankets, 
and found enough jam, bully beef, and biscuits to last him many a day. We threw all his kit and 
blankets outside, and shared out the eatables. When he returned, we gave him the option of reporting 
us, or owning up to us, and promising to share out openly in the future. Of course, he chose the latter, 
as he would have been in serious trouble if the C.O. had heard about it.454 
 
This was not an isolated incident and the same group was later involved in the 'education' of a new 
draftee who refused to share his food parcels (but was happy to receive handouts from others).455 
Thus, existing alongside social expectation was a code of discipline that quickly moulded men to 
conform with the rest of the primary group. 
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How did this affect learning? It is difficult to precisely attribute the effect on combat efficiency. Yet 
it is possible to posit a number of areas where the existence of strong ties between the primary 
group, social expectation and scrounging could affect the ability of a unit to perform well in 
combat. Scrounging is an example of a much larger effort on the part of soldiers, Regular, 
Territorial or New Army, to adapt to the changing particulars of the Great War. The scrounging case 
study demonstrates that the primary group provided a forum for ideas and set many of the moral 
and ethical standards. NCOs and 'old sweats' were pivotal in moulding newer drafts into useful 
soldiers through the lateral transfer of ideas and methods. Scrounging, as trivial as it may now 
seem, played a ubiquitous role in the lives of the front line soldier and officers were often fully 
aware of this. Thus, comfort with all its links to mood (as distinct from spirit) could alter the short 
term morale of a unit.456 Nevertheless, in the longer term scrounging fostered cohesion within the 
primary group and encouraged adherence to an agreed set of ethics. This aided the individual 
soldier's environmental adaptation by providing a group of peers who could empathise and advise 




The hierarchical structure of the army coupled with the image of draconian discipline has obscured 
the reality that soldiers did not always follow orders to the letter.457 They were individuals with 
varying backgrounds, skills and opinions and the army's preference for principles over prescriptive 
instructions did little to stifle independent action. This section makes a distinction between two 
different types of disobedience: consent and evade and more serious insubordination. The 
distinction is artificial; both could be considered insubordination, but by splitting them up the 
                                                 
456 Clausewitz, On War (1976) pp.187-189; Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches (2000) p.180 
457 The image of Haig as a 'brutal disciplinarian' has been discussed by John Peaty, 'Haig and Military Discipline' in 
Brian Bond & Nigel Cave (eds) Haig A Re-Appraisal 80 Years On (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 1999) pp.196-222. For 
hierarchical discipline in the army see Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches (2000) pp.61-78; 150-155 
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severity and consequences can be better seen and assessed. Both drew upon an individual's 
experience, and were affected by his attitudes towards the army as an institution while also 
modified by their relationship with their superiors. Furthermore both consent and evade and outright 
insubordination stem from the same circumstance: an order was given that the perpetrator disagreed 
with either in method or goal. Not all acts of disobedience were done to subvert a specific superior, 
and many – if not most – were carried out to circumvent impractical general orders. A further 
distinction must be made, it was not always an individual, but could involve collective action. This 
was driven by prevailing opinions within the primary group. In the case of consent and evade the 
subordinate party, rather than pointlessly arguing, consented but avoided carrying an impractical 
order out fully or changed how it was implemented. Insubordination rejected the order and goal 
outright. Given its severity this was rarer within the army. The section will look at a case study of 
the insubordination of the 11/Borders on the night of 9/10 July 1916 and assess its impacts on the 
learning process. 
 
The difficulty of enforcing orders on the ground has been acknowledged in civilian life but there 
remains considerable scope for a detailed historical analysis. The sources make this difficult. 
Consent and evade almost exclusively occurred at the battalion level and below, where officers and 
rankers could change the implementation of orders on the ground. The subversive nature and 
potential punishments for such actions greatly diminished the likelihood of anyone documenting 
them. Furthermore in the case of letters from the front there was always the possibility of the unit 
censor reading any incriminating admissions. Thus, there existed a natural disinclination to reveal 
any information that could endanger the perpetrator. One 32nd Division officer highlighted the issue 
when he was forced to use a cryptic fictional analogy to complain about Major-General Shute.458 
He later remarked, when complaining about shirking on the Home Front: 'I could tell you explicitly 
                                                 
458 IWM, 88/39/1, Lt-Col I.H. MacDonell 22 May 1917 
 149 
what I mean but for the Censor [sic] who will read this.'459 Nevertheless some took the risk in 
letters, and other evidence can be gleaned from post-war memoirs where there was little risk of 
recrimination. It is impossible to accurately gauge the full extent to which disobedience existed but 
this section will outline the circumstances in which it could arise and note the complexities, and 
benefits, of its existence. 
 
Consent and Evade 
 
In May 1917 Lt-Col James Jack (then commanding 2/W. Yorks, 23 Infantry Brigade, 8th Division) 
found himself in a position where he was forced to engage in 'hateful subterfuge'.460 He faced the 
prospect of losing the best men within the weak companies in his battalion to a 'battle patrol 
platoon.' His response was to ensure that '30 backward privates who might be improved under the 
eye of the Regimental-Sergeant-Major and Provost-Sergeant and who would be useful for fatigues' 
were sent to the reorganised unit.461 As John Terraine has noted, these battle patrol platoons were 'a 
'recrudescence' of the corps d'elite argument', the intention being that the best within the battalion 
would be fresh to follow-up the attack and probe ahead to take advantage of the disorganisation of 
the enemy after the initial assault had reached its objective.462 The idea was good in principle but 
infeasible in practice, as Jack noted: 'After faithfully trying the idea, we found that by the time this 
gallant band could reach the leading troops in action and decide on the best course to pursue[,] 
companies on the spot had already taken all possible measures – as was their clear duty – to further 
their gains.'463 As with any order passed down from a higher authority some manipulation was 
needed before it appeared to be fulfilled. Before the battle patrol platoon was paraded in front of his 
                                                 
459 IWM, 88/39/1 I.H. MacDonell 4 June 1917. For further opinion on censorship see Carrington, Soldier from the Wars 
Returning (1965) pp.176-178 
460 John Terraine (ed.) General Jack's Diary: War on the Western Front 1914-1918 (London, Cassell, 1964) p.220 
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462 Ibid. 
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superiors Jack pulled '12 of the finest looking soldiers in each company...to head the march, after 
which they handed back their armbands and rejoined their platoons.'464 His actions indicate that 
consent and evade was not strictly limited by rank or personality. Sidney Rogerson described Jack 
as having an 'almost exasperating punctiliousness' and was '[s]omething of a martinet' which makes 
Jack's decision to subvert the official organisation even more surprising.465 When the goal is 
considered, the decision seems less a case of overt disobedience than of professional initiative. Jack 
had initially carried out the order, and once it became obvious that it had not achieved the desired 
results, but would not be overturned, he acted. This highlights the important role individual 
initiative, experience and wisdom could play within the learning process.  
 
Chapter one has shown that the BEF was quick to analyse the results of battle, but there could still 
be a significant time lag between practices on the ground and formal dissemination through major 
doctrinal publications such as SS 135. Consent and evade could mitigate the effects of out-dated 
bureaucratic instructions. Moreover if a senior commander's understanding slipped out of step with 
the front line realities, it provided a means for subordinates to preserve the effectiveness of their 
units or primary group. When theory was converted into practice but found to be impractical in 
reality consent and evade preserved efficiency. Conversely it also had the potential to slow the 
learning process down if a true report of the impracticalities of the order were not forthcoming from 
below. It would take the official abolition of battle patrol platoons in early 1917 before Jack 
admitted his actions to his superiors.466 However, as the following examples demonstrate, consent 
and evade occurred almost exclusively outside of major set-piece battles limiting the obfuscation to 
more common front line matters. Furthermore, as chapter two has demonstrated there were 
significant opportunities for subordinates to raise concerns in the build-up to major offensives 
                                                 
464 Terraine (ed.) General Jack's Diary (2003, or.1964) p.220 
465 Ibid., p.13; Rogerson, Twelve Days on the Somme (2006, or.1933) p.22. Despite the description Rogerson held 
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coupled with a significant degree of tactical autonomy that largely obviated the need to consent and 
evade in such circumstances. 
 
Professional experience and understanding was a pivotal part of contravening unrealistic orders. In 
October 1916 Captain W. N. Child, M.O. to the 17/NF, received orders from 32nd Division Staff to 
quarantine any of his patients showing signs of diphtheria. Writing in a letter home to his wife: 
 
[T]hey wanted all contacts isolated + any amount of fuss to be made but of course I knew my 
business + did nothing and the result is – NIL. Today again an alarm of  dysentery – telegrams flying 
around however it will calm down by Wednesday or so.  They really have nothing else to do and must 
appear busy to keep their job.467  
 
To Child this was a case of professional pride. As a medical officer he felt that he was in a better 
position to judge than the divisional staff. By consenting and evading he ensured that it was his 
decision to quarantine, based on his knowledge rather than a blanket order from division. It is worth 
considering Child's circumstances briefly, before observing the effects of his action. Having been 
recently moved from battalion HQ to a company, Child was detached from his primary group, thus 
this decision was an individual one.468 The primary group then, was a catalyst rather than a pre-
requisite for forms of constructive disobedience. Furthermore his actions can be directly tied to his 
views on the divisional staff whom he saw as wasting his time with pointless 'wind alarms'.469 This 
draws direct comparisons to Jack; both were essentially operating against orders that were out-of-
step with realities on the ground, but they markedly differ in effect. Both improved the internal 
efficiency of their units; in Child’s case, by avoiding quarantine, his and the sick soldier's time was 
saved. Yet the repercussions if the MO had got it wrong would have been far more damaging. In this 
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case the 32nd Division had, only six months before, experienced a whole battalion taken out of the 
line owing to an outbreak of rubella.470 Their caution was understandable and perhaps warranted. It 
is difficult to look back on this and conclude that Child's actions were wholly beneficial. This 
emphasises the inherent problems that consent and evade, and battle wisdom in general brought; it 
had the potential to improve efficiency and mitigate delays in implementing official changes, but 
when applied incorrectly or inconsiderately it could harm the combat effectiveness, or discipline 
within a unit or formation. 
 
One unit that encountered an issue with the improper execution of orders was the 1/5 S. Staffs, a 
Territorial unit:  
 
28th/29th: Patrols very poor. 2/lieut: DARE crossed the front line. Another Officer out for the first 
time “on his own” has not gained sufficient confidence, but will probably do better. The third patrol 
was distinctly bad. Some men have no aptitude for leadership in independent command.471  
 
Lt-Col Lamond, C.O. of the 1/5 S. Staffs, had encountered consent and evade aimed at preserving 
the live and let live system.472 The soldiers were not carrying out their patrols in any meaningful 
capacity to protect the inertia on the front lines. This was essentially self-preservation, and in theory, 
bad for the learning process. Experience was essential to effective learning yet there was a feeling 
that the British Army's 'active front' policy was self-defeating and cost more in lives than the benefit 
it gave in 'blooding' troops.473 There was an understanding during the war that the potential benefits 
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of raiding could only be felt if they were conducted successfully. In June 1917 a 32nd Division 
conference reached three conclusions regarding raids. It concluded raids: 'keep up offensive spirit of 
our troops'; could be harmful unless successful, and that the prevailing opinion had become 
defensive.474 Many of the criticisms were fair, but the 'active front' policy's positive effects should 
not be dismissed wholesale; there was a complicated balance to be struck.475 Measuring the full 
effects of the policy is problematic, with key benefits such as experience and esprit de corps being 
largely intangible and unquantifiable. Some sources do suggest that the policy, when supported, 
could be a useful source of pride.476 For battle wisdom however, the 'active front' policy offered 
opportunity to build a body of experience which could be applied to circumvent outdated standard 
procedure. Lt-Col Lamond, responding to the poor patrolling and reliance upon the grenade, 
employed his own initiative to encourage greater vigour and the use of the rifle by banning those 
going out into No Man's Land from taking grenades.477 While official doctrine recognised 'the cult 
of the bomb' as a problem to be overcome, it is doubtful whether GHQ would have approved of 
limiting soldiers' options in such a way.478 Moreover, whether Lamond actually observed an 
improvement in his unit's patrolling or his subordinates merely became more adept at concocting 
'eye-wash' is impossible to discern.479 What can be deduced however is that, primary groups and 
kinship played a large part in encouraging consent and evade within a unit. 
 
The relationship between commander and subordinate affected the likelihood of a soldier 
                                                                                                                                                                  
policy see TNA, WO 33/1297, Report of the Committee on the Lessons of the Great War (The Kirke Report) pp.55-
56; Ashworth, Trench Warfare (1980) pp.186-189; 198-199 
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475 For an example of a failed raid doing harm see TNA, WO 95/2400 97 Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 4-5 July 1917 
476 IWM, 79/12/1, Captain E.B. Lord p.41; see also Chapter Six 
477 TNA, WO 95/2686, 1/5 Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment, 10 January 1918 
478 See Stuart Mitchell, 'The Training and Preparation at Battalion level, 1914-1918' (MA thesis, King's College, 
London, 2007) p.16; Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front (London, Yale University Press, 1996) 
pp.65-74 
479 Eye-wash was a colloquial term used within the BEF to describe instances where appearances were artificially 
formed to obscure the realities of the situation. Patrol reports for example could be laced with eye-wash to give them 
the air of official respectability whereas the action itself may never have taken place. See Ashworth, Trench Warfare, 
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consenting but changing the methods used to fulfil a task. Captain E.B. Lord was ordered by his 
commanding officer, Lt-Col H.G. Harrison, 15/LF, to begin constructing the main line of defence 
after the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line in March 1917.480 Upon seeing the proposed 
trench lines, Lord was unimpressed: 'I did not like mine at all, but one in particular seemed bad, so I 
altered it without saying anything.'481 During the six day period of work the lines were inspected by 
Major-General Shute and Lt-Col Harrison. Shute rebuked Harrison for the position of his defensive 
lines, consequently changes were ordered with the notable exception of Lord's unofficially adjusted 
one.482 The beneficial impact of Lord's decision on the general effectiveness of the unit should be 
clear, in amending the plan in one minor way he reduced the labour that was needed on the new 
defences while presumably giving the men a stronger defensive position. While military principles 
underpinned the professional disagreement in the positioning of the new trenches it was the poor 
relationship and lack of faith in his superior that acted as a catalyst for action. Lord described 
Harrison as: 'a regular from the Manchesters, [and] disliked by all.'483 It is easy to read too much 
into the fact that Harrison was a regular and that this fact was mentioned; a soldier's background 
was never far from conversation. Nonetheless, the implication that Harrison was not 'one of them' 
nor up to the expected standards is clear. Lord's opinion was further influenced by his strong ties to 
the unit's second-in-command, Major A. Stone, who would later assume command of the 16/LF.484 
Be it motivated by a sense of allegiance to Stone, a lack of professional respect, or a natural dislike 
for Harrison, consent and evade was encouraged by Lord's individual relationships.  
 
How did consent and evade stemming from an individual relationship differ from that caused by 
'faceless' staff orders sent from a superior authority? The biggest difference arose in the dangers if 
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caught. No further action was taken against James Jack after he admitted to his subterfuge once the 
'battle patrol platoons' order had been rescinded.485 On the other hand, if caught directly 
contravening an order given by a known superior, court martial was a likely result. Nevertheless, 
Lord was left exasperated rather than fearful:  
 
I felt pretty annoyed, as I had worked like a Trojan and done, I thought, a conscientious job as a 
company commander, and all I got for a solid fortnight's slavery, was a cursing. I immediately wrote 
out an application for the Flying Corps, but Major Stone persuaded me to withdraw it.486  
 
He was not the only one to risk serious censure over disregarding a senior's order. George Ashurst 
serving in 16/LF, 32nd Division, was tasked with rushing his men to the defensive positions in the 
front lines while they were occupying the active Nieuport salient between June and November 
1917.487 Rather than travel the agreed route, Ashurst took a detour after seeing the barrage they 
would have had to navigate through to reach the front line positions. This alternative route was 
much safer, but took longer to reach.488 Although Ashurst’s detachment arrived in the front line with 
only minor casualties, the acting commanding officer of the company heavily criticised the NCO 
for the time it took him. Ashurst quoted him as saying: 'I want you to understand that that delay 
might have cost us our position in the line and to disobey orders like that can only be put down to 
cowardice, and I have a good mind to send you to the colonel.'489 Ashurst, an old regular, was not 
one to mince his words and his apparent reply did little to endear him to his superior: 
 
“You, you call me a coward! What a brave officer you are! What a lot of swank you've got when you 
are miles behind the line! ...Why weren't you leading us the way to go? ...Yes, take me to the colonel 
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486 Ibid., p.52 
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and I'll tell him how you have crouched in my dug-out while I and the boys have done your patrols 
for you, and enjoyed the stimulating effect of your whisky flask while we were doing them.”490 
 
This should be treated with a healthy degree of scepticism. Written after the war, a degree of post-
facto bravado has almost certainly crept into the anecdote and it is improbable he was so scathing in 
his response. It is clear that Ashurst viewed his course of action as the correct thing to do, although 
his comment to his men at the time: “The fellow who ordered us must come and take us” suggests 
he knew he was taking a risk with the diversion.491 Despite the disrespectful reply Ashurst was not 
disciplined. It is impossible to establish a balanced picture from the available sources, but if 
Ashurt's account is accepted it seems appropriate to conclude that he escaped court martial on the 
grounds that it would cause a stink. From the junior officer's perspective, his new but tenuous 
position as an acting company commander coupled with the potentially damaging accusations of a 
senior NCO and the men of his platoon would have made reporting the incident counter-productive 
for all parties. This mutually assured destruction of sorts was a key limiting factor in cases where 
individuals challenged authority.492 
 
The likelihood of report and punishment for consent and evade was part of a broader approach to 
discipline which could vary from one unit to the next depending upon their type. Gary Sheffield has 
demonstrated that discipline within the Regulars, Territorials and New Army units was affected by 
the idiosyncrasies of the officers and their relationship with the rankers, the background of the unit's 
soldiers, and the internal cohesion. Discipline styles changed as the soldiers who comprised it did 
so. Their relationships, paternalism, and understanding of regimental or battalion traditions moulded 
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79/23/1, J.A. Whitehead, p.81 
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the prevailing attitudes to insubordination.493 This directly affected learning and efficiency of the 
unit. The knowledge of how to effectively circumvent a poor order saved time and fostered 
individual initiative. Ashurst's improvised route to the front line did not merely challenge his 
superior's authority but set an example for his men, all of whom supported him when the situation 
with the company commander was explained to them.494 If the poor order was a push factor, urging 
soldiers such as Ashurst, Lord or Jack to evade carrying it out in the manner intended then the 
primary group was a pull factor.495 Their safety and expectations provided a framework within 
which decisions were made. Strong bonds and primary group loyalty provided a smokescreen for 
minor disobedience and could add further encouragement for the individual contemplating 
subversion.496 However, when it required the complicity of those within the primary group any 
action often had to meet their approval. This was not always forthcoming. One second-in-command 
in 32nd Division, held back from travelling with his unit to the front, wrote to his commanding 
officer requesting he 'invent an excuse to get me up the line' and was refused.497 Ashworth contends 
that those who shunned peer-approval were ostracised and given unflattering labels such as fireater. 
This process reinforced the live and let live system.498 This is a problematic idea. A negative label to 
one was a source of pride to another. The case of Major JN Marshall, an Irish Guardsman attached 
to 2/Manchesters and later 16/LF, is illuminating. It is covered in greater detail in chapter five but 
here it is enough to recognise that his sobriquet of the 'Mad Major' was not considered pejorative.499 
Kinship among men of varying ranks, fostered through paternalism and sympathy, meant that minor 
acts of disobedience could be hidden when required. This played a pivotal role in facilitating 
consent and evade and battle wisdom. 
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The general widespread effects of consent and evade are impossible to gauge, each must be 
considered in their own circumstance and context. Jack's action for example can clearly be 
considered beneficial, he had tested both methods and only used disobedience and subterfuge to 
implement the superior method. Ashurst’s action on the other hand, is debatable. Had he taken the 
direct route he would have almost certainly suffered heavy casualties; the 32nd Division were 
heavily out-gunned in the Nieuport sector of the line at that time and heavy bombardments were a 
regular occurrence.500 His decision to take an alternative route was within keeping of his 
responsibility to ensure the welfare of his men. Thus, the safety of his primary group had a direct 
effect on his actions. Nevertheless, the officer was not entirely unjustified in his complaints.501 The 
what-ifs are less important than the actual repercussions; men's lives were saved by his actions, the 
platoon – his primary group – was stronger for the experience. Ashurst would later be granted a 
commission.  
 
To what extent was consent and evade widespread? The examples of Lord and Ashurst suggest that 
consent and evade was more common during periods of upheaval such as the pursuit of the 
Germans to the Hindenburg Line, or at Nieuport. This is understandable; during these times more 
opportunities appeared to exercise individual initiative, even when this could be considered 
insubordinate. There is little evidence of it occurring during the major set-piece battles. As chapter 
two has shown the exercise of initiative was still possible but when lives might depend on actions 
being taken in accordance to a plan there was a powerful reason to avoid subversion. Yet as Child, 
Lamond and Jack show, it was in no way confined to these periods and could occur in any part of 
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the line when an individual felt that his initiative could improve efficiency – be that reducing 
workload, or improving chances of survival. Consent and evade must not be seen in isolation. While 
usually carried out by an individual it was a social action influenced by the primary group, 
prevailing standards of expectation, and likelihood of recrimination. The effect of the disciplinary 
style of a unit, be it auxiliary or regular, is difficult to quantify.502 The evidence of discipline 
factoring into decisions is sparse but Ashurst and Lord suggest that they viewed their actions as 
generally beneficial and this would be recognised if reproached.503 The ubiquity of consent and 
evade and its effects within the primary group and wider unit modified the learning process. It could 
preserve unit strength, efficiency and combat effectiveness but at the cost of withdrawing valuable 
negative feedback from the system. The live and let live phenomenon further complicates the 
picture. The avoidance of patrols deprived the unit of valuable experience which would aid them in 
future combat. Thus inertia preserved what experience had already been gained but did little to 
develop it. Ultimately, consent and evade at its most useful acted to mitigate the effects of infeasible 
or poor orders and reduced any potential damage caused by the time lag between front line practices 
and standardised procedures, but could, when left unchecked, encourage lethargy and inertia as was 
the case in the 1/5 S. Staffs. The complexity of the issues makes it necessary to view consent and 
evade on a circumstantial basis. Broadly it appears that the process was beneficial for the 32nd 




Cases of outright insubordination within the BEF were rare. Morale within the army ebbed at times 
but it was never broken. Learning theory has indicated that stable environments where individuals 
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have a valuable, discrete role within established groups are the most conducive to learning.504 
Under such conditions individual improvements can best be harnessed to yield results for the 
organisation as a whole. While this ideal was rarely fulfilled under the conditions of war where 
turnover within front line units could be high during periods of battle it, it provides a good 
benchmark for analysing insubordination. If disobedience damaged stability and cohesion what 
effect did this have upon development? This section will look at the insubordination of the 
11/Borders on 9/10 July 1916 as a case study. It will first set out a brief narrative of events, then 
look at how battle wisdom influenced the night's actions, finally looking at how cohesion was 
affected. 
 
On 1 July 1916 the 32nd Division were badly cut up on the opening day of the Battle of the Somme 
attempting to take the village of Thiepval and the Leipzig Salient. The 11/Borders, 97 Brigade, 
suffered particularly badly during the divisional assault, losing 516 officers and rankers as 
casualties.505 Only eight days later, on the evening of 9/10 July, the acting CO of the 11/Borders, 
Captain G.H.C. Palmer, was instructed by Brigadier-General Jardine to conduct an attack on 200 
yards of German trench with his reserve company.506 The operation was to take place at 12.30am on 
10 July and was to be carried out by two officers and 100 other ranks; 40% of the fighting strength 
of the battalion at this time. The first indication of a problem came when Captain Palmer was only 
able to raise 90 men, and they had been used to furnish carrying parties earlier in the day. Soon men 
began reporting in sick to the two officers tasked with leading the assault, 2/Lts Ross and 
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Twynam.507 Initially Twynam sent the first three soldiers to the Medical Officer, Lt G. N. 
Kirkwood, however it soon became apparent that the problem was more widespread and he refused 
to refer anyone further.508 2/Lt Ross did the same on the grounds that all the men's nerves were in 
the same condition. Rather than leaving it at that, Ross informed his superior, G.H.C. Palmer. The 
situation becomes unclear at this point, with testimonies clashing on important details. Ross and 
Palmer's statements to the subsequent Court of Enquiry suggest that they then instructed Kirkwood 
to judge the state of the men tasked with the attack. Captain Palmer's adjutant, 2/Lt Lowthian cast 
doubt over this series of events.509 His testimony to the Court of Enquiry suggests that Palmer was 
initially aware of the battalion's poor condition and visited Brigade to effect a cancellation, this 
being done at approximately the same time as when the rankers were reporting sick to Ross and 
Twynam. This plea was refused and only then did he order Kirkwood to give a judgement the 
condition of the men. What can be deduced with a degree of certainty is that Lowthian made the 
call to Kirkwood to instruct him to inspect the body of men. What is less clear is where Palmer was 
when this call was made, Lowthian suggests he made a return trip to brigade but was struck 
prostrate by shell fire. Palmer on the other hand, makes no mention of his visits to the brigade. The 
picture that presents itself is one where a vacuum of command was created which delegated 
responsibility onto the shoulders of the battalion MO, Kirkwood. He found the men incapable of 
carrying out the attack. His certificate was sent directly to the brigade via 2/Lt Ross who had 
instructed 2/Lt Lowthian that the attack was now uncertain. Preparation was halted. By 11.45pm, 9 
July, Brigadier-General Jardine had wired back to Palmer instructing him that the attack must 
continue, and this information was given to 2/Lt Ross. 
 
                                                 
507 2/Lt J. Ross, joined 11/Borders 5 April 1915;. 2/Lt Twynam, joined 11/Borders 12 August 1915. 
508 Captain George Notman Kirkwood, RAMC, relinquished commission 5 October 1916; re-commissioned Lt 4 June 
1917; RAMC. For further biographical information see Brigadier-General Timothy P. Finnegan 'Failure of 11th Bn 
The Border Regiment to Carry Out an Attack on 10 July 1916' in The British Army Review No.144 (Spring, 2008) 
pp.92-95 
509 2/Lt J. B. Lowthian, joined 11/Borders 15 January 1915 
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If the first act of insubordination was the men reporting sick en masse then the second was through 
avoidance of duty. The attack would never take place. Initially the men did not pick up all of their 
grenades which meant the redistribution of 30 sacks of bombs had to take place. This delayed the 
start further. According to 2/Lt Twynam the blame for this must firmly rest on the shoulders of the 
Sergeants: 'All the NCOs knew this [that bombs were to be distributed en route] but 
notwithstanding about a third of the party did not supply themselves with them.'510 Furthermore a 
number of the men took the wrong turning when moving to the front from the reserve positions, 
while the order became extended when traversing a particularly poor section of trench. The officers 
attempted to close the ranks, with both 2/Lt Twynam and 2/Lt Ross moving from the rear and front 
respectively in an attempt to see what was happening and receive any message sent to them. 
Nevertheless, by 1.30am they had only got about half-way and consequently 2/Lt Ross decided to 
countermand the order. The division had operated around this area for seven months, and while the 
trenches were dark and in a poor condition the guides and NCOs should have had a functional 
knowledge of the sector on which they were operating. This idea is compounded by 30 of the men 
leaving their allocation of grenades behind. These two factors strongly suggest that reserve 
company were pro-actively attempting to subvert their orders and halt the attack. 2/Lt Ross clearly 
harboured doubts over the men's motivation: 'I knew that there was a great lack of the offensive 
spirit in the party'.511 2/Lt Twynam's identification of the NCOs being aware of the bomb 
distribution plan highlights both his desire not to be implicated in the error and his own suspicions 
of their culpability. They were not alone. Brigadier-General Jardine, after 2/Lt Ross had been forced 
to cancel the attack, placed the four NCOs tasked with guiding the troops to the front line under 
arrest. General Gough also gave his opinion: 'Conduct such as theirs' [sic] merits the extreme 
penalty and it is in every way regrettable that examples are not able to be made.'512 
                                                 
510 TNA, WO 32/17700 'Report on the insubordination of the 11th Borders', testimony of 2/Lt Twynam to the Court of 
Enquiry. [undated] 
511 Ibid., Testimony of 2/Lt Ross to the Court of Enquiry [undated] 
512 Ibid., Letter to X Corps from J.M. Sargent, DA & QMG Reserve Army stating the thoughts of General Gough. 14 
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In the resulting enquiries Kirkwood, the MO, was singled out for blame. His case reached Haig at 
GHQ and the Director General of Medical Services, Surgeon General A. Sloggett.513 They 
intervened in defence of the MO who they adjudged to have been treated unfairly, made a 
'scapegoat', and given responsibility beyond reasonable expectations.514 The NCOs fared better. 
Evidence was not forthcoming and consequently they were released. Captain Palmer did not remain 
with the battalion. He was replaced by Major Austin Girdwood on 16 July 1916 and sent to Beuvy 
where he took up the role of assistant to the town major until 19 September when he assumed 
command of a prisoner of war battalion. This episode highlights the negative effect the unchecked 
application of battle wisdom could have. It is certain that the men of the reserve company did not 
feel equal to their task, they were exhausted both emotionally and physically, but it is equally likely 
that the initial reports of sickness were partly motivated by one another, consciously or otherwise. 
2/Lt Ross saw this as a possibility at the time: 'if I allowed these men to see the MO all the other 
men in the party would wish to do the same.'515 This was not without precedent. 2/Lt Twynam 
initially granted 3 men permission to see the MO and was subsequently visited within ten minutes 
by between 6-12 men.516 It would be surprising if there had not been a degree of influence, if not 
quite outright collusion, among those reporting sick; although with the evidence sparse and 
occasionally contradictory this is difficult to definitively prove. Indeed, this was a problem the 
authorities were struggling with at the time. In an annotated note (originally from an unspecified 
source), Colonel J B Wroughton, the Assistant Adjutant General at GHQ remarked: 
 
Reading between the lines it is evident that if Palmer didn't aid and abet this croaking (the fact of his 
going to the Bde if he did is evidence against him – points to his having done so) Instead of going 
                                                                                                                                                                  
July 1916 
513 Sir Arthur Thomas Sloggett KCB CMG, Born 24 November 1857; commissioned 11 February 1881 RAMC 
514 Ibid., Letter to A.G. GHQ from Surgeon General A. Sloggett D.M.S. 29 July 1916 
515 TNA, WO 32/17700 Testimony of 2/Lt Ross to the Court of Enquiry [undated] 
516 Ibid., Testimony of 2/Lt Twynam Court of Enquiry [undated] 
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back to the Bde he should have gone forward to his Coy – just as the Bde should have gone or sent 
his staff to the Battalion517 
 
It is clear from Colonel Wroughton's annotations that he firmly believed that the men of the reserve 
company 11/Borders were intentionally avoiding their duty and they were being aided in this regard 
by Captain Palmer. The unspecified original author of the note wrote: 'The latter [Lt Lowthian] says 
that Capt Palmer himself thought that the men were not fit for the operations and went to the 
brigade office and was told to carry on with the scheme'. Colonel Wroughton underlined 'thought' 
and wrote 'of course he did!' - a strong but cynical position and one firmly denied by Captain 
Palmer who testified to the company commanders not communicating the state of their units. 
Nevertheless, while avoiding the strong language of Wroughton, Haig agreed that Captain Palmer 
was 'directly responsible for this lamentable incident'.518 Their judgements were correct and it is 
difficult to look favourably upon Palmer's role which was either negligent of his duty of care to his 
men, or actively aiding and abetting their insubordination. It would be easy to suggest that this case 
boiled down to a friction between the safety and sanity of the men and the danger of the orders, but 
given the performance of the battalion in battle before and after, this conclusion is difficult to 
uphold. Rather the bond of reasonable expectation had been broken, and the men were asked to do 
too much, their bodies and minds being at stake for what must have appeared at the time as meagre 
potential gains (200 yards of front line). Moreover in their condition, the chances of success were 
slim and this was recognised by GHQ: 'for whatever may have been the cause of the battalion 
getting into that state it would seem very unlikely that after it had got into that state the attack 
would succeed without help of some kind.'519 
 
                                                 
517 Ibid., Annotated note signed JBW [undated] 
518 Ibid., Letter from GH Fowke, Adjutant General, to Headquarters Reserve Army “A” detailing Douglas Haig's 
thoughts 6 August 1916 
519 Ibid., Annotated note signed JBW (quotation from the original author not Colonel J.B.Wroughton's annotations) 
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Lt Kirkwood,'s role in this case also bears consideration. Did Kirkwood knowingly grant exception 
to all contrary to the wishes of high command and without valid medical grounds? Or was his 
action justified by the state of the men within the company? His testimony makes a strong case for 
the latter. Kirkwood gave six reasons for his decisions to the Court of Enquiry, based on both 
physical and psychological factors. The men had lost all their officers; their rest was spent 
organising their dead comrades' belongings; they had furnished ration parties under shell-fire all 
day; they had been disinterring the dead in the trenches and had been subjected to an 'atmosphere of 
decomposed bodies'. His final reason, that twenty men had already been sent to the advanced 
dressing station suffering from shell shock, was perhaps aimed at justifying his group decision. 
While certain individuals at the time, most notably the divisional GOC Major-General Rycroft, felt 
that Kirkwood 'showed undue sympathy with the men on the occasion', it is difficult to now 
conclude that Kirkwood did anything other than his duty.520  
 
If a critical factor in the successful improvement of unit cohesion is the understanding of individual 
roles then the 11/Borders failed in this regard. Owing to a command vacuum created by Captain 
Palmer at Battalion HQ, uncertainty spread to those tasked with implementing the orders. This 
uncertainty was exacerbated by the lack of familiarity and experience the officers had with one 
another; Palmer was new and Lowthian was only a temporary adjutant. It is unsurprising that when 
faced with a perceived medical problem they logically consulted and deferred to the medical officer. 
In principle this was consistent with the wider consultative approach employed by the BEF at this 
time.521 On this occasion they expected too much of their specialist and he was asked to go beyond 
his remit as MO and make a command decision. By carrying out his orders unchallenged Kirkwood 
became the architect of his own downfall. His name was cleared but he would never again serve 
with a front line unit. 
                                                 
520 Ibid., Letter to X Corps from Major-General W. Rycroft dated 13 July 1916 
521 See chapter two. 
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How did battle wisdom affect learning and performance? The Court of Enquiry and subsequent 
discussions among the higher ranks paints a clear picture of the reluctance of the reserve company 
to go into battle. There are strong indications that the men were actively attempting to subvert their 
orders using a number of methods. One in isolation could be considered unfortunate coincidence, 
but the sick reports, delay in bomb distribution, getting lost and losing touch during the forward 
march all strongly indicate passive resistance to the orders given. The application of these tactics 
may have avoided casualties and further demoralisation, but they also destroyed what fledgling 
cohesion existed at the unit's headquarters and ensured the whole battalion suffered the indignity of 
parading without arms and experiencing reproach in front of the other units of the brigade. The 
incident highlights some key factors for learning: cohesion, communication, and morale of both the 
officers, NCOs and men were pivotal in ensuring that orders were carried out in an appropriate 
fashion. When a break-down occurred the boundaries of responsibility were removed and as 
organizational learning theorists have observed in surgeons, performance suffered when individuals 
were initially given responsibilities beyond their level of experience or applied their experience 
incorrectly.522 Had the officers more experience with each other the situation may have been more 
like what Guy Chapman described as: 'curiously democratic control'. He faced a similar 
circumstance of poor command creating a vacuum but observed that the co-operation of junior 
officers: 'had effected a more complete harmony, confidence, and loyalty than was often to be found 
in units more capably led.'523 When the orders were insensitive to the local conditions and abilities 
of the men tasked with carrying them out the possibility of consent and evade dramatically 
increased. 9/10 July 1916 was a rare case where consent and evade was taken to such a degree that 
it constituted outright insubordination. The difference between constructive disobedience and 
destructive insubordination was slight. What the task was and who was affected by any 
                                                 
522 Reagans et al. 'Individual Experience and Experience Working Together' in Management Science Vol. 51: No. 6 
(June, 2005) p.879 
523 Chapman, A Passionate Prodigality (1933) p.127 
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unauthorised change in conduct dictated the latitude that was given to the perpetrators. But perhaps 
the most important factor was simply whether they were caught or not. It is difficult to see Jack, 
Child or Lord's acts of consent and evade as outright insubordination, although they could easily be 
treated as such. The actions of the NCOs and men of the reserve company of the 11/Borders 
combined to directly halt an attack and were consequently much more serious. The effects should 
shape our judgement. The examples of consent and evade given in this chapter all had the effect of 
improving performance, organisation or cohesion. In this instance the reserve company's actions did 
no such thing, but it must be recognised that this was as much down to being caught as to their 
subversive actions. Had there not been an inquiry their actions could sit more comfortably alongside 
the other examples of beneficial consent and evade. 
 
The learning process relied upon experience being accrued, disseminated and applied, but this took 
time and prevailing inexperience could lead to impractical impositions. Consequently, individuals 
or groups applied lessons that contradicted the letter but often not the spirit of senior command's 
orders. How the affected soldiers viewed their actions played a crucial role in what effects the 
disobedience had. Often they could unite and improve cohesion when recognised as the correct 
course of action, while at other times they could spark discord and division. The immediate effects 
of the insubordination of 11/Borders were surprisingly muted. Change occurred at the top with 
Major Austin Girdwood assuming command and the MO being removed but the notion of any 
lasting stigma being attached to the battalion is undermined by its continued usage in offensive 
action.524 Within days 32nd Division was moved north to the area of Béthune for rest and 
recuperation where the battalions received drafts from home, but by November they were back in 
line on the Somme. The 11/Borders had the opportunity for atonement on 18 November 1916 when 
the division assaulted Munich and Frankfort trenches near Beaumont Hamel. The specifics of the 
                                                 
524 For the selection of Austin Girdwood as Battalion commander see chapter two; TNA, Cab 45/134  Girdwood to 
Edmonds, 30 June 1930. Lt Kirkwood RAMC was removed on 12 July 1916; TNA, WO 95/2403 11 Battalion 
Border Regiment 12 July 1916. 
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attack have been dealt with elsewhere, but the usage of the Lonsdales in the first large attack the 
division was to make after 9/10 July is suggestive of no lasting stigma.525 It is difficult to be more 
definitive on this issue; 97 Brigade was ordered by II Corps to use all four of its battalions against 
the German positions, so Brigadier-General Jardine was compelled to use 11/Borders. Furthermore, 
some within the division felt that General Gough harboured ill-feelings towards the formation after 
the failure to take Thiepval on 1 July. The further insubordination would have done little to endear 
them to Gough.526 At the very least it is possible to say that the selection of 97 Brigade to form the 
main thrust of the attack is indicative of trust remaining within the division. Despite the problems 
caused in the immediate aftermath of 9/10 July, the lack of cohesion and morale was remedied by 
their time spent out of the line, and thus the potential damage to performance and learning 
environment was mitigated. Insubordination then, had a surprisingly limited effect on the battalion, 
damaging cohesion but leaving no obvious stigma. 
 
Disobedience within the BEF was not necessarily a divisive and damaging force. The effects could 
often be positive and facilitate a more efficient operation, although the very existence of consent 
and evade implicitly suggest problems with inexperienced or poor leadership and impractical 
bureaucratic obligations. The extent to which disobedience affected the army is inherently difficult 
to quantify but the evidence suggests that it was highly dependent upon circumstances, 
opportunities, individual goals and morale of the individual or unit. Problems with the existing 
systems and orders were just part of a larger framework of causes. These existed within a wider 
framework of dynamic military change as the BEF struggled to respond to the German defensive 
adaptations such as elastic defence in depth, new conditions and developing tactics. Thus, selective 
disobedience operating on a foundation of battle wisdom played a role in the overall development 
of the army at low-levels. 
                                                 
525 Peter Simkins, 'Somme footnote: the Battle of the Ancre and the struggle for Frankfort Trench, November 1916' in 
Imperial War Museum Review, No.9, 1994 
526 TNA, CAB 45/138 Colonel E. G. Wace to Edmonds, 30 October 1936 
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4.4 An Evolutionary Process? 
 
So far the importance of the primary group, individual and collective experience, circumstance, 
communication and observation have been emphasised when suggesting how battle wisdom spread.  
Yet certain lessons became accepted and some methods became more prevalent than others, 
ignoring the confines of the primary group. This can be accounted for by a process of evolutionary 
selection. Those ideas that had lasting value and merit or aided survival flourished. A couple of 
examples illustrate this. The initial antipathy towards the Brodie steel helmet has been commented 
on in a number of places.527 It was not initially popular, but once its utility began to be recognised 
its reputation very quickly improved with one soldier remarking: 'After a time I liked mine so much 
that, when in the trenches, I never took it off for days on end and always slept in it...They saved 
many lives.'528 Through shared recognition and observation the Brodie became a treasured item. 
Moreover this was an overt recognition, for within a number of months of their widespread use 
officers began commenting on the life-saving qualities of the helmet in reports and diaries.529 
Despite the success soldiers attempted to adjust the helmet in certain ways. One sick soldier wore a 
woolly hat under his Brodie to keep warm, while another officer ordered his men to regularly clean 
and oil their helmets – this only lasted for a couple of trips up to the front: 'the shiny surface was 
like a mirror in the brilliant sunshine' thus giving away their positions.530 Those adjustments and 
innovations that improved the chances of survival or made men's lives more comfortable were 
consequently more likely to take root in the army. 
 
                                                 
527 IWM, 79/12/1, Captain E.B. Lord p.7; Cameron Stewart (ed.) A Very Unimportant Officer (2009) p.76; 6 July 1916 
528 Cameron Stewart (ed.) A Very Unimportant Officer (2009) p.76; 6 July 1916. A similar point was made in a report 
by Captain A.A. Mercer (Lucknow Machine Gun Sqdn) IWM, 92/52/1, 'Report to Staff Captain', 16 November 
1916; see also: TNA, WO 95/2397 15th Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, 'Raid Carried out 5/6th May 1916' 
529 TNA, WO 95/2397 15th Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, 'Report on the raid carried out on 5/6 May 1916' Note e.; 
IWM, 79/12/1, Captain E.B. Lord p.4 
530 IWM, 79/23/1 J.A. Whitehead, p.89 
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The second example of evolutionary selection further highlights the continued necessity of 
observation and communication to the development of battle wisdom. John F. Tucker, 1/Londons, 
was walking along a regularly shelled road when one of his group lit up a cigarette. He was quickly 
told to extinguish it otherwise it would attract the attention of German snipers; it duly did and the 
cigarette was put out.531 Bad ideas were quickly recognised by those who had experienced them or 
their effects, and the lessons spread locally. If they were not taken on board death or injury was a 
risk. Tucker noted this himself, linking it to a deficiency in training: 'In those days we were not 
trained so strictly as in the last War in the necessity for concealment and track discipline, being left 
to learn by experience often too late.'532 On other occasions the inquisitiveness of the soldiers could 
encourage dangerous experimentation. Lt E F Churchill, RE of 32 Division Signals Company, 
recalled one man of a nearby Trench Mortar Battery testing his ammunition by dropping it out of a 
first floor window. He was passing by at the time and fortunate that the shell did not explode.533 As 
the Somme Case Study in chapter two demonstrated, good ideas were quickly drawn up the chain of 
command and disseminated, although it took time for them to be incorporated into the training 
manuals. To avoid risking a similar situation to that faced by Tucker's unit, 14 Infantry Brigade 
issued orders on 12 June 1916 stating: 'Smoking along BOUZINCOURT – AVELUY road is 
forbidden.'534 Conversely dangerous practices were discouraged by more experienced peers or those 
who recognised the harm that could arise. 
 
Death or wounding would not only stop the action attempted but dissuade others from doing it. 
Consequently recommendations or warnings would spread outward from that moment with soldiers' 
'chats' and 'trench conferences' promoting the spread of lessons. Sniping was one area where the 
importance of communications to the process of evolutionary selection can be seen. For Alexander 
                                                 
531 John F. Tucker, Johnny Get Your Gun: A Personal Narrative of the Somme Ypres and Arras (London, William 
Kimber, 1978) p.114 
532 Ibid., p.114 
533 IWM, 83/23/1, Major EF Churchill, p.13 
534 TNA, WO 95/2390 14 Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 12 June 1916, Appendices.  
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Stewart and his men, (1/SR, 19 Infantry Brigade, 33rd Division), the lessons very quickly emerged, 
if not through personal experience then through reflection upon the experiences of others: 'It was 
not very safe to fire many shots from the same place, and we had several men killed or wounded 
who were careless in that respect. A very important point was to make no movement [when in 
position or for a period after firing].'535 Sniping was largely an individual endeavour, and while 
Stewart does recall doing it in a small group, the bulk of the lessons will have been disseminated by 
those who could successfully communicate their experiences with others who had not been there to 
observe. And as Stewart suggests those who did not learn their own lessons quickly when sniping 
and were 'careless' did not survive to disseminate their practices. 
 
The concept of learning through a process of natural evolutionary selection is somewhat 
complicated by the problematic application of lessons. Circumstances and the dynamics of war 
meant that general principles could be successfully learnt and certain practices adhered to but there 
could never be a fully effective prescription for success. Merely recognising appropriate battle-wise 
practices was not always enough, and certainly no guarantee of success. The correct application of 
lessons also needed to occur and this relied much more heavily upon circumstances, personnel, 




Battle wisdom was the knowledge gained on the ground either through personal experience, 
observation of others, or through a dialogue with those who had been through similar 
circumstances. The examples given here demonstrate that it was not necessarily in tune with official 
orders. It could be damaging to unit cohesion and undermine the authority of the higher echelons. 
                                                 
535 Cameron Stewart (ed.)  A Very Unimportant Officer (2009) pp. 33-34; 26 March 1916 
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However, on the whole it did not, the results often being beneficial even when they went against the 
wishes of higher levels of command. Battle wisdom was not synonymous with disobedience 
however, scrounging was an accepted part of front line life and further examples demonstrate that 
men on the ground adapted to localised conditions through personal experience, observation and 
communication. Indeed these three aspects explain why considering battle wisdom merely as 
accumulated experience is insufficient in explaining the complex process of learning. Considered in 
tandem with the unauthorised applications of battle wisdom, such as when it informed the process 
of consent and evade, we may conclude that it played a central role in the adaptation of units to the 
challenges of the Western Front. It is naturally difficult to quantify the success of such an 
amorphous concept when success itself could stem from a vast array of factors. It should however, 









Part III: The Role of Leadership in 





Leadership and Learning: Theory, Context and Characteristics 
 
This chapter will establish the theoretical framework for analysing leadership's effects on learning. 
It will assess how classical and Edwardian leadership traits shaped the conduct and opinions of the 
men of 32nd Division. Modern leadership theories will be considered and the link between 
leadership and learning explored. A case study of Major General Cameron Deane Shute will be used 
in both this and the following chapter to assess how a senior commander's characteristics and 
understanding shaped the way the division fought and learnt. As GOC 32nd Division, Shute faced a 
range of diffuse challenges in incredibly difficult operational environments. It will be argued that 
Shute's characteristics were consistent with valued Edwardian leadership traits and these often 
coloured his command performance. 
 
32nd Division, while on the Western Front, was commanded by a total of nine different men 
(although only four commanded for longer than one month); Shute provides the most balanced case 
study of leadership commanding for the longest period in offensive, defensive, semi-open and 
trench warfare environments.536 Furthermore, Shute offers a useful companion study to John 
Bourne's account of William Heneker as a divisional commander.537 Both men were the products of 
an Edwardian culture that promoted similar attitudes to leadership and they shared a number of 
common features: rigorous standards, thorough preparation and decisive action.538 Although 
idiosyncratic, Shute is a good example of a divisional general that embodied many Edwardian 
leadership values. There is no shortage of material relating to Shute's time with the division. By 
                                                 
536 Commanders of the 32nd Division: W.H. Rycroft, R.W.R. Barnes, C.D. Shute, A.R. Montagu-Stuart-Wortley, R.J. 
Bridgford, T.S. Lambert; the following held command temporarily: J.A. Tyler, J. Campbell, F.W. Lumsden. The 
relative tenures of these men in command of the Division is given in Appendix Eight. 
537 J.M. Bourne, 'Major General W.C.G. Heneker: A Divisional Commander of the Great War' in Matthew Hughes and 
Matthew Seligmann (eds.), Leadership in Conflict 1914-1918 (London, Leo Cooper, 2000) pp. 54-67 
538 Ibid., pp.60-63 
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using a range of private papers, letters, official divisional files and a critical surviving set of his 
post-war lecture notes it is possible to build up a comprehensive picture of the man and his 
command. This will be used to explore how his leadership characteristics moulded the fortunes of 
the division and shaped the learning process. 
 
5.1 Leadership: The Theories: Classical, Contemporary and Modern 
 
This section will look at how classical ideas of leadership developed and evolved to inform 
Edwardian expectations of the function of good leaders. It will be shown that leadership during the 
Great War was fundamentally rooted to a 'character' or 'trait' based approach.539 Attitudes towards 
leadership were subjective and did not remain static. How a leader was regarded during the Great 
War often depended as much upon the perceptions of the commentator than on the actions of the 
commander. These perceptions nonetheless, were generally rooted in classical ideas of good 
leadership, and rank modified opinion by exposing officers to some of the responsibilities of those 
in command higher up. This variability of opinion means that any analysis cannot be solely reliant 
upon first-person primary testimony, but has to also include a post-facto appraisal using 
contemporary documents to understand the pressures the commander was experiencing at the time; 
pressures which first-hand accounts may not have fully understood. It is in this regard that more 
recent developments in leadership theory will become useful. Theorists such as Horst Rittel 
working with Melvin Webber, and Keith Grint have developed important frameworks to understand 
the roles and functions of leaders. These will be explored in the third part of this section and later 
used to analyse the problems and leadership solutions applied by Cameron Shute, the 32nd 
Division's General Officer Commanding (GOC). Nevertheless, care must be taken to avoid passing 
unfair judgement upon the past based on modern criteria that would have been alien to an 
                                                 
539 For more on trait or characteristic based leadership see James MacGregor Burns, Transforming Leadership, 
(London, Atlantic Books, 2003) pp.10-12 
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Edwardian general; modern theory therefore, will be used with extreme caution. This section will 
close by establishing a simple model through which the impact of leadership upon learning can be 
explored. Three ideal roles will be established against which Shute can be analysed in this and the 
following chapter. These roles are the mentor, the role model and the peer. As shall be shown the 
three facets are keenly tied together, and the best 'learning leaders' were those who could excel to 




The classics, alongside sporting prowess, mathematics, geometry, sciences and language formed the 
bulk of the curriculum for the Edwardian boy.540 Gary Sheffield, has persuasively argued that the 
values of the classics permeated the Weltanschauung of the Edwardian public school system 
underscoring the values of the officer class.541 The classical themes, of integrity, judgement, 
knowledge and oratory intersected with chivalric values and meshed to influence the 'standards 
expected of gentlemen placed in command of men' among the generation of public school boys who 
would form the bulk of the officer class.542 Nevertheless, caution should be exercised when drawing 
a straight line of causality between the public school and the battlefield; these attitudes needed the 
wider reinforcement of higher Edwardian society to become so ingrained. Captain Charles Miller 
(2/RIF), writing an autobiographical letter to his daughters in 1938, reflecting on his time at Rugby 
Public School, demonstrates that in spite of classical predominance and firm interest, the teaching 
was not always effective: 
                                                 
540 J.A. Mangan, Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The emergence and consolidation of an 
educational ideology (2nd ed. London, Frank Cass, 2000; or.1981) p.112 
541 G.D Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches pp.48-50 
542 Ibid., p.48; for classical themes see Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War (London, Penguin Books, 2nd 
ed. 1972) pp.163-4 the funeral oration encapsulates many persistent leadership traits. For a case against sophistry 
and for an enquiring mind see: Plato, The dialogues of Plato / translated with analysis by R.E. Allen. Vol.1, 
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Gorgias, Menexenus. (London, Yale University Press, 1984) in particular Gorgias 
[516 a&b]; Plato, The Republic (trans. Allan Bloom) (New York, Basic Books, 2nd Edition: 1991) Book VI pp.163-
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So far as education was concerned I don't think it was very good. In my then state of mind I very 
much doubt if anyone in the world [sic] could have got me very much interested in such subjects as 
Mathematics, Euclid, Geometry, Science, French or German, but on the other hand I had a very real 
interest and liking for English, both poetry and drama, and I believe that a good patient classical 
master could have developed me a great deal in Latin and Greek. However I am bound to admit that 
so far as school prestige was concerned learning counted for very little, supremacy at games was 
everything.543 
 
Miller's experience would have been familiar to his fellow school boys. It is clear that classics and 
literature played an important role in the development of children within the public school system, 
but to what extent they engaged with the material directly was highly contingent upon the 
individual, his fellow classmates and the schoolmaster. James Murray (17/HLI; 3/HLI; 15/HLI) 
came from a working class family in Glasgow. He attended a government funded board school and 
shows why drawing conclusions from classroom teaching alone is problematic: '...by this time the 
boys had learned to cheat, and, of course, I could not draw the teacher's attention to that.'544 Despite 
this Murray was aware of the enduring themes in literature and poetry beyond the lurid tales of the 
penny dreadfuls (although he admits he amassed quite a library of those too): 'This thing called 
Love has been written about by poets and authors for a few thousand years but cannot be truly 
explained.'545 It is one thing to know what authors have written about and another thing to have read 
it, but the point does not require Murray to have done so; it is enough that he even considered it 
when explaining his own emotional experiences.546 The classrooms of public and board schools did 
not create a generation capable of reciting the works of Homer or Herodotus, Plutarch or Plato in 
                                                 
543 IWM, 83/3/1, C.C. Miller, p.8 
544 IWM, P457, J. Murray, p.14; See chapter four for how cheating and its accompanying 'honour code' laid the 
groundwork for the expression of initiative and expectations within primary group bonds. 
545 Ibid., p.82 
546 Murray often reflects with pride his own self-education, so it is probable that he at least came in contact with some 
classical and contemporary literature. 
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their entirety.547 On the contrary those who could, appear to have been viewed as charmingly 
archaic; nostalgic survivors of a past age.548 The classics, rather, provided an articulation of what 
were treasured core societal values; each fundamentally supported the other. So even if the students 
paid no attention in class, the classical values were impossible to escape, forming an omnipresent 
part of the cultural ethos. This then, does not overturn Sheffield's view, but rather supports his 
contention that the values of leadership and officer-man relations owed much to the classical, heroic 




This section will set out how leadership was viewed in different ways depending upon rank and 
circumstance, yet stress that despite some notable differences the conception was still 
fundamentally 'classical' along the whole hierarchy. The core Edwardian principles of leadership 
were implicitly laid down through military publications; most notably FSR I. Concepts of 
leadership in the British Army by 1916 were based upon a mix of Edwardian mores, classical traits 
and practical lessons of command. This blend however, differed at the individual level and 
consequently contemporary judgement of leadership proved to be greatly subjective. 
 
For many soldiers the first written official guidance on military leadership would have been the 
British Army's FSR I. The manual opens with a short but relevant section entitled: 'Application of 
General Principles to the Leading of Troops' and, in language reminiscent of Clausewitz's 
characteristics of military genius, expounds the virtues of certain traits: 'Skill cannot compensate for 
want of courage, energy, and determination; but even high moral qualities may not avail without 
                                                 
547 Although many would explain contemporary events using references to the classics: Sheffield, Leadership in the 
Trenches (2000) p.49 
548 J.C. Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew 1914-1919 pp.125-126; see Capt. A. Attwater's description of 2/Lt W.G. 
Fletcher [2/RWF] as 'truly Elizabethan' for being able to recite Aristophanes. Fletcher was nicknamed 'the Don'. 
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careful preparation and skilful direction.'549 Continuing with the moral theme, FSR I in effect 
ranked traits by importance:  
 
The development of the necessary moral qualities is therefore the first of the objects to be attained 
the next are organization and discipline, which enable those qualities to be controlled and used when 
required. A further essential is skill in applying the power which the attainment of these objects 
confers on the troops.550 
 
The very first page, of the pre-eminent military guide to the British Army covered both firm 
leadership advice and did so in a Clausewitzian, trait-orientated fashion.551 This is later augmented 
by practical principles of command and the duties of certain specific command positions such as the 
sections Advanced Guard Commander, Personal Reconnaissance by a Commander, and 
Considerations which Influence a Commander in offering Battle.552 Despite the more specific 
examples, the manual never strays far from the formula of stating broad principles instead of 
prescriptive rules. That these principles were wholly traditional can be seen in the emphasis upon 
courage, determination, intellect, and communication. Furthermore that FSR I should mirror the 
language used by Clausewitz is not surprising. While it is highly doubtful On War was widely read 
in its original form by the pre-war officer corps, it is clear that the Prussian theorist's ideas had 
influenced the leading military minds of the pre-war British Army, albeit in relation to the 
                                                 
549 General Staff, Field Service Regulations Part I (HMSO, 1909 with 1914 amendments) p.11; For important aspects 
of Clausewitz's military genius see Carl von Clausewitz, On War (1976) pp.100-112, 138-140, 145-147, 177-178, 
184-193; for a detailed account of Clausewitz's intellectual understanding of military genius see: Ulrike Kleemeier, 
'Moral Forces in War' in Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century pp.107-121; and for 
more on his intellectual approach Hew Strachan, Clausewitz's On War: A Biography, p.89; p.93 
550 Ibid., p11 
551 For Clausewitz's influence see Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001); for influence on the British, French and Germans in particular see 
Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994) ch.10; accessible at 
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/CIE/Chapter10.htm; Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, 
Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007); Hew Strachan, Clausewitz's On 
War: A Biography (New York, Grove Press, 2007); John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London, Hutchinson, 1994) 
pp.354-355 
552 Ibid., p.79, p.102; p.107 
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contemporary debates; morale, policy and strategy for example.553 Furthermore, writers such as 
Spenser Wilkinson, Major Stewart Lygon Murray, and Colmar von der Goltz had popularised 
aspects of Clausewitz's ideas, and these were then brought to the important, but proportionally 
small, section of the army who passed through the Staff College at Camberley under the tutorship of 
G.F.R. Henderson.554 Shute as a graduate of Staff College was one of this small select band.555 
Douglas Haig was another who engaged with Clausewitz's principles. He owned a signed copy of 
Thomas Miller Maguire's annotated and abridged version of On War as well as books by Rudolph 
von Caemmerer, Colmar von der Goltz and Walter Haweis James, all of whom had written accounts 
of modern war heavily influenced by the writings of Clausewitz.556 He annotated these works 
underlining passages relating to Clausewitz's use of theory, the importance of the overthrow of the 
enemy, and morale factors in war.557 Through a combination of his own reading, cogitation and 
interaction with his peers it is clear Haig held these 'Clausewitzian' principles central to his military 
thought; he revealed as much writing to Launcelot Kiggell on 14 July 1910 complaining of the: 
'many talkers at the War Office – aldershot [sic] – Camberley x [&] Elsewhere Who know not What 
                                                 
553 For morale see G.F.R. Henderson, The Science of War: A Collection of Essays and Lectures 1891-1903 (London, 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1912) 'Lessons from the past for the present' p.173; research by Paul M. Ramsey has 
suggested Spenser Wilkinson, a Clausewitz enthusiast, was influenced by the Prussian's ideas on strategy and policy: 
'The British Way in Warfare and the Complexity of Strategy: From Spenser Wilkinson and Julian Corbett to Liddell 
Hart', paper delivered to the Institute of Historical Research Military History Seminar, London, 6 December 2011; 
for Clausewitz's further influence on policy see Walter Haweis James, Modern Strategy: An Outline of the Principles 
which guide the Conduct of Campaigns (London, William Blackwood and Sons, 1908) p.10; see also Hew Strachan, 
'Clausewitz and the First World War', The Journal of Military History Vol.75, (April 2011) pp.367-391, p.374.  
554 Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army (Westminster, Archibald Constable & Co, 1895);  Major Stewart L 
Murray, The Reality of War: An Introduction to Clausewitz (London, Hugh Rees, 1909) later republished in edited 
form as The Reality of War: A Companion to Clausewitz (London, Hugh Rees, 1914); Colmar von der Goltz, The 
Nation in Arms (London, W.H. Allen and Co., 1887; trans. Philip A. Ashworth): For ubiquity and popularity of the 
works here and in n.40 see Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and 
America, 1815-1945 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994) ch.10 passim. 
555 Shute attended 1893-1894; the other 32nd Division commander to have passed staff college was Rycroft who 
attended 1891-92. 
556 NLS, Haig library collection, Haig.18: Thomas Miller Maguire, General Carl von Clausewitz On War (London, 
William Clowes & Sons, Limited, 1909); Haig.17: Rudolph von Caemmerer, Development of Strategical Science 
During the Nineteenth Century, (London, Hugh Rees, 1905; trans. Karl von Donat); Haig.28 Colmar von der Goltz, 
The Conduct of War: A short treatise on its most important branches and guiding rules (London, Paul, Trench and 
Trübner, 1908; trans. G.F.Leverson); Haig.47 James, Modern Strategy (1908)  
557 NLS, Haig library collection, Haig.17, von Caemmerer, Development of Strategical Science... (1905) pp.76-78; 
pp.87-88; Haig.18, Maguire, On War (1909) p.6; thanks to Andrew Duncan for his help with these sources. 
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War [sic] really is, nor Clausewitz's fundamentals.'558 This is further supported by Sir William 
Robertson, a reader of Clausewitz, who wrote about his experiences at Staff College and the 
common ideals inculcated there with Haig and other peers: 'There was never, so far as I know, any 
material difference of opinion between us in regard to the main principles to be observed in order to 
win the war.'559 Recently historians have shed more light on the pivotal part Haig played in the 
writing and dissemination of FSR I offering an explanation for how such influences were 
introduced, but as Robertson suggests, these were ideas that were already in circulation through 
various means of dissemination.560 Consequently the classical, and Clausewitzian ideas of 
leadership found articulation through the main manual of the British Army, which itself was 
reflective of the wider understanding of the principles of war at this time. 
 
FSR I was not a purely Clausewitzian document, it owed as much to the Edwardian society as it did 
to the nineteenth century Prussian. Christopher Bassford has suggested that Haig's reading of 
Clausewitz may have been limited by 'a psychology that insists on a clear hierarchy of values'.561 
Rather than being solely confined to Haig's psychology it is much more reflective of a society that 
placed higher value upon certain traits, namely courage to act 'gentlemanly' in the face of 
adversity.562 Nevertheless, it would be unfair to categorise any hierarchy laid down in FSR I as 
strict. This was not a departure from Clausewitz's holistic approach but rather an order of 
preference. While moral factors were indeed the priority, a wider reading of the manual reveals the 
importance of other factors such as communication, organisation and inter-arm co-operation.563 The 
                                                 
558 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA): Kiggell Papers 1/7; Haig to Kiggell 14 July 1910. Sir 
Launcelot Kiggell (1862-1954) commissioned into the Royal Warwickshire Regiment 1882 and was Haig's Chief of 
Staff between December 1915 and January 1918. 
559 Sir William Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal (London, Constable & Company, 1921) p.98 
560 Gary Sheffield, The Chief (2011) p.60 
561 Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English (1994) ch.10 
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/CIE/Chapter10.htm (accessed: 2/2/ 2012: 11:05am) 
562 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches (2000) p.48-49 
563 General Staff, FSR I (1909) for Communications see p.111: 'Converging movements, however, demand the most 
skilful timing and complete arrangements for inter-communication, for any failure may lay the divided parts of the 
army open to risk of defeat in detail by an enterprising enemy'; for organisational advice, of particular pertinence to 
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intellectual minds of the British Army recognised the importance of moral traits such as courage, 
vigour and a determination to overcome the enemy, but it would be a blinkered reading of the text 
to suggest that this was emphasised at the expense of practical factors; it was not an 'either-or' 
choice.564 
 
Did officers read the manuals? The dissemination of FSR I's principles through the lectures and 
advice given to officers and rankers throughout the war ensured that they came into contact with the 
ideas whether they read the manuals or not. Surviving note-books indicate that lectures given in 
basic training and while on refresher courses often drew verbatim upon the principles and 
distinctions laid down in FSR I furnishing these with further specifics and practical advice.565 So, at 
the very least soldiers and officers were exposed to these ideas. Moreover, FSR I's moral principles 
were consistent with broader Edwardian values of chivalry and sacrifice; whether the soldiers were 
exposed to FSR I or not, many of the generation of citizen officers would have implicitly 
understood the societal benchmarks for good leadership. To demonstrate this, a case study example 
of Lt-Col James Neville Marshall will be used.566 
 
Marshall's actions, although remarkable in their own right, are less important than what the words 
of his contemporaries tell us about the expectations of leadership at the lower levels of the British 
Army. Through testimony of his peers and subordinates it is clear that the characteristics lauded in a 
leader were still inherently classical, irrespective of level of command. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the later trench warfare developments see The Defence chapter 108. Preliminary Measures specifically pp.122-126; 
for support see p.116: 'All leaders down to those of the smallest units, must endeavour to apply, at all stages of 
the fight, this principle of mutual support.' [Bold in original] 
564 Travers, The Killing Ground (2003; or.1987) p.48 
565 IWM, 94/23/1, Captain G.A. Potts, Potts's surviving pocket books contain notes showing copies of the distinctions 
and strengths of the various arms, this too can be seen in FSR II pp.11-17 
566 Marshall appears to have used both John, and James as forenames, he is buried under the forename James. 
http://www.cwgc.org/search-for-war-dead/casualty/336413/MARSHALL,%20JAMES%20NEVILLE His nickname 
at school was 'Bogey'. 
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Lt-Col James Neville Marshall VC was killed seven days before the Armistice leading 16/LF across 
the Sambre-Oise canal. His parent Regiment was the Irish Guards, but at the time of his death he 
was attached to the Lancashire battalion. Between September 1914 and January 1915 he fought in 
the Belgian Army which led to him being awarded the Croix de Guerre (Belgian) and Chevalier de 
l'ordre Leopold. Born in Acock's Green, Birmingham, Marshall attended King Edward’s Grammar 
School, Camp Hill, between January 1899 and March 1902. It is notable that during this time he 
was singled out as 'a very useful forward in the Rugger Team', demonstrating the value placed on 
sporting achievement in the grammar and public school system.567 After leaving school he worked 
as a clerk at the Midland Institute and later in the medical faculty at the University of Birmingham, 
before moving to Essex to become a veterinary worker.568 It is clear from the citation for his 
Victoria Cross, that leadership by example was both a critical factor in his decoration and a valued 
attribute for a front line commander: 
 
Under intense fire and with complete disregard of his own safety, he stood on the bank encouraging 
his men and assisting in the work, and when the bridge was repaired, attempted to rush across at the 
head of his battalion and was killed while doing so. 
 The passage of the canal was of vital importance, and the gallantry displayed by all ranks 
was largely due to the inspiring example set by Lt.-Col. Marshall.569 
 
The original citation was penned by Marshall's second in command, Captain G. A. Potts (11/LF, 
later 16/LF), and demonstrates clearly that both courage and leadership by example were the 
successful cornerstones of Marshall's reputation as a good leader.570 Moreover, Marshall was 
                                                 
567 IWM, Misc. 3 Item 42, Biography of Lieutenant – Colonel J.N. Marshall V.C. M.C., Misc. 3 Item 42; this is not a 
straight-forward biography but a collection of papers relating to his service from which a patchwork of biographical 
detail can be found. 
568 There is no evidence to suggest he ever professionally qualified as a vet. 
569 IWM, Misc. 3 Item 42, J. N. Marshall V.C. M.C.; London Gazette, 13 February, 1919 pp.2249-2250; see Appendix 3 
for full citation. 
570 IWM, 94/23/1, G. A. Potts, letter from Stanley F. Witherick. 
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regarded as both a disciplinarian and somewhat of a 'fire-eater'. A letter from Private S. Hudson 
(16/LF) to G.A. Potts is illuminating for the rankers' perspective of their 'Colonel':  
 
Before Col. Stone was killed I went out with Major Marshall one night in search of a German M.G. 
And he got it... We all called him the “Mad Major” (a great compliment) and he was utterly fearless. 
 By the way, this is not a morbid story, but a Token of my esteem for a very brave man.571 
 
Potts, writing in 1970, would support Hudson's appraisal of Marshall: 'He was a character of guts 
and determination, he didn't fear any-body or anything, it was a complete tragedy that a man of his 
quality should have been lost at the end of the War.'572 Time and again, the notion of 'fearlessness' 
arose in descriptions of leadership within the 32nd Division, and indeed the wider army.573 Captain 
Charles Cecil Miller (2/RIF) described his C.O., Colonel Jack Crawford, as: 'I think one of the 
stupidest men I ever met, and one of the bravest; nothing shook him from his lethargy and least of 
all shell blasts in his immediate vicinity. He was easy going and we all liked him...'574 Another 
soldier, Albert Elshaw (17/HLI) wrote of how an officer's coolness under fire coupled with a 
sarcastic wit could amuse his fellow soldiers; a transport officer who was shortly to return home: 
'distinguished himself...by standing at the door of his hut – face leathered [sic], razor poised for 
action – and in reply to a yell that shells were falling on the camp quietly commented: “Shelling the 
camp, are they? Strange.”'575. Fearlessness was not simply elevated as a blind act of bravado, but 
suggested to the men that their leaders could stay calm enough to make decisions under difficult 
circumstances; it was an obvious example of the sorts of moral qualities vaunted by FSR I and had 
been enshrined through the classics.  
                                                 
571 IWM, 94/23/1, G. A. Potts,  letter from Private S Hudson, 5/1/1971 
572 IWM, Misc. 3 Item 42, J. N. Marshall V.C. M.C.,  
573 See Ernest Shephard, A Sergeant-Major's War (Marlborough, Crowood Press, 1987) p.82, p.97; also quoted in 
Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches (2000) p.108; Sheffield has linked the portrayal of fearlessness to Hankey's 
'Beloved Captains' and identified the conflicting amalgam of characteristics praised among the officer class, 
Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches (2000) pp.108-111 
574 IWM, 83/3/1, Captain C. C. Miller, p.20 
575 IWM, PP/MCR/49, Albert Elshaw, p.61 
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The Edwardian ideals of stoicism placed high value upon those who acted in a gentlemanly fashion 
when exposed to extreme danger. Charles Douie recalled the complexities that this created among 
young subalterns, one of whom (a fellow alumnus of Rugby): 'cared very little for whether he lived 
or died.' Despite the expectation that this subaltern keep up appearances, Douie saw that he: '...had 
not previously realised how much of unhappiness the laughter of a brave man may conceal.'576 But 
despite the emotional trauma that may have prompted fearlessness in some officers, Douie still 
concluded that it was a privilege to have served with: 'so gallant a body of men, of a company 
which merited the proud title of “gentlemen unafraid”.'577 Marshall was not unique in being 
praiseworthy for his fearlessness. He was merely one of many respected officers. Conversely, many 
officers did not act in such a fashion and were held in esteem for different reasons, while some 
others were simply denounced for not being up to the expected standards.578 Nevertheless, the 
ability to lead was time and again linked to overt acts of courage under fire. This shaped the way the 
lower ranks evaluated the overall leadership of their division. 
 
In contrast to the dynamic and fearless leadership at the front, the divisional command and staffs 
could seem distant and irrelevant to some. Miller, in 1938, criticised the brigadier and divisional 
GOC for seizing: 'the opportunity to make an infernal nuisance of themselves in the way of parades 
and inspections and Lord knows what.' In terms reflecting the paternalism of the front line officers, 
he expected them to spend: 'their energy on seeing that the billets were in decent order, arranging 
good bath houses in the neighbourhood and so forth, how much it would have been appreciated.'579 
The paternalism within the army mirrored that which existed in society, thus it should be no surprise 
that officers and men expected their generals to have their best interests at heart. Nevertheless, we 
                                                 
576 Charles Douie, The Weary Road, (1929) pp.84-85 
577 Ibid., p.85 
578 IWM, 83/3/1, Captain C. C. Miller, p.20: Miller described the second in command as: 'a silly little ass of a man...He 
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579 Ibid., p.22 
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should be mindful of reading too much into post-facto recollections of individuals, especially 
among the literate and poetic public school officer class. It is evident that a mixture of attitudes 
existed towards the generalship of divisions. Frederic Manning, (7/KSLI, 3rd Division) in his semi-
autobiographical, fictionalised account depicted the range of opinion that co-existed when looking 
at the generals' jobs. After a number of condemnatory remarks from the characters of Weeper, Shem 
and Glazier, the main protagonist, Bourne, speaks up in defence of the generals: 'He's not thinking 
of you or of me or of any individual man, or of any particular battalion or division. Men, to him are 
only part of the material he has got to work with; and if he felt as you or I feel, he couldn't carry on 
with his job. It's not fair to think he's inhuman.'580 Although written as a novel, this section, built 
upon Manning's own experiences, perfectly demonstrates the difficulty of generalising. The 
expectation that paternalism should be a priority and that leaders should lead by example influenced 
the opinions of some who drew their ideas from classically influenced Edwardian attitudes 
prevalent in both the military and wider society. This, coupled with the value placed upon personal 
courage led many subordinates to evaluate their senior leaders on terms other than tactical or 
operational planning. 
 
Returning to the case study of Marshall, one final area of critical importance relevant to all levels of 
command is that of inspiration. In recent years the notion of a 'transformational' leader has given the 
idea of an inspirational leader a strong theoretical backbone, but it was nonetheless recognised as an 
important attribute of leadership during the Great War.581 Marshall's citation (quoted above) 
highlights his 'inspiring example' while Potts praised him for his attempts to 'instill [sic] a sense of 
discipline and smartness' into the disorganised battalion, according him: 'some success' but 
recognising that 'the lack of experienced officers is something which is almost impossible to 
                                                 
580 Frederic Manning, Her Privates We [originally The Middle Parts of Fortune, 1929] p.155 
581 James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (London, Harper Row, 1978) 
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overcome in a short space of time.'582 Private Hudson, too, proudly told his son of Marshall's feats, 
but perhaps the highest praise was accorded to Marshall while he was still alive.583 On 31 August 
1918 a short piece was published in the Oldham Standard entitled: 'An Irish Guardsman Attached to 
Lancs. Fusiliers' in which a soldier of the Lancashire Fusiliers described Marshall's relations with 
the men, adding: 'He is the bravest and best leader of men I have ever known and had the honour to 
fight under, he now is the most beloved of men in the Battalion.' The piece concluded with: 'I'll 
gladly follow him anywhere, he has the Regiment with him and we are all proud of him.'584 While 
other depictions of Marshall may suffer from the veneration bestowed by hindsight, this article 
strongly suggests that he did manage to instil a strong sense of loyalty among his subordinates in a 
very short space of time. Furthermore, to prompt such strong praise shows that during his time with 
16/LF he certainly had an inspirational effect upon at least one of his subordinates. Although, 
inspiration was easier to achieve as a battalion C.O., where a leader could strike up personal 
relationships with many of those under their command, it will be seen, in the case of Cameron 
Shute that inspiration of subordinates played a pivotal role in achieving results. The case of 
Marshall demonstrates that inter-personal relationships, the role of the leaders in setting an 
example, and a 'disciplined' professionalism were the key factors in promoting the improvement 
within the battalion. These factors remained relevant to the divisional commanders, and while the 
jobs of a battalion C.O. and Major-General fundamentally differed, the example provides a viable 
benchmark for evaluation of the latter's capacity to inspire. 
 
There were some within the army that saw the changing character of war as something which would 
modify the way leaders interacted with their men, William Robertson was one such figure. He 
understood the difficulties posed by the great expansion of army size for leaders relating on a 
personal level with their troops, yet still stressed the importance of leaders making: 'additional 
                                                 
582 IWM, Misc. 3 Item 42, J. N. Marshall V.C. M.C. 
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efforts to meet these new conditions, for the human factor remains unchanged and the men are as 
sensitive as ever to the human touch.'585 Despite showing an awareness of the changing context 
within which leaders in the British Army operated, Robertson was not advocating tailoring the 
leadership style in any real sense; a process which modern theorists would recognise as 
understanding leadership as a broad discipline.586 Rather, his advice should be seen as promoting 
the continued importance of strong relations between leader and led in whatever new environment 
may arise. This was not the only attempt to inculcate and promote the valued leadership qualities. 
On 1 April 1916, The Times published the lecture given by a 'senior officer' at a school for junior 
officers, entitled: 'The Duties of an Officer', later to be reproduced as SS 415.587 Prior to that 
however, it was compiled alongside other useful articles of advice and published in a short booklet 
which was distributed around 74 Infantry Brigade (25th Division), and other formations, including 
32nd Division.588 The address itself further demonstrates the fusion of classical, Clausewitzian and 
Edwardian ideals that had blended to shape the expectations of leadership for the British Army: 
character, discipline, and knowledge provide the major themes interspersed with the language of 
paternalism, patriotism and self-sacrifice.589 The speech was as much about developing beneficial 
leadership qualities in a classical fashion, while the interest and dissemination demonstrate an overt 
desire within the British Army (and indeed wider society) to attempt to understand what made good 
leaders. Thought was given to leadership but the onus was on continuity of existing principles and 
centred on the leaders' characteristics. 
 
Command was a different matter. As chapter one has set out, command is not simply a synonym for 
leadership, but a sister concept, concerning the systems in place to ensure the right decisions are 
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made by the right people in the right place at the right time. In FSR I the BEF had enshrined 
important command principles such as good planning, clear communications, decentralisation and 
flexibility to handle 'friction'.590 General Gough's conduct in July and November 1916 has 
demonstrated that delegation was inconsistent and highly contingent upon leadership style. Shute's 
leadership and influence on command will be shown to largely adhere to FSR I's principles but stop 
somewhere short of a fully decentralised system.591 Contemporary thoughts about command offer 
evidence that the British Army was looking at how best to approach battle. They recognised the 
principles behind command, even if as John Bourne has noted: 'Existing notions of command and 
existing command structures were presented with a fundamental challenge by the massive and rapid 
expansion of the Army.'592 Yet, the application of command principles as part of the solution to this 
problem remained inconsistent even at an individual level. 
 
Overall, this section has demonstrated that the British Army taught and promoted a combination of 
classical, Edwardian social and military leadership principles through FSR I and the Staff College, 
Camberley. These were inculcated in the officer class, who were already primed with many of the 
notions via the public school system. The values themselves were not equally emphasised; moral 
factors such as courage and determination took priority in development over organisation etc., 
nonetheless this did not mean other factors were wholly ignored. At the lower levels these 
prominent characteristics shaped the effects a leader could have upon his men, while also 
influencing subordinates' views of senior officers. There was still a divergent range of opinion, 
which could be highly subjective; yet the principles themselves remained consistent with the 
broader themes. The British Army attempted to understand leadership, by identifying what made 
                                                 
590 See chapter one. 
591 For current scholarship regarding decentralised command see: Bryan Watters, 'Mission Command: Auftragstaktik', 
Leadership Symposium, RAF Cranwell. 13 May 2004; David Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives (Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2006) pp.60-63; Keith Grint, Leadership Management and Command: Re-thinking D-Day (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2008) p.349; although not mentioning Auftragstaktik Bruce Gudmundsson does acknowledge 
the underlying concept in: Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918 (London, Praeger, 1989) 
p.171 
592 John Bourne, 'British Generals in the First World War' in Sheffield (ed.), Leadership & Command, pp.93-116, p.94 
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leaders successful. This next section will look at how this characteristic based understanding of 
leadership has been superseded by approaches drawing upon psychology and the social sciences, 




This section will do two things: it will first establish the modern leadership theories that will be 
used to evaluate the 32nd Division's GOC in this and the following chapter; the second part will look 
at leadership's relationship with learning and explain how the two are intimately connected. The aim 
of both these parts is to set out new ways of analysing and interpreting the decisions, and effects of 
Major-General Shute's leadership of 32nd Division. To avoid unfair or ahistorical analysis modern 
theory will only be considered alongside the established contemporary criteria. 
 
Over the last thirty years the literature relating to leadership has grown dramatically. Peter Gray has 
observed that four key areas have contributed to this rise in publication: 'the works of the successful 
businessmen [in which he also includes “business school literature”]; the psychology field 
(including occupational and organisational); the social scientists; and the broad historical church.'593 
From these four fields perhaps the most influential and theoretical work has stemmed from the 
social sciences. Authors such as James MacGregor Burns and Bernard Bass have strongly 
influenced writers in the other three fields and established leadership ideas that challenged existing 
trait or character based approaches.594 The idea of transactional and transforming leaders has arisen 
from this. There was little scope for a GOC, 32nd Division, to 'cause a metamorphosis in form or 
structure' of the extent that would meet Burns's definition of transforming leadership.595 The 
                                                 
593 Peter Gray, 'The Strategic leadership and direction of the Royal Air Force strategic air offensive against Germany 
from inception to 1945' (Ph.D thesis, University of Birmingham, 2010) p. 
594 A summary of their ideas is given in the literature review. 
595 Burns, Transforming Leadership (2003) p.24; Leadership (1974) p.20 
 191 
motivation of subordinates through incentive, threat of punishment and bargaining, core aspects of 
transactional leadership, were employed albeit unknowingly. 
 
The contextual approach to understanding leadership problems offered by Keith Grint and heavily 
drawing on the work of Horst Rittel and Marvin Webber, is more useful for this study. The 
categorisation of problems as 'tame', 'wicked' and 'critical' reinserts context as an important factor in 
deciding the appropriate leadership methods.596 Management solutions can be effective for tame 
problems, but wicked ones require a leader to be consultative and ask the correct questions. Critical 
problems create the conditions where authoritarian styles are best suited. This type of leadership 
style allows for a rapid response to the crisis as it unfolds.597 Like all typologies there is a degree of 
artificiality about both Grint, Rittel and Webber's tame, wicked and critical problems, and the 
corresponding leadership solutions given. The emphasis on direct decision-making in a crises is 
muddied by the circumstances of poor communications which shrouded the self-evident character 
of a critical problem. In this command vacuum Shute had very little scope to influence events. 
Consequently, identity and communication formed important parts of leadership's 'ensemble of arts' 
and Shute's employment of these will be analysed alongside his responses to contextual leadership 
problems.598 
 
Assessing how leadership affected the fighting performance of 32nd Division is only part of the 
answer to how the formation learnt. Through their actions, leaders could directly shape the capacity 
of their subordinates to learn. To adequately assess this it is necessary to set out a brief and simple 
way of gauging how leaders can affect their followers and shape the pace and speed of learning. 
The literature has not ignored the overlap between leadership and learning. Both the business and 
                                                 
596 Horst Rittel & Marvin Webber, 'Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning', Policy Sciences Vol 4: No 2 (June, 
1973) pp.155-169 
597 Grint, Leadership Management and Command: Re-thinking D-Day (2008) p.11 
598 Keith Grint, The Arts of Leadership (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) p.27 
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social science schools have looked at how 'transformational' leadership can infuse and promote 
organisational learning.599 These approaches are much less convincing in a historical context where 
transformational leadership cannot be artificially implanted. Other fields have been slower to 
evaluate learning and leadership as inter-related aspects of performance. In the 'historical church', 
and more specifically the First World War literature, progress has been made in both fields but 
rarely have they overlapped. One exception is John Bourne's account of 'British Generals in the 
First World War' which offers a firm defence of leadership within the broader context of the 
'learning curve' idea.600 Nevertheless, there is no attempt to explain how leadership affected 
learning beyond the general improvement in the conduct of operations as experience grew. To 
rectify this three areas where leaders directly affect learning can be considered: 
 
1. As a mentor: Direct advice and guidance is given by the leader to subordinates, in a similar 
fashion as a teacher does for a student. 
2. As a role model: The leader is exemplary in both conduct and attitude. This differs from a 
mentor in that it does not require direct interaction. Application, consideration and 
thoughtful study of war and its conduct may create an environment which promotes good 
learning practices.601 
3. Through discussion and appraisal: By either informal conversation or direct appraisal the 
leader can mould subordinates (or peers) in how they develop.602 
 
                                                 
599 Meredith Atwood, Jordan Mora, and Abram Kaplan, 'Learning to lead: evaluating leadership and organizational 
learning' Leadership and Organizational Development Journal, Vol. 31: No.7 (2010) pp.576-595; Lillas Brown and 
Barry Posner, 'Exploring the relationship between learning and leadership'  Leadership and Organizational 
Development Journal Vol. 22: No.5/6 (2001) pp.274-280 
600 Bourne, 'British Generals in the First World War' in Sheffield (ed.), Leadership & Command, pp.93-116; for a 
similarly important study of command within the broader framework of the 'learning curve' see articles in Gary 
Sheffield and Dan Todman (eds.) Command and Control on the Western Front (Staplehurst, Spellmount, 2004) 
601 Clausewitz recognised the need for a thoughtful approach to war: 'A specialist who has spent half his life trying to 
master every aspect of some obscure subject is surely more likely to make headway than a man who is trying to 
master it in a short time.' On War (1976), p.141 
602 The formulation of these three aspects has been greatly been aided by conversations with Peter Gray about the 
importance, influence and consequences of leadership in relation to learning. He has my sincerest thanks. 
 193 
This is not intended to be a comprehensive list, but a way to introduce an analytical component to 
and help understand the effects a leader can have upon peer and subordinate improvement. It must 
be recognised that this was not a one-way relationship nor was leadership and learning confined to 
those in positions of authority, discussions amongst peers took place and lessons went up as well as 
down. Consideration also needs to be given to the circumstances within which leaders were 
operating, communications, pressure from superiors and enemy actions modified a leader's capacity 




Although sometimes implied by the proponents of an approach, no leadership theory can rightfully 
claim comprehensive treatment of the entire domain of leadership phenomena. Because at least some 
empirical support is available for each perspective, leadership appears to be a far more complex set 
of cause-and-effect relationship than suggested by any one of the comparatively simple theoretical 
models offered to date.603 
 
This section will briefly summarise the notable aspects of the contemporary and modern models to 
offer a loose set of parameters for evaluation. As Arthur Jago (quoted above) recognised, leadership 
theory should not be thought of as a set of conflicting, contradictory ideas but a set of interpretive 
tools which can enable us to explore the complexity of the causal relationship between leadership 
and other concepts; structure, efficiency, and learning for example. While written in 1982 Jago's 
observation remains true today, and for this reason these parameters should only be considered an 
outline for evaluation. The contemporary section showed that Edwardian leadership values drew 
heavily on classical ideas. This was fundamentally a trait based approach, which remained 
                                                 
603 Arthur G. Jago, 'Leadership Perspectives in Theory and Research', Management Science, Vol.28: No.3 (1982) 
pp.315-336, p.330 
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consistent at all levels and in differing contexts, but could be divided into moral and organisational 
strands. The latter encompassed much of what today would be considered 'command structure' and 
has been assessed in chapters one, two and three. Organisational qualities will instead be considered 
in relation to the leaders' personal abilities. The key 'traits' sought by contemporaries in the leaders 
of 32nd Division were: 
 
The Moral: 
• Courage (into which go gallantry and fearlessness) 
• Energy 
• Determination 
• Inspiration (through example, and paternalism) 
 
The Organisational: 
• Command Skill – Individual planning, communication and flexibility of direction 
• Professional knowledge  
• Discipline (and control) 
 
No single modern model of leadership will be used to unite the disparate ideas of Bass, Grint, Rittel 
and Webber but where appropriate their theories will be used to explore the difficulties and 
decisions made by the leaders of 32nd Division. 
 
An explanation needs to be given for what the fundamental aim of leadership is and how this can be 
brought together with learning. Sheffield, drawing on the works of W.D. Henderson, has identified 
two aims: 'the achievement of cohesion, when the formal military unit becomes for its members a 
substitute for family' and 'to mould the cohesive group so that their goals are congruent with those 
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of the greater organisation, the army.'604 This is reasonable at the tactical level of command but as a 
leader's focus shifts to operational and strategic factors the means of achieving these aims 
necessarily change.605 For a divisional GOC fostering a culture of cohesion and unity of purpose 
was as important as ensuring specific units conformed to this ideal. One issue with this definition of 
the aims of leadership is that it does not accommodate a leader's responsibility to ensure 
improvement in fighting performance. Cohesion and congruency may ensure men will follow 
orders willingly but it does not account for them knowing what they are doing when they do so. 
Therefore the aim of leadership should be: 
 
To achieve cohesion within the unit or constituent units of the formation so that the strongest  
possible bonds exist between members. They must also ensure that the goals of the organisation are 
shared by the smaller groups being commanded. Leaders must seek to improve the ability of the led 
to prosecute war successfully. 
 
This added component brings leadership and learning much closer together and highlights the true 
purpose of both, within the military context, that is, the maintenance of fighting efficiency and 
improvement of combat performance. The following section will establish the case study of 
Cameron Deane Shute, GOC 32nd Division from February 1917 until April 1918. His characteristics 
and conformity with Edwardian standards will be analysed. Chapter six will build upon this to 
explore his understanding of war and success as a 'learning leader'. 
 
5.2 A Case Study in Leadership and Learning: Cameron Shute Context and 
                                                 
604 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches (2000) p.43; W.D. Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat 
(Washington DC, National Defence University, 1985) pp.11-16; see also Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The 
Behaviour of Men in Battle (originally published as Firing Line) (2nd Ed. London, Cassell, 2003; 1985) pp.340-353  
605 Chapter four has shown that congruency with the aims of the organisation are pivotal at all levels within a division, 
but this does not necessarily require strict adherence to orders. Orders can be broken with the aim of preserving or 




This case study will assess Shute's command during his time with the 32nd Division.606 It will not be 
a chronological study of his time with the division but will assess using examples to build a picture 
of his leadership style. This first chapter will focus on the moral elements of Shute's leadership and 
demonstrate that by contemporary definitions he was a strong leader, embodying many of the 
principles valued by the British Army at the time. This had some problematic ramifications: Shute 
was liable to be too aggressive when the circumstances demanded reserve; his manner with 
subordinates was often brusque when he felt standards were not being maintained; and he divided 
opinion through his punctiliousness, inspiring fear in some, and deep admiration in others. The 
following chapter will build on this by exploring his organisational and tactical understanding as a 
leader as well as his influence on learning within the division. 
 
Shute is a curious figure in the historiography of the First World War. The bawdy poem by A.P. 
Herbert lent the General an immortality few other divisional, or corps commanders have 
received.607 Yet this has tended to focus historical attention on Shute for his four months in charge 
of 63rd (Royal Naval) Division.608 Those historians that have looked at Shute's other commands be 
that of a brigade, division or his later time as V Corps commander have furnished interesting, but 
limited conclusions.609 Outside of his role as a figure of satire, Shute makes the occasional cameo 
appearance but has never been the lead actor. To an extent this is unsurprising; the largest period of 
                                                 
606 For a short biography see Appendix 5. 
607 For A. P. Herbert's poem see Appendix 6. 
608 Gordon Corrigan, Mud, Blood and Poppycock (London, Cassell, 2003) pp.87-88; Leonard Sellers, The Hood 
Battalion (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 1995) 
609 Brigade: Bourne, 'British Generals in the First World War' in Sheffield (ed.), Leadership & Command, pp.93-116, 
pp.102-103; Corps: Peter Simkins, 'Somme Reprise' in Bond (ed.) 'Look to your Front' Studies in The First World 
War (Staplehurst, Spellmount, 1999) p.151; Andy Simpson, Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the 
Western Front 1914-1918 (Staplehurst, Spellmount, 2006) pp. 163-169; Michael LoCicero's thesis 'Moonlight 
Massacre: The night Operation on the Passchendaele Ridge, 2nd December 1917' (Ph.D thesis, University of 
Birmingham, 2011) is a worthy exception. Although only relating to one engagement, it covers Shute's leadership 
style and personality in an even-handed fashion. The continuity of Shute’s operational method from Brigade to V 
Corps is outside the remit of this study but would provide a fertile avenue of future research. 
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time he spent in one post was as GOC 32nd Division, a formation without a divisional history to 
advertise its exploits.  
 
Context of Leadership 
 
To truly understand Shute's performance as GOC 32nd Division, the context in which he joined the 
division needs to be covered. After Major-General Rycroft was replaced on 21 November 1916 by 
Major-General Barnes, the 32nd Division experienced a small renaissance in reputation. 1 July and 
the bloody localised battles on the Ancre between 18-23 November had soured the reputation of the 
division in the eyes of some. This was down to the former GOC, William Rycroft, who according to 
Lord Stanhope: '[He] did not act happily with either his staff or his brigadiers.'610 As far as General 
Gough was concerned, the 32nd Division had bungled his attack on 3 July, had an insubordinate unit 
– 11/Borders – and failed to carry its objectives in the Ancre attacks.611 Despite research suggesting 
Gough's abrasive and assertive command style meant he had to shoulder some of the blame, it is not 
difficult to see why he may have had concerns about the 32nd Division.612 Irrespective of Gough's 
opinion, the relationship between Rycroft and his superior had broken down irreparably.613 Once 
Rycroft was replaced things started to improve. This culminated on 10 February 1917 with the 
                                                 
610 Lord Stanhope quoted in Richard Holmes, Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-1918 (London, 
Harper Collins, 2004) p.222 
611 For 3 July 1916 see: TNA, WO 95/2368 32nd Div. General Staff, 'S.G. 142/169' 4th July 1916, report in response to X 
Corps's G.178, which itself very probably prompted by Reserve Army's 'G.S. 406/49' 3 July 1916 see TNA, WO 
95/851 X Corps General Staff. For more on 3 July 1916 see Gary Sheffield, 'An Army Commander on the Somme: 
Hubert Gough' in Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front: The British 
Army's Experience 1914-1918 (Staplehurst, Spellmount, 2004) pp.71-95; p.78; p.80; Simpson, Directing Operations 
(2006) pp.38-39. For insubordination of 11/Borders see chapter four; TNA, WO 32/17700 'Report on the 
insubordination of the 11th Borders'; Brigadier-General Timothy P. Finnegan 'Failure of 11th Bn The Border 
Regiment to Carry Out an Attack on 10 July 1916' in The British Army Review Num.144 (Spring 2008) pp.92-95. 
For the Ancre: TNA, WO 95/2368 32nd Div. General Staff, 17-23 November 1916; 'Narrative of Operations Carried 
out by the 32nd Division  - 18th November 1916' 
612 See chapters two and three; Ian F. Beckett, 'Hubert Gough, Neill Malcolm and Command on the Western Front' in 
Bond (ed.) Look to Your Front (1999) pp.1-12; pp.2-3 suggests a climate of fear had arisen; Helen McCartney and 
Gary Sheffield, 'Hubert Gough' in Ian Beckett & Steven Corvi, Haig's Generals, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2006) 
pp.75-96; p.91 and Simpson, Directing Operations (2006) pp.38-39, have pointed to Gough's 'assertive' and 'hands-
on' command style. 
613 TNA, Cab 45/138 E.G. Wace to J.E. Edmonds, 30 October 1936. 
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successful attack on Ten Tree Alley, conducted by 97 Brigade, adjacent to the site of the previous 
year's vicious fighting.614 This brought warm praise from Gough who on the 20 February sent the 
following message: 
 
On leaving the command please convey to the whole division my best wishes for the future and in 
particular to the G.O.C. 97th Brigade and to his officers and men my appreciation of their very 
successful attack on TEN TREE ALLEY on 10th/11th February and the fine offensive spirit 
displayed. I am sure this is only the beginning of many and greater successes. 
 (Signed). General Gough.615 
 
It is possible that Gough sent this simply as a standard morale-boosting token of gratitude. Yet his 
previous conduct suggests this was not the case. When 32nd Division began the move north on 16 
July 1916 to the Cambrin, Cuinchy and Bethune area, Gough sent no similar thanks.616 Even if this 
was simply a formality, it had the effect that there was no lingering animosity, on the surface at 
least. When Shute arrived, the division essentially had a clean slate. 
 
There is little evidence to suggest that the men themselves worried too much about the intrigues of 
the commanders. Instead they reflected upon the losses and what it would take to be victorious. 
Albert Elshaw, 17/HLI, observed after the war that the mood amongst the men had subtly changed 
by those early months of 1917:  
 
The determination to “see it through” was still there, but the gay adventurous spirit of the early days 
                                                 
614 TNA, WO 95/2368 32nd Div. General Staff, 10th February 1917. Notably the 11/Borders played a leading role in 
overcoming the German positions. 
615 Ibid., 20th February 1917 
616 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, July 1916; Haig notes that Gough was 'very pleased' by the appointment 
of R.W.R. Barnes to replace W.H. Rycroft. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, The First World War Political, Social 
and Military Manuscript Sources: Series One: The Haig Papers from the National Library of Scotland, Part I Haig’s 
Autograph Great War Diary (Brighton: Harvester Press Microfilm Publications LTD, 1987) 21 November 1916  
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gave way to a desire to “get it over”. Whilst the sense of humour was by no means quenched, the 
attitude to war became less of a game played to set rules and conduct – the realization had dawned 
that this was a savage fight to a finish.617 
 
This feeling of determination and apprehension was shared by the others within the division. 
Shortly before the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line the men of 16/HLI were sombre but 
determined, as the battalion history recorded:  
 
The black mood was on the men at the eve of a remarkable phase of the war. But they carried on with 
grim cheerfulness and a profound fatalism, knowing that if their own lot was miserable, their 
enemy's was infinitely worse, and that endurance now stood for a quicker finish to the ghastly 
business.618 
 
The actions on the Somme, at Thiepval and Beaumont Hamel, had left their mark upon the division 
and their shadow hung across the minds of those in the battalion who survived: 
 
The expressed intention of the French to advance to a depth of several miles was, to put it no higher, 
regarded as far too sanguine by troops on whom were scarcely healed the scars of former battles that 
had been announced with a like flourish of trumpets. The deeply-bitten lessons of yesterday and the 
lately-ended purgatory wiped the lustre from any hopes that this was to be different from the 
others.619 
 
Despite the change in mood the attacking intent was far from subdued and events were to quickly 
provide Shute with the opportunity to improve morale, impose his own leadership style upon the 
                                                 
617 IWM, PP/MCR/49, A. Elshaw, Mudlarks and Sandbags: A Troglodyte's Tales of Nieuport, Passchendaele and the 
Somme During the Critical days of 1917 [unpublished memoir] p.31 
618 Thomas Chalmers (ed.), A Saga of Scotland: History of the 16th Battalion Highland Light Infantry (City of Glasgow 
Regiment) (Glasgow, John M’Callum & Co, 1930) p.79 
619 Chalmers (ed.), History of the 16th Battalion HLI (1930) p.78 
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formation and score an important victory against the enemy. On 16 March 1917 the Germans in the 
trenches opposite the 32nd Division, now on the extreme right of the British line at Le Quesnel, 
began their withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line. This presented the GOC with a fundamentally 
'wicked' problem of how he would co-ordinate the follow up. He had to surmount supply, 
communications and engineering challenges while maintaining a steady advance. Furthermore 
Shute was still new to the division and the majority of its personnel. He joined on 19 February 1917 
but only spent ten days with the division before the German withdrawal; 15 days were spent on 
leave in Britain (between 1-15 March).620 Shute was for all intents and purposes, a new commander 
entering the division on the eve of the German withdrawal. Under Shute's command the 32nd 
Division was able to rapidly close with the Germans and on 1 and 2 April 1917 they engaged the 
enemy’s advanced positions in and around the villages of Savy and Holnon. The attacks were 
carefully planned and swiftly executed but came at a high cost in casualties. This aggressive style 
favouring the attack wherever possible would typify Shute's command of 32nd Division. During 
1917 the division faced two more major challenges: the Battle of Nieuport 10 July 1917 and the 
attack in the Ypres salient, 2 December 1917. These posed different challenges for Shute: at 
Nieuport the division was attacked by the Germans and faced a crisis, at Passchendaele it was the 
'wicked' problem of how to conduct an attack against an entrenched enemy, over broken terrain and 
with only limited artillery support. The manpower shortage of 1918 limited the scale of attacks 
made by the division to two major raids in February on the German positions in the Houthulst 
Forest and an assault on the village of Ayette by three battalions on 5 April. Similar problems of 
planning and co-ordination were faced. The division's responses shared many common features 
with previous assaults; wicked problems were beginning to be 'tamed'. The following section will 
look at how Shute's personal leadership characteristics contributed to solving the challenges faced 
by the division. When Shute took over command of the division it had an improving reputation; the 
                                                 
620 TNA, WO 95/2373 32nd Division Headquarters Branches and Services: AA & QMG, 19-28 February 1917; 1 and 15 
March 1917. 
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troops were cautious and cynical but determined to see it through; and the coming months of 1917 




The value of a formation, no matter what its size, depends on the character and personality of its 
commander, whether he be a colonel or a lieutenant. A company can be what its commander makes 
it; the men will catch his fire and enthusiasm.621 
 
As the size of the force under a leader's command expanded, so too did the difficulty of impressing 
the individual character upon that body of troops. Identity and the cohesion forged by it, was not 
easily changed, but over time the character of the leader shaped the outlook of the subordinates. 
This was understood by Shute who in a lecture delivered at the Staff College, Camberley spoke of 
'COMMAND. Efficiency of every Formation or Unit from Div. downwards is a reflection of 
PERSONALITY OF COMMANDER.'622 Shute strove to create an aggressive ethos within the 
division. To understand this his personality, principles and character need to be explored. It would 
be easy to view Shute as an archetypal over-aggressive commander, whose 'offensive spirit' led to 
an unreasonably strict code of discipline and needless loss of life. His time with 63rd (Royal Naval) 
Division has led John Bourne to view him as insensitive to the backgrounds of the troops he was 
commanding, while Gordon Corrigan has taken a more forgiving approach by defending the 
principles underlying the punctiliousness.623 These opinions and approaches are useful, but paint 
too simplistic a picture of the General's attitude to leadership and war. Shute was not simply 
                                                 
621 W.N. Nicholson, Behind the Lines, (London, Jonathan Cape, 1939) p.48 
622 Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC) library, A.H. Marindin Papers, 'Lecture delivered by Major 
General Sir C.D. Shute, KCB, KCMG, November 1920' p.8; Thanks to Gary Sheffield and Michael LoCicero for 
alerting me to this document. 
623 For views differing views of  Shute's approach  to the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division see Corrigan, Mud, Blood and 
Poppycock (2003) pp.87-88 and Bourne, 'British Generals in the First World War' in Sheffield (ed.), Leadership & 
Command, p.103; Michael LoCicero, 'Moonlight Massacre: The night Operation on the Passchendaele Ridge, 2nd 
December 1917' (2011) pp.353-362 
 202 
aggressive owing to ego or a desire to act with the appropriate measure of 'offensive spirit' but an 
optimist with confidence in his own and his subordinates’ ability to plan and launch attacks. He 
emphasised discipline, and 'spit-and-polish' which in certain circumstances did not go down well, 
but he also adhered to the Edwardian ideal of personal bravery and cared for his charges. It is these 
elements that will now be considered. 
 
Courage and Discipline 
 
Shute possessed two characteristics which made him a strong leader by contemporary measures. He 
was physically courageous and a disciplined soldier who expected the same standards from his men. 
Yet, despite meeting contemporary definitions and expectations, in a practical capacity these traits 
could have unforeseen negative effects. His courage in reconnaissance and front line inspections 
could lead to subordinates feeling stifled and under-appreciated, while his discipline manifesting in 
'spit-and-polish' could seem excessive and pointless to the front line soldier. 
 
In a physical sense Shute was certainly a courageous commander going forward to inspect the lines 
and undertaking personal reconnaissances. While commanding 59 Infantry Brigade, 20th (Light) 
Division, in front of Guillemont, September 1916, he conducted a personal reconnaissance of the 
front line. One Staff Officer recalled how: 'He stood up on the parapet, eighty yards from the 
Germans approximately, and gazed through his glasses for five or six minutes'.624 This had a 
profound effect on some of his subordinates, Sergeant A. K. Paterson served under Shute during this 
time: 
 
General Shute was the finest offensive officer I've ever come across. He was a man who wanted to be 
                                                 
624 Major H.G. Parkyn, The Rifle Brigade Chronicle (London, The Rifle Brigade Club and Association, 1937) p.330. 
Thanks to Michael LoCicero for bringing this source to my attention. 
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in the line and to know exactly what was going on...[He] was no milksop, no remote, godlike figure 
so detached from his men that he saw them as pawns or statistics.625 
 
Not everyone was as impressed by the visits. When one 'Top Brass' (more than likely Shute or one 
of the Brigadiers) was given a tour of the lines in the Nieuport sector, the following conversation 
was recorded by Albert Elshaw: 
 
“We get a fair amount of shelling hereabouts, the men call it 'Whizz Bang corner!”  
“Quite. Quite. Did you say, Captain, that there is an alternative way back? I think we'll take it!” 
One of war's horror “stories” - maybe! 
Nevertheless, no man would go out of his way to traverse a shelled area except strictly on duty.626 
 
As John Bourne has correctly pointed out, this personal approach came with risks: 'Getting up to the 
trenches and back was a long and exhausting business, much of it necessarily on foot. During that 
period, in effect, he commanded nothing.'627 Moreover the very presence of such an authority could 
have a destabilising effect on the subordinate commanders and troops. Lt-Col. Ian MacDonell, who 
at the time was in temporary command of the 1/Dorsets, had one such experience: 
 
One evening after the trenches had been knocked about by bombardment during the night – Gen 
Chute [sic] came round – He only looked at a little piece of the line + was very nervous of shell fire 
'+from start to finish he damned me'628 
 
Shute went on to question him about the defensive posture of the trenches, why they were in a bad 
                                                 
625 Quoted in Lyn MacDonald, The Somme (London, Michael Joseph, 1983) pp.230-231 
626 IWM, PP/MCR/49, Albert Elshaw, p.65 
627 John Bourne, 'British Generals in the First World War' in Sheffield (ed.), Leadership & Command, pp.93-116, p.105 
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state and whether a fatigue system had been put into place. When MacDonell informed him of what 
had been done, the situation became heated: 
 
We had [a fatigue system] but he would not listen to what it was – he swore - + jumped – If I could 
not do better he would. 
If a shell had come + killed me, I would have welcomed it, if it had also killed him. 
He went away growling and cursing. 
He is said to be a very good General - + it may be – I don't know that – But he is hated by everyone 
but his jackals.629 
 
This incident demonstrates two facets of Shute's command: his occasional personal reconnaissance 
and an interrogatory approach to his subordinate's actions. In this case his actions did little to endear 
him to MacDonell but as will be argued in the next chapter, there were benefits. Shute understood 
that timing was important when going forward. In his Staff College lecture he advised his students: 
'Unit Commanders should not be in too great a hurry to advance their H.Qs. They lose touch whilst 
doing so. “Better to drive from the box than sit on the necks of the leaders.”'630 As chapter three has 
shown, the staff played an important role in the information gathering process during 1917. By 
promoting the collection of information in this manner Shute was able to keep abreast of the 
circumstances in the front line without undue exposure himself.631 Shute was courageous enough to 
visit the front, and he generally conducted personal reconnaissance of new areas but regular visits 
became increasingly difficult to reconcile with the pressures of divisional command. Still, Shute's 
visits fulfilled the expectations that an Edwardian leader be physically unperturbed by danger, yet it 
brought limited benefits and could destabilise command of subordinate units. His attitude to 
discipline offers some explanation for Shute's front line involvement. 
                                                 
629 IWM, 88/39/1, Lt-Col I H MacDonell, 24 June 1917 
630 JSCSC Library, A.H. Marindin Papers, Shute Lecture, November 1920 p.5 
631 See also A.B. Scott, 'The Diary of Lieutenant A.B. Scott, M.C.' in Whinyates, Artillery and Trench Mortar 
Memories (1932) December 18th and 19th 1917, p.86 
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Shute was a strict disciplinarian. At the heart of this was his belief that 'weak and passive command 
results in discontent, slackness behind the lines, want of resolution in battle and failure (with 
inevitable corollary of failure i.e. Discontent and loss of moral).'632 Slackness for Shute was a 
manifestation of poor command and the only way to stop this from happening was to be decisive 
and proactive. This meant the men, both infantry, supporting and specialist arms were subjected to 
regular inspections when out of the line. This 'spit-and-polish' was understandable given the values 
of the day but in much the same way as regular forward forays could disrupt the troops, so too could 
inspections. Rev. Rowan Earnest Grice-Hutchinson, chaplain to the 32nd Divisional Artillery, 
observed Shute's exacting standards:  
 
The Divisional General, Shute, inspected the D.A.C. to-day, Headquarters and B échelon here at 10 
o'clock, and 1 and 2 Sections at 12. I rode up to the latter and viewed it from afar. I thought the 
Column looked splendid, but I heard afterwards that, though he praised the animals, yet he had a lot 
to say about the harness and tidiness of the men.633 
 
 
Lt Ludovic Heathcoat-Amory, Staff Captain Divisional Artillery, was a little less diplomatic when 
he bemoaned the cleaning required for inspections: 'Round 168 lines. Mud bad. Damn this 
burnishing steel – enough to do without it.' Only four days earlier he had observed that 'All-Highest 
[Shute] back on war-path!'634 While a persuasive case can be made for the importance of 
maintaining strict discipline, Shute went too far. On 21 May 1917 Shute sent a 16 point 
memorandum to his brigades, specialist headquarters and divisional troops bemoaning the current 
                                                 
632 JSCSC Library, A.H. Marindin Papers, Shute Lecture, November 1920 p.8 
633 Grice-Hutchinson, M.C., 'The Diary...' in Whinyates (ed.), Artillery and Trench Mortar Memories 32nd Division 
(1932) 4 May 1917; pp.205-206 
634 Lt Ludovic Heathcoat-Amory, 'The Diary of the Late Major L. Heathcoat-Amory' in Whinyates (ed.) Artillery and 
Trench Mortar Memories (1932) 4 and 2 February 1918, pp.640-641 
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state of 'March Discipline'. Some points were fair: '(e) Packs were not always well fitted and in 
many cases were evidently over-loaded.' This could unnecessarily tire men out and cause injuries. 
'(a) Unpunctuality of units at the starting point resulting in gaps in the column' had the potential to 
cause much greater problems if units were late arriving at their destination. Conversely some 
criticisms could only have drawn the ire of the officers and NCOs forced to implement them: 'In 
some cases men broke their sections of fours to avoid puddles bad places in the road, etc., Officers 
and N.C.Os did not check this.'635 Nor could the divisional cyclists have appreciated being 
instructed to push their bikes in file behind the columns either.636 Adding to the discomfort of the 
men by applying the 'regular army' code of discipline was not always the most prudent method of 
winning their trust.637 Discipline played an important role in maintaining standards and efficiency, 
but when taken to extremes it invited the employment of 'consent and evade'.638 Nevertheless, 
Shute's martinet discipline did not constitute an abrogation of his paternalistic responsibilities to his 
men. The welfare of those under his command remained important to him throughout his career. His 
obituary recognised this neglected side of his character: 'his voice would often break in talking over 
their [the regimental soldiers'] hardships and their casualties; a trait in his character not always 
realized.'639 This is developed further in the following chapter, but it is enough to observe here that 
despite his strict code of discipline he held to the same paternalistic duty of care for his subordinates 
as other Edwardian officers.  Shute's approach to both courage and discipline, while in line with 
contemporary pre-war attitudes to strong leadership, was not wholly appropriate to practicalities of 
both the situation and the changed composition of the army. While he recognised the problems with 
                                                 
635 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, May 1917, Appendix 8. 
636 By instructing cyclists to push their bicycles it was possible to keep a standard pace and set timing which would be 
more difficult if mounted. It could also reduce wear on the bicycles. It is unlikely these rationales would have made 
the instruction any more tolerable to the men. 
637 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches (2000) pp.1-12 
638 This is covered in chapter four. IWM, 11/6/2, Lt A. Knight, 5 November 1916 letter describes how his company was 
able to 'win' (steal) a wheel-barrow that was then attached to the Battalion (17/HLI) establishment. The company 
was loath to leave it so it was given to Knight to transport during route marches. He was more than happy to use it to 
avoid the usual chafing of his rucksack. 
639 Major H.G. Parkyn, The Rifle Brigade Chronicle (London, The Rifle Brigade Club and Association, 1937) p.335 see 
also p.329 
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going forward as a divisional commander, his strict discipline remained a permanent feature of his 
command. 
 
Aggression, Determination and Optimism 
 
Shute was an aggressive leader. On 27 March 1918 with the German offensives in full swing the 
commander and his GSO1 reconnoitred the line they were going to join in the Third Army area 
South of Arras. Upon returning Lt Ludovic Heathcoat-Amory observed: 'General Shute, is quite 
happy about situation – says French are waiting their time to counter-attack. We shall probably join 
in from Arras.'640 This was not an isolated incident; earlier in the year Heathcoat-Amory had again 
noted in his diary that they would be out of the line for 24 hours but followed it up with: 'I wonder! 
General Shute wants to go south to St. Quentin for a battle.'641 The yearning for combat was not a 
deplorable characteristic in a commander and Shute's understated response to the German 
offensives can be partially explained by the fact that the line he reconnoitred in March had not yet 
become the focal point of the German offensives. Yet it was his natural optimism and risk taking 
that underpinned his perceived aggression. In his 1920 Staff College lecture he argued: 'The strong 
man in war is an OPTIMIST. He won't allow himself that he is going to fail. You will always find 
plenty of people who try to persuade you to take the line of least resistance. Pay no attention to 
them once you have made up your mind.'642 He followed this up by saying:  
 
Don't hesitate to take risks. Don't dread defeat. Feel sure of victory. Your optimism will communicate 
itself to those under you. Remember that the man who takes no risks will never get great results and 
                                                 
640 Lt Ludovic Heathcoat-Amory, 'The Diary of the Late Major L. Heathcoat-Amory' in Whinyates (ed.) Artillery and 
Trench Mortar Memories (1932) March 27th 1918, p.642 
641 Ibid., January 2nd 1918 p.639 
642 JSCSC Library, A.H. Marindin Papers, Shute Lecture, November 1920 p.5 
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does not deserve them. Fortune favours the bold.643  
 
These views were in line with the contemporary understanding of what made a good commander 
and his emphasis upon acting with resolution drew heavily upon the pre-war principles espoused in 
FSR I.644 Furthermore, looking at the intellectual development of the pre-war Edwardian Army, Tim 
Travers described the twin ideas of 'the psychological battlefield' and 'the cult of the offensive'. 
While these overstate the division between an emphasis on fire-power and morale, the work does 
throw light on the pre-eminence of the offensive in military thought.645 It was from this 
environment that Shute's views developed. He was not a maverick. His attitudes adhered to the 
traditional perspective regarding how a commander should lead. Shute's views on leaders reaching a 
rapid decision are relevant to understanding his actions during the conflict:  
 
Any fool can solve a military problem in several days or hours. It will then be too late. Must be 
decided at once. Then, if only nearly right, if carried through with determination overcoming all 
obstacles, all will be well. 
 “Look before you leap but if you're going to leap don't look too long.”646 
 
It is possible to see the echoes of the contemporary leadership values of energy, courage and 
determination in the characteristics Shute was advocating. It is through these that Shute's aggressive 
approach must be viewed. How these characteristics and aggression shaped Shute's command 
decisions will now be analysed. 
 
One of the most telling indications of Shute's optimism and aggression came in the wake of the 
                                                 
643 Ibid., p.6 
644 General Staff, FSR I (1909), p.107  
645 Travers, The Killing Ground (2003; or.1987) pp.47-49; see also General Staff, War Office, FSR I (1909) Chap. VII – 
The Battle, section 100. The Offensive and Defensive in Battle pp.108-109 for further primary evidence of the strong 
emphasis on the attack. 
646 JSCSC Library, A.H. Marindin Papers, Shute Lecture, November 1920 p.6 
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German attack on the British positions at Nieuport 10 July 1917. Although he was satisfied by the 
way his division had reacted during the defence of the bridgehead over the Yser, he wished to turn 
the tables on the Germans and launch his own counter-attack. Operating under the impression that 
97 Brigade's local attempts to regain the lost front line trenches were progressing successfully, he 
issued orders at 11.30pm on 11 July for a deliberate counter-offensive on the town of Lombartzyde 
to be conducted by 14 Brigade at a later unspecified date.647 It soon became clear that the British 
positions were worse than initially thought and 97 Brigade had failed in its immediate efforts to 
completely recapture the ground lost to the Germans. The Lombartzyde attack was temporarily 
shelved [until early August] and the target was changed; plans were re-drawn to attempt an 
organised counter-attack to reclaim the lost positions.648 These were issued on 13 July 1917, and the 
operation took place on 15 July at 1.15am. Initially it was successful regaining portions of the front 
line trench, but the men had to withdraw on 16 July under the pressure of German counter-attack, 
bombardment and fire from the opposing lines.649 That 32nd Division lost a small portion of line to 
the Germans reportedly irritated Shute: 'This attack [on Lombartzyde; 7 August] specially 
commended itself to the GOC of the 32nd Division to whom the events of July 10 – and notably the 
first loss of trenches ever admitted by the Division – were not palatable.'650 The contemporary 
opinions on counter-attacking help to explain Shute's desire for a riposte. He viewed counter-attacks 
as the: 'Essence of Defence', while recognising they could be executed in two forms: 'Immediate 
                                                 
647 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, 10 July 1917 'Record of Telegraph and Telephone Messages – 11th July 
1917'; Wire message 19, timed 5.55am reached DHQ at 8.17am, distributed to XV Corps and 96 Brigade at 9.58am 
and read that '97th Bde. holding original line with defensive flank thrown back facing GELEIDE BROOK.' At 
11.25am DHQ would be informed verbally that: 'You are holding NOSE TRENCH up to NOSE ALLEY and the 
Hun is holding the remainder of it. The Bosche is in the front line from NOSE ALLEY northwards.' DHQ's response 
was unequivocal: 'The General says he must have that front bit of NOSE TRENCH taken at once.' The reply was: 'It 
is being done now.' It is evident from the ambitious plans for a counter-attack that Shute was planning under the 
impression he held or would shortly be holding all of his original front line positions. The order can be found in 
TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, 11 July 1917 'Operation Order 105'. 
648 Ibid., 32nd Div. General Staff, 13 July 1917 'Operation Order 106'; the initial plans would form the basis of the 
proposed attack on 7 August 1917 to improve the position and take Lombartzyde. Rawlinson noted that GOC XV 
Corps General John Philip Du Cane (Royal Artillery; 1865 – 1947)  stopped the initially proposed attack from going 
ahead. See Churchill Archives Centre: GBR/0014/RWLN 1/7: Rawlinson Diary, 11 July 1917 
649 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, 14 July 1917; see also Appendix 15. 
650 Chalmers (ed.), History of the 16th Battalion HLI (1930) pp.104-105; Rawlinson also observed GOC XV Corps  
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[conducted by] Local Commanders' and 'deliberate' which should 'Take time.'651 Like his views on 
the characteristics of a good commander, this was consistent with the prevailing views and found an 
echo in FSR I.652 On 10 July and in the days following both immediate and deliberate counter-
attacks were made. There were a number of reasons for this: the prevailing expectation that losses 
should be counter-attacked; the objectives set by Shute and given to the division; the GOC's 
understanding of war; and the independent initiative from subordinate commanders.653 The G.O.C.'s 
attitude has to also be factored in as part of this: aggression, optimism and risk-taking all 
encouraged a positive, offensive response when faced with a crisis. 
 
This aggressive intent was not confined to the German Nieuport attack. On 1 April 1917, during 
32nd Division's assault on Savy, Shute recognised that there was a possibility of taking the follow-
up, secondary objectives of Bois de Savy and Point 138 which lay beyond the village. Rather than 
pausing to consolidate, and thus allow the enemy a chance to strengthen their own defensive 
positions, Shute ordered 32nd Division's artillery into advanced positions upon taking the village of 
Savy and proceeded to launch a second attack.654 The attack was partially successful with 96 
Brigade advancing, exposed, across 5000 yards in daylight to effect a strong lodgement in Bois de 
Savy. Despite efforts to manoeuvre the German defenders off Point 138 during the night, attempts 
to take this position failed. The following day Shute brought up 14 Brigade for an attack on Holnon; 
with further effort the guns were pushed forward again and the attack launched in conjunction with 
renewed efforts on Point 138 by their reserve battalion. The result this time was a complete success, 
and by the evening 97 Brigade had provided one battalion to exploit the success by taking Bois de 
Holnon, which lay beyond the village and was holding up unifying the line with the neighbouring 
                                                 
651 JSCSC Library, A.H. Marindin Papers, Shute Lecture, November 1920 p.3 
652 General Staff, FSR I (1909), pp.128-129 
653 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, 'Report on the Operations on the 32nd Division front on 10th July 1917', 
Part IV, p.8; the aspects of command and delegation are dealt with in much more detail in the following section. 
654 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff: April: 'Report on the Operations...1st & 2nd April'. Shute planned the zero 
on 1 April 1917 in-part to allow the longest preparation time for exploitation: Part II Plan of Attack on Savy Village; 
point 8. For awareness of the dangers to the division of pausing and artillery manoeuvre see: Part III: The Attack on 
Savy and the Events leading up to the Attack on Bois de Savy and Point 138; point 14 & 17. 
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61st Division.655 The division surpassed all expectations, taking, within two days, positions that 
were expected to hold out until 8 April. This was achieved at the cost of 973 casualties, including 
174 killed – a high price to pay against enemy forces which Prior and Wilson have described as 
'strong rear guards.'656 Such a dismissive view is to ignore the positive effect the attacks had on 
morale:  
 
The road from Nesle to St. Quentin is a long and cruel one, but in these early days of 1917, it was to 
the 17th H.L.I. the pathway to glory. They were sweeping onwards in the track of the retreating 
enemy, with the glow of victory to strengthen their hearts and the blessings of a delivered people in 
their ears. The echoing trumpets of romance called to them from the Cathedral City, and their blood 
stirred to the call. These were the impressions that led them, in common with the rest of the Division, 
to surmount appalling obstacles, natural and devilish. They soaked in the snow, and froze in the keen 
blast; they starved and toiled on the way, but "stuck it," and their reward was the fall of Savy village. 
There was fighting all along the 50 mile front just then, and Savy did not loom very large in the 
chronicles of the time, but those who took part in its capture, and in the taking of the wood a mile 
beyond, knew that they had achieved the heroic.657 
 
Rev. R. E. Grice-Hutchinson was more reserved, but nonetheless concurred with the sentiments: 
'Everyone seems delighted at the success of our attack, as we are supposed to have completed three 
or four days' work in two.'658 Shute was in no doubt what the great lesson was: 'the importance of 
                                                 
655 Ibid., April: 'Report on Operations 1st & 2nd April': Part VII: Plan of Attack on the HOLNON and SELENCY 
Positions. Part VIII: The attack of the 14th Infantry Brigade on the HOLNON and SELENCY positions.  
656 Robin Prior & Trevor Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914-
1918 (London, Blackwell Publishers, 1992) p.266 At the risk of straying into counter-factual history, rather than 
simply dismissing the German lines as rear guards it seems likely that had IV Corps allowed the Germans time to 
dig in they would have held a formidable outpost line for longer, inflicting much more significant casualties upon 
the attacking divisions. 
657 John W. Arthur and Ion S. Munro, The Seventeenth Highland Light Infantry (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce 
Battalion): Record of War Service 1914-1918 (Glasgow, David J. Clark, 1920) p.57  
658 Grice-Hutchinson, M.C., 'The Diary...' in Whinyates (ed.), Artillery and Trench Mortar Memories (1932) 2 April 
1917; p.193; see also 17 March 1917; p.184 and IWM, PP/MCR/49, A. Elshaw, p.33 for further evidence of the 
tangible improvement in the division's morale.  
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striking quick and striking hard when an advance is once undertaken.'659 During the German 
withdrawal the GOC's aggression played a decisive part in scoring a tangible success in the eyes of 
the men of 32nd Division; it resonated throughout the ranks, while it built on the improving 
reputation of the division in the eyes of the senior leadership. Upon transfer out of Fourth Army, 
General Rawlinson, wrote to the division praising:  
 
The gallantry and dash displayed by the Division during the advance in March and April, especially 
in the actions resulting in the capture of SAVY, BOIS de SAVY, FRANCILLY, HOLNON, 
SELENCY, FAYET and CEPY FARM, reflect the highest credit on all concerned.660 
 
He went on to say: 'heartily congratulate the Division on the successes they have achieved.' 
concluding with: 'I much regret that the Division is now leaving the Fourth Army, but I shall hope 
that at some future date I may again have the good fortune to find them under my Command.'661 
Aggression was not a deplorable characteristic in a commander; it was required to win. But it had to 
be channelled towards the overall goals of the Army and drawing on Clausewitz's idea of military 
leadership, the 'violence of emotion' had to be balanced by 'judgement and principle'.662 It is clear 
from Nieuport's requested raid, and follow-up Lombartzyde attack that Shute on two occasions 
pushed for offensive actions that were impractical; a combination of his subordinates, seniors and 
circumstance saw to it that these attacks did not take place.663 Later in the aftermath of the failed 
night attack on the Passchendaele ridge, 2 December 1917, Shute would again propose further 
attacks, planned for the following night, that were unlikely to yield results; on this occasion Haig 
                                                 
659 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, April: 'Report on Operations...1st & 2nd April': Part IX: General remarks 
on Lessons of the above Operations; Point 1. 
660 IWM, 80/10/1, T.S. Lambert, 'Fourth Army No. G.S.702' 
661 Ibid. 
662 Clausewitz, On War (1976) p.107 
663 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, 'Record of Telegraph and Telephone messages - 10th July 1917': 6.10pm;  
WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, '11 July 1917 Operation Order 105'; the initial Lombartzyde attack was folded 
into a larger XV Corps operation to re-secure the bridgehead: WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, 'G.S. 1310/2/38 
29th July 1917'; Appendix 39; see also IWM, 80/10/1, T.S. Lambert, 'XV Corps Order No.126', 27th July 1917 
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ordered a halt in operations.664 Shute's optimism, risk-taking and rapidity of action heavily inclined 
the commander  towards the offensive. This could, and did, push him into making rash and hasty 
attacks; nevertheless, it is difficult to wholly condemn him for this. Ultimately these attacks did not 
take place, while circumstance played a large role (German attack and poor positioning at Nieuport, 
and the manpower considerations facing Haig) so too did Shute's command style. His consultative 
approach encouraged frank discussion with his subordinates and stopped ill-advised offensives 
occurring. This command system, and his wider understanding of war shall now be considered. 
 
                                                 
664 TNA, WO 95/2370 32nd Div. General Staff, '32nd Division Telephone and Telegraph Messages. 2nd December 1917': 
9.10am Verbal to 14th Bde.; 7.55pm Verbal to 14th Bde.; Haig's rejection of attacks can be found in WO 158/209 
Second Army Operations with Maps, 'Brigadier-General J.H. Davidson Note', 3 December 1917. 
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Chapter Six 
Learning and Leadership: Intellectual Understanding and Influence 
The Case Study of Cameron Shute Expanded 
 
This chapter will develop the case study of Cameron Deane Shute, GOC 32nd Division, by 
analysing his understanding of war and his influence on his subordinates. It will evaluate his 
personal command system, his approach to planning, the evolution of his tactical understanding and 
the fostering of a communal identity to improve cohesion. The chapter will conclude by revisiting 
the three roles a leader can fill to foster an environment conducive to learning. It will be shown that 
his divisive characteristics undermined his ability to be a 'learning leader' by the criteria established 
in chapter five. 
 
6.1 Personal Command System 
 
Shute's approach to command had its basis in the pre-war principle of delegation to the man-on-the-
spot. He was an assertive commander, who co-ordinated the actions of his subordinate formations 
and the supporting arms during battle, while consciously collecting as much information as possible 
from the front to inform his command decisions. This part of the case study will first establish the 
principles by which Shute sought to command and then compare this to his actions commanding the 
32nd Division. 
 
In the lecture Shute delivered to officers at the Staff College, Camberley in 1920, he gave perhaps 
his clearest explanation of his own command philosophy. By articulating his principles, he 
described what today would be considered pre-requisites of a decentralised or 'mission command' 
system, but were then essentially the orthodox pre-war view: subordinate initiative, orders detailing 
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intention rather than prescribing details and the importance of the staff and broader command 
relationships. On subordinate initiative he argued, under the heading: 'QUALITIES REQUIRED IN 
COMMANDERS': 'If you accomplish the task set, don't sit down and be content, but immediately 
say to yourself “Can I do more, can I better this position? What will be the next step? How do I 
think I shall do it?”' Later he added: 'Cultivate initiative. Think quickly and act strongly.'665 This did 
not just apply to the infantry. Shute emphasised the relevance of this principle to the artillery as 
well, observing: 'Battery and Brigade Commanders were sometimes inclined to wait for orders. 
They must know the plan and act on own initiative.'666 The argument for initiative in command was 
strengthened towards the end of his lecture when speaking about the importance of acting according 
to circumstance. In this section he described the pitfalls of commanders being unable to adapt to 
new events once a plan had failed, backing it up with examples from the Western Front and offering 
further evidence that he was essentially in agreement with the pre-war military view: 'Vary your 
methods according to circumstances. Don't misapply principles and apply lessons to situations to 
which they have no reference.'667 Shute's approach to decentralised command hinged upon 
subordinates understanding the broad aims of the attack: 'Make sure [sic] understand the wishes and 
intention of your superior. Not only know his orders but think what is the idea behind those 
orders.'668 To facilitate this, good orders were a pre-requisite but the General warned: 'Many orders 
are spoiled by the attempt to make them short. The real essence is that they shall be clear.' To ensure 
everyone knew their role Shute advocated conferences on receipt of both warning and written 
orders.669 For his system of command to be effective, the General recognised the importance of both 
information and opinion flowing back up the chain of command: 'All unit commanders of all arms 
must realize the importance of getting information back. Requires careful preparation.'670 Later in 
                                                 
665 JSCSC library, A.H. Marindin Papers, Shute Lecture, November 1920 p.6 
666 Ibid., p.4 
667 Ibid., p.7 
668 Ibid., p.6 
669 Ibid., p.4 
670 Ibid., p.5 
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the lecture he stressed the importance of constructive discussions between commander and 
subordinate: 'Have an opinion and don't hesitate to give it. Don't sit still and grouse and make 
destructive criticisms. That helps no one and destroys morale.'671 The role of staff was not 
neglected: 'every commander must know the work of the Staff. Administration is a necessity for 
operations. All branches must know the commander's wishes and work together. Conferences.'672 
Shute's lecture provides a clear articulation of his command philosophy, demonstrating that his 
principles remained essentially in line with those espoused in FSR I before the war. Above all else, 
the General recognised that flexibility was one of the most valuable assets for any command 
system, leader and army. He concluded his address reflecting on the international spread of training 
manuals and how quickly their contents would be invalidated: 'If this is so then does it not follow 
that the next great war, as in the last, we shall have to alter our tactics in the commencement of 
War? Hence the best Army will be that which is most fluid and adaptable.'673  
 
Were Shute's post-war views, simply the culmination of his Great War experience or were they a 
reflection of the enduring relevance of the British Army's pre-war approach? The actions of the 32nd 
Division's commander suggest that he adhered to these principles, for the most part, throughout his 
tenure as GOC, but his command in practice was not quite as flexible and 'mission led' as theory 
would suggest. In his first major engagement commanding 32nd Division, the German withdrawal to 
the Hindenburg Line, Shute's command was an ad hoc mixture of decentralised and direct 
command. In planning the GOC allowed his subordinates a fairly free hand to organise the attack so 
that it achieved the objectives set. At 9.55 a.m. on 1 April 1917 Shute spoke to Brigadier-General 
Ashburner, 96 Brigade, and specifically gave him the freedom to act according to his own 
judgement: 'Your objective is that laid down in the paper, that is the Eastern edge of both woods. 
When you have occupied them and established yourself, you will report that you have done so, but 
                                                 
671 Ibid., p.6 
672 Ibid., p.5 
673 Ibid., p.9 
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if it seems desirable to you to occupy Point 138 at once do so without further orders.'674 This 
approach was repeated on 2 April 1917 with 14 Brigade who had captured a German field battery 
but were struggling to bring the guns back. Shute stressed at 11.35 am that he was keen to get the 
guns out, but accepted General Seymour's earlier argument (10.35 am) that: 'I do not think it could 
be done by daylight, but I will get them back as soon as I can.' After reconnoitring was conducted 
by 14 Brigade and gunners from the divisional artillery, Shute was told: 'Nothing can be done in 
daylight.' Following that, the message went on to record that they had arranged to bring them in that 
night and that they 'have made all arrangements.'675 The plans for withdrawing the contested guns 
were drawn up by brigade and despite Shute's preference for extracting them as soon as possible, he 
allowed his subordinates the freedom to organise their own operation.676 In the end the action was 
carried out and all but one of the guns were recovered. In the process, Major F.W. Lumsden, then 
Shute's GSO2, won the Victoria Cross for his part in leading the teams of gunners and infantry 
through the German barrage to bring back the guns while driving off the enemy's attempts to 
recapture them.677 This decentralisation of tactical command to the brigade level was not limited to 
1 and 2 April 1917. At 11.31am on 14 April 1917, during the attack on Fayet, 96 Brigade was 
disposed according to 97 Brigade's suggestion.678 Three hours later at 2.35pm Brigadier-General 
Blacklock, commanding 97 Brigade, independently moved two battalions of 96 Brigade in support 
of the line and shortly thereafter the decision to withdraw the remaining battalions of 96 Brigade to 
the Divisional Reserve was vetted by Blacklock: 'The two Battalions of the 96th Brigade not under 
your command are being withdrawn to Divl: Reserve further back. Does the situation permit of 
this? Yes.'679 There can be little doubt that this was an intentional method of governing his 
                                                 
674 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, 'Telephone Messages on 1st/2nd April' Appendix 1; Out, message 9.55 
a.m., 'To 96th Brigade Gen. Ashburner' 
675 Ibid., 2nd April 1917; Out, messages 10.35 a.m., 11.35a.m., 5-55p.m. To 14th Bde. 
676 Shute felt that if the guns were withdrawn sooner they would cease to be a focal point for both shelling and counter-
attacks. TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, April 1917, 'Telephone Messages on 1st/2nd April' Appendix 1, 
2nd April 1917; Out, message 11.35 p.m. 
677 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, 3 April 1917; WO 95/2373 32nd Div. AA & QMG, 8 June 1917. 
678 Ibid., WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, 14th April 1917, From 96th Brigade 11.31 a.m. 
679 Ibid., From 97th Brigade 2.35 p.m.; To 97th Brigade 3.15 p.m. 
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subordinate troops used by Shute. At 3pm IV Corps issued a statement to all units congratulating 
them on their success, the divisional commander adding to this: 'The Divisional Commander wishes 
all ranks informed that the success of the Division is entirely due to the careful plans of Brigade 
Commanders coupled with the Intelligence, rapid movement and great dash of the troops.'680 On 1, 
2, and 14 April 1917 the bulk of the planning and a number of decisions were delegated down to the 
brigade level, but Shute was not removed from the decision-making process entirely. 
 
On a number of occasions on 1 and 2 April 1917 during the attacks on Savy, Holnon and the 
surrounding positions Shute directly instructed the brigades on tactical matters. At 7.10am on 1 
April Shute spoke to Blacklock, their conversation being recorded in the Telephone Messages file: 
'There are some Bosches in a crater in the road leading to Bois de SAVY from SAVY, and some in 
the cemetery. Get up your Stokes they are the things to deal with them.'681 While it is unclear who 
initially pointed out the position of the Germans in the crater and cemetery, the authoritative 
language indicates that it is Shute who ordered the use of the mortars. Later in the same message the 
GOC again asserted control over tactical plans: 'Patrols to be very light in front. If there is no fire 
the patrols will gradually occupy the Wood and push forward. Put another company on that ridge: it 
forms an escort to the guns. Push one forward to the ridge and keep two with you. I dont [sic] think 
there will be any counter-attack.'682 It was not simply 97 Brigade that was affected by this direct 
tactical control. At 7.47pm 96 Brigade received a call from an irate Shute, who was angered by the 
lack of progress in capturing the German positions at Point 138: 'They have to take 138; there is 
nothing against them. When do they propose to take it. Tell him to put three battalions at it if he 
cannot take it. Tell the General that he must go and carry out his job, and hurry up about it too.' He 
was a little more cordial the following day, when at 9.20am his instructions were passed to 97 
Brigade: 'The General wants you to put one Battalion to fill the gap between the 96th Bde and SAVY 
                                                 
680 Ibid., To all Units., 3 p.m. 
681 Ibid.,'Telephone Messages on 1st/2nd April' Appendix 1, 1st April 1917, Out, message 19, 7.10am To 97th Brigade. 
682 Ibid. 
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joining up with the French on that spur. It is rather an awkward place that.'683 This direct approach 
was not limited to 96 and 97 Brigades. On 14 April, under similar circumstances to the attacks of 
the 1 and 2 April, Shute repeatedly pushed 14 Brigade to: 'occupy Spurs in S.6.central at once, and 
to send strong patrols to CEPY FARM and to try and bomb up German trench to 97th Brigade.'684 
Evidently, at times, Shute gave direct tactical commands seemingly at odds with his philosophy in 
1920, but why? How could Shute both delegate important command decisions on one occasion but 
not at other times? 
 
Context and circumstance play a big part in explaining Shute's seemingly inconsistent command 
style. The most marked occasions of direct involvement in the tactical decisions occurred at 
moments when Shute perceived time to be a factor and an early attack to be favourable, a case in 
point being his irritation with 96 Brigade over their occupation of Point 138 and urging 14 Brigade 
to push on to Cepy Farm. At the other extreme, Shute used the decentralisation to surmount the 
'wicked' problems posed by closely following a retreating enemy over fractured ground, such as 
how best to prioritise limited artillery, labour resources and supplies.685 The priority targets for the 
artillery were driven by the requests from the front line. On 14 April Shute spoke to the CRA, 
Brigadier-General Tyler and told him: 'Genl BLACKLOCK is very insistent that the two copses 
should be done in, and also the copse in M.30.c. as there is a machine gun there.'686 Context only 
provides a partial explanation. Shute's attitude to his subordinates carrying out his wishes should 
also be taken into account. The GOC sought input from his subordinate commanders and expected 
them to discuss the viability of the orders if there were any problems. This offers a much more 
nuanced way of accounting for the discordance between Shute's later ideas and his actions in 1917. 
                                                 
683 Ibid., 2nd April 1917, Out: 9.20 a.m. To 97th Brigade. 
684 Ibid., 14th April 1917 6-0 a.m. To 14th Brigade. See also: 6.30 a.m. and 7.40a.m. 
685 Ibid., 1st April 1917, In, message 13, 9.25 a.m. Shows the needs of the Artillery dictating the immediate priorities of 
the Royal Engineers. For supply difficulties and consultative approach see 2nd April 1917 To 4th Corps. B.G.G.S. 
10.30 p.m. 
686 Ibid., 12.2 p.m. To CRA 
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He expected any impracticalities to be discussed if the front line conditions merited it. The proposed 
attack of 97 Brigade on the Twin Copses, 14 April 1917, offers an insight into this process of 
discussion. After the brigade's early success capturing the village of Fayet, the Twin Copses became 
the focus of exploitation; the specifics of the attack were established at 9.21am:  
 
Does the Divisional commander want a night or a daylight attack? The Divisional Commander wants 
you to attack by day as soon as you can organise it. It is an attack for one Battalion. Another 
Battalion of the 96th Brigade is being sent up, and you can use them as you think fit, and also the 96th 
M.G.Coy. ...G.O.C., 97th Brigade said he would attack about 12 noon.687 
 
Notably it was 97 Brigade that were left to organise the specifics of the attack going so far as to set 
their own zero time. Despite this agreement with Shute, Blacklock by 10.06am had unilaterally 
delayed this action: '97th Brigade intend taking the TWIN COPSES at 1o'clock if hostile machine 
gun is knocked out.'688 This was confirmed at 10.15am in a message outlining the brigade's plan of 
attack: 'The COPSES will be attacked at 1.0 p.m. by 3 Companies of the Borders.'689 There was no 
argument from Shute, quite the opposite. Five minutes after the call to 97 Brigade he spoke to the 
CRA, Brigadier-General Tyler, to inform him: '97th Brigade are attacking the COPSES at 1 o'clock. 
You had better arrange about the Artillery. 97th Brigade want the Heavies to bombard the Copses 
from now to 1 p.m. 97th Brigade are 150 yards short of their objective and want the trench running 
East of the road done in.'690 It is possible Shute's acquiescence was down to the plan stemming from 
97 Brigade originally, as opposed to his own firm orders. Even so it demonstrates that he was not 
simply a commander who dictated to his subordinates, but one who was happy to adapt to front line 
conditions. 
 
                                                 
687 Ibid., 9.21 a.m. To 97th Brigade. 
688 Ibid., 10.5 a.m. From 97th Brigade. 
689 Ibid., 10.15 a.m. To 97th Brigade. 
690 Ibid., 10.20 a.m. To C.R.A. 
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One occasion on 1 April 1917 indicates that Shute was responsive to front line reports if his plans 
could not be practically implemented. At 4.33 pm Shute proposed that Blacklock push his brigade 
through 96 Brigade and advance on the Vermand-St Quentin road, saying: 'I can give you artillery 
support up to the road and Heavies also, It [sic] is extreme range but I can give you a protective 
barrage, and I will have as many guns as I can in the time moved up to the Bois de SAVY.'691 
Blacklock's reply was straight to the point: 'He thinks he cannot get them along.' Within 15 minutes 
Shute was back in contact with Blacklock, and the messages log records: 'The General has decided 
not to do that to-night with your Brigade.'692 There was continuity in this approach; on 7 November 
1916 while Shute was in charge of 63rd (Royal Naval) Division, 7/RF and 1/HAC attempted a joint 
raid on a German strong point in Mound Trench near Hamel. The raid ended in failure when the two 
parties encountered newly laid German wire and an alert enemy holding their front line in strength. 
Captain John Forster, who was leading the raid, decided to retire while under heavy fire and 
crawling through the newly laid wire. Rather than incurring rebuke or opprobrium for his decision 
the corps, divisional and brigade commanders all sent remarks indicating their appreciation: 'of his 
leading and of the sound common sense which actuated him when under trying conditions'.693 In 
this instance Shute was complimentary towards the exercise of individual initiative even when it led 
to the abortion of the attack. It would be easy to see the instances of Shute's strong centralised 
direction as evidence that he was an over-bearing commander who imposed impractical orders upon 
his subordinates. But this overlooks the context of his interventions and the consultative aspects of 
his command style. He did pass down direct orders but he also invited criticism, encouraged 
discussion and modified or shelved plans accordingly. 
 
So far the analysis of Shute's command style in practice has focused upon his early engagements 
during the German withdrawal where the conditions of open and semi-open warfare posed a 
                                                 
691 Ibid., Appendix 1 Telephone Messages on 1st/2nd April; Out, 1st April, 4-33 p.m. To 97th Brigade. 
692 Ibid., Out 1st April 1917, 4-47.p.m. To 97th Brigade. 
693 TNA, WO 95/3119 7th Battalion Royal Fusiliers, 7th November 1916 
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'wicked' problem, but one which was not particularly indicative of the prevailing circumstances he 
faced during the rest of his time in charge of the division. It is worth looking at whether the 
conclusions drawn for the German withdrawal apply in different circumstances. At Nieuport, 10 
July 1917, Shute faced a crisis. The division was being heavily shelled, lines of communication 
were knocked out, bridges were demolished and at 7.45pm they came under attack by the German 
infantry. The command response was broadly consistent with that of the earlier pursuit to the 
Hindenburg Line. Shute gave the brigades a large amount of freedom but also intervened at points 
to give direct orders. As the German shelling intensified leading up to the attack all telephone lines 
to the front were cut and Shute found himself increasingly detached from the battle. Recognising 
the difficulties in communication the commander took the pre-emptive step of actively delegating 
authority: 'As communications with Divisional H.Q. At present so bad 97th Brigade will in case of 
emergency have a direct call on No.3 Battalion of 96th Brigade which is in Divisional Reserve at 
NIEUPORT.'694 Once the attack had begun and the Germans had forced a lodgement in the British 
lines the driving forces behind the British response became the brigade and battalion, not the 
division. At 8.55 p.m. (1 hour 10 minutes after the German infantry attack began) 97 Brigade wired 
the division, it reached DHQ at 10.pm. and read:  
 
Enemy reported in NOSE SUPPORT in M.22.b. am counter-attacking with two companies 17th 
H.L.I. Reinforcing 11th Borders with two companies 16th H.L.I. with one. Have fired S.O.S. am in 
telephonic communication with Group. Front line troops badly done in with bombardment. Have 
only one Battalion Divl. Reserve in hand. Bridges practically destroyed. Borders are in NASAL 
SUPPORT and are going to counter-attack as soon as two Companies of 17th H.L.I. and K.O.Y.L.I. 
are ready.695 
 
                                                 
694 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, Record of Telegraph and Telephone Messages - 10th and 11th July 1917, 
message 52, 4.30.p.m., to 96th & 97th Bdes. This was the 16th Northumberland Fusiliers. 
695 Ibid., Wire timed 8.55.p.m. Arrived 10.p.m. From 97th Brigade. 
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97 Brigade's report also indicates that counter-attacks were organised and made locally by the 
commander of 11/Borders, Lt-Col Girdwood; a move entirely in-keeping with Shute's emphasis on 
acting within the intentions of an order.696 The communications delay had effectively removed the 
divisional commander from directly affecting the action, but his delegation had promoted the 
desired response, in-keeping with his wishes, at the lower levels of command. Grint has suggested 
that in a crisis a commander is required to act as soon as possible and with the required leadership 
response.697 In the case of the divisional commander on 10 July 1917, the delegation of authority in 
the wake of the communications failure made it the only effective decision he could take. That it 
was done before the attack fell against 32nd Division's lines gave 97 Brigade a greater freedom to 
act decisively to limit the German gains.698 Despite the impediments of communication Shute did 
still attempt to give direct orders when he saw them as necessary. These were generally aimed at 
establishing the requirements for his subordinates as opposed to directing their movements and 
tactics. On two occasions he sent definite instructions, at 8.35pm: 'The 32nd Division will hold its 
positions at all costs.' This order also strengthened the decentralisation of command by placing the 
other reserve battalion of 96 Brigade, 15/LF under 97 Brigade's control in addition to 16/NF who 
had been placed under Blacklock's command by the earlier order. Two hours and twenty minutes 
later Shute again reminded his charges: 'The Divisional Commander relies on 97th Brigade not 
giving up an inch of ground and gaining any they can.'699 The GOC's interventions were almost 
exclusively conducted with aim of emphasising this point: no territory loss would be acceptable. 
Yet, in spite of the central importance of this one driving goal, Shute still accepted that his orders 
could and should be modified if the circumstances on the front line required it. At 11.30am on 10 
                                                 
696 TNA, WO 95/2400 97 Infantry Brigade Headquarters, July 1917 Appendix D, 'Report on Operations in Nieuport 
Area 8/11th July 1917'. 
697 Grint, Leadership, Management and Command (2008) p.427 
698 Only one company of 96 Brigade's reserve battalion, 16/NF, were initially brought up by 97 Brigade at 9.25pm on 
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July, just over eight hours before the Germans launched their infantry attack and with the 
bombardment having demolished the front line trenches, the Right Battalion (16/HLI) retired to 
their second line.700 Upon receiving this information at 12.40pm Shute gave an unequivocal reply 
five minutes later: 'Front line must be held whether demolished or not. Please report if your front 
trenches still being heavily shelled and if you anticipate infantry attack.'701 This was not ordered out 
of a sense of pride, ignorance or stubbornness, but the recognition that holding the ground was of: 
 
vital importance to our offensive plans... Our position North of the YSER had only a depth of about 
3,000 yards. The enemy's artillery had all the bridges over the Canals registered, and at the first signs 
of an offensive would render the passage of troops over the river a precarious operation. In an attack 
on the LOMBARTZYDE and WESTENDE positions all assaulting troops would have to form up 
North of the Canals. If ground were lost assembly would be difficult.702 
 
The ground was not reoccupied with a complete garrison. Instead, recognising the difficulties of 
occupation with little cover and heavy shelling, 97 Brigade only sent battle patrols forward to hold 
it as an outpost line.703 Shute was satisfied with this modification and considered the front line re-
occupied. While not carrying out Shute's orders to the letter, the brigade's actions were the best 
approach given the circumstances. By pushing out small parties they adhered to the greater purpose 
of offering as much resistance as was possible without incurring wasteful casualties from shell-fire, 
which may otherwise have undermined 16/HLI's ability to resist any infantry attack. Looking at the 
crises facing 32nd Division at Nieuport, Shute's command response was consistent with his broader 
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approach. He was happy to delegate authority to the man-on-the-spot, but still gave direct 
commands on occasion. These could be modified and interpreted by subordinates to suit the local 
conditions while leaving little room for uncertainty over the GOC's intentions. 
 
Was Shute's approach the same for a planned set-piece attack? On 2 December 1917 32nd Division 
assaulted a series of German positions on the Passchendaele Ridge. Despite the notorious 
conditions, communications during the attack held up surprisingly well between Shute and his 
brigadiers. As always, getting information back from the attacking battalions was a more difficult 
endeavour. Nevertheless, with improved communications it would be fair to expect Shute to take a 
more direct role, but this was not the case. Throughout the day Shute consulted and deferred 
judgement to his subordinates on a range of matters: at 3.55am his staff spoke to those at the 
Divisional Artillery headquarters asking: 'The General wants you to ginger things up in Square 22 
and would like a couple of 6” on it if it can be done.'704 Notably this request came as a result of a 97 
Brigade wire which reported that a machine gun was causing problems in that location.705 The 
capability of the artillery dictated the final decision. Shortly thereafter events overtook Shute's 
request; 97 Brigade had liaised with the Divisional Artillery and organised the S.O.S. shoot on 
square V.22.d to deal with the hostile machine guns and counter-attack.706 This was then stopped by 
order of 97 Brigade at 4am.707 Later in the morning a similar decision was deferred to 97 Brigade's 
Brigadier-General Blacklock, contact was established and the question posed: 'Are you being 
bothered from VALUATION HOUSES or MALLET WOOD.[sic] The Divisional Commander 
wants to know if Genl. BLACKLOCK would like an artillery concentration on either or both.' 
Recognising that in principle Blacklock would have more up-to-date information about the progress 
of the attack he deferred the decision to his subordinate. The 97 Brigade Staff replied: 'Genl. 
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BLACKLOCK would like to wait until he gets more news before he decides that question.'708 Shute 
did not sit idly by, he continued to gather information, and when he established that the divisional 
artillery were not firing he ordered the shoot on Valuation Houses and Mallet Wood.709 These 
targets lay beyond the final objective and so the bombardment posed little chance of hitting the 
troops of 97 Brigade. 
 
As was the case at Nieuport the driving decision-making level was that of brigade. Division 
organised and set the parameters and Shute suggested methods to achieve the objectives he set, but 
ultimately the action was decided upon lower down the chain of command. Perhaps one of the most 
clear cut examples of this system is shown by the dialogue between DHQ and 97 Brigade between 
7.45am and 8.15 am on 2 December 1917. 97 Brigade contacted DHQ at 7.45am to inform them 
that their troops had been driven out of Teall Cottage and Hill 52. Shute responded:  
 
Absolutely necessary that TEALL COTTAGE and WEAL and HILL 52 should be regained. Do this 
with your reserve Battalion assisted if safety permits, by fire from your special battery and Stokes 
Mortars. Any more considerable barrage is impossible owing to your uncertainty as to the position of 
your troops.710 
 
Eleven minutes later 97 Brigade responded with a plan:  
 
At 9-20.am. The 16th Northd.Fus. Will push up and attack Hill 52 and two other Battalions will push 
ahead. Nos 1,2 and 3 Battalions will push ahead. A M.G. Barrage will be put down and a little 
artillery as close as possible. Position on right is not known and so barrage cannot be put down. 
Commanding Officers are up there now and Capt. LAURIE and two other Brigade Officers are 
                                                 
708 Ibid., message 80, 7.10 a.m., To 97th Bde. 
709 Ibid., message 83, 7.20 a.m., To Div. Arty. 
710 Ibid., message 87, 7.45 a.m., To 97th Bde. 
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organising for the push at 9-20.a.m.711 
 
Division was recommending a course of action; Shute was establishing the parameters and 
objectives of the attack but the specifics were organised at the brigade level by Blacklock. They 
were thinking along similar lines. At 8.15am Shute sent a message to 97 Brigade saying: 'The 
Divisional Commander thinks that Stokes Mortar barrage would be a good thing.'712 Blacklock 
replied informing division that this had already been arranged. Could this have been a consequence 
of the strong working relationship between Blacklock and Shute? The evidence indicates not. By 
9am Shute had recognised that the attack had only been a limited success and if he was to achieve 
his initial goals he was going to have to launch a secondary attack using Brigadier-General 
Lumsden's 14 Brigade. With his plans still at an early stage Shute contacted his subordinate and 
read out the proposed draft orders. These required two of Lumsden's battalions to form up at 10pm 
behind the two battalions on the right of 97 Brigade's line. They then were to pass through them 
pushing on to new objectives. The orders themselves are less important than the record of the 
closing moments of the conversation between Shute and Lumsden. After reading the order the 
divisional commander said:  
 
I want you to think over that and let me know your ideas. You have got to relieve and it is better to 
attack straight through them than to relieve and attack again. What is necessary to know is whether 
you consider the task too difficult for you to carry on.713 
 
An hour and a half later, with the situation on 97 Brigade front even more precarious, Shute spoke 
again to Lumsden asking: 'Do you consider it is more advisable for you to relieve the line and then 
to attack or to form up behind the troops who are there and go through them.' Lumsden preferred to 
                                                 
711 Ibid., message 90, 7.56.a.m. From 97th Bde. 
712 Ibid., message 95, 8.15.a.m., To 97th Bde. 
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relieve the line and attack the following day, 'but in the event of having to do both on one night he 
would rather attack through them.'714 Shute's consultative command philosophy was evidently not 
limited to any particular subordinate. The outcome of this was an open and frank dialogue between 
leader and led. The results of this are not always easy to discern. Generals were attempting to form 
both accurate idea of what was going on in front of them as well as judgements on the best course 
of action. Nevertheless the evening of 2 December 1917 provides two clear instances of the 
command system avoiding orders which may otherwise have compounded failure. At 6.55pm Shute 
heard that 97 Brigade had been seriously counter-attacked losing the vast majority of the ground 
occupied. This effectively ended the chance of Blacklock delivering further attacks, as Shute 
recognised in his after-action report: 'G.O.C., 97th Infantry Brigade at the same time [as reporting 
the counter-attack] reported that his troops were very much disorganised and that he had few 
Officers left and he considered it impracticable to carry out a further offensive with the troops at his 
disposal.'715 Shute was not happy about the latest turn of events but Blacklock's beleaguered brigade 
was struggling to even hold its original front line.716 Rather than force further attacks upon his tired, 
disorganised and scattered troops, Shute: 'decided that it was impracticable to resume the offensive 
with the 97th Infantry Brigade.'717 He had not given up the idea of launching an attack using 14 
Brigade. The new front line situation had forced a rethink and Lumsden and Shute both agreed that 
an attack that evening was: 'not offering the necessary chances of success.'718 While the idea of 
attacking the following night had not been discounted, that is once reconnaissance had been 
conducted and adequate assembly positions organised, the consultative approach had led to the 
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termination of two potentially disastrous further attacks. In the end no more attacks were to be 
made, while planning for follow-up operations by 14 Brigade was done and division submitted 
proposals to Corps, but higher up the chain of command there were deep misgivings. The decision 
fell to Haig who halted operations. Brigadier-General Davidson, Director of Military Operations, 
GHQ, communicated the C-in-C's wishes to Rawlinson, who commanded Second Army: 'I said that 
the C in C wished to economise troops & did not want to get involved in any more unnecessary 
fighting. Sir HR said he would stop anything further being done.'719 
 
32nd Division successfully achieved its objectives during the pursuit to the Hindenburg Line and in 
stopping the Germans from gaining the bridgehead across the Yser on 10 July 1917, but failed badly 
on 2 December 1917. Was Shute's command style inappropriate for a limited set-piece attack in late 
1917? The communications difficulties that plagued divisional commanders until the end of the war 
meant that direct intervention was often based upon partial or limited reports gathered from the 
front. Shute's attempts to overcome the communications gap are dealt with in chapter three, but it 
should be recognised here that the circumstances effectively limited the effect the GOC could have 
upon the battle. His approach remained broadly consistent throughout his time in charge of the 
division irrespective of the problem facing him; Shute was a consultative commander who would 
delegate authority down the chain of command if it was necessary. Yet he was prone to flurries of 
direct commands. These have to be seen within the wider context of his approach and the 
circumstances the orders were given. At Nieuport the order to retain and recapture all ground was 
given with the wider potential for future operations in mind. This set the objective but allowed the 
subordinate 97 Brigade enough room to carry it out as they saw fit. Furthermore, despite dressing 
down 96 Brigade on 1 April and 97 Brigade on 2 December, Shute was generally accommodating 
and accepting of modifications to orders so long as they could be justified and remained within the 
                                                 




Shute's aggression, underscored by an optimism and confidence in what his division could achieve, 
are likely to have encouraged his interventions. It is difficult to conclude that Shute's command 
style was an unequivocal success. It curbed the more unrealistic excesses thrown up by his 
optimism and determination; it allowed the subordinates room to tailor their tactics to the conditions 
and through his occasional direct intervention he reminded his subordinates of the wider objectives 
and possible tactical methods for achieving them. Shute's command style may not have been pure 
Auftragstaktik or 'mission command' as it would be understood today, but it was a flexible and 




The decentralised approach rested upon the foundations of well-planned actions. Without that the 
GOC could not rely upon his subordinates to have access to the necessary materials, be in the best 
position for success or have the requisite artillery cover. This section will assess whether Shute 
recognised the importance of careful planning and effectively managed his responsibilities leading 
up to his battles. It should be recognised that the 32nd Division's GOC was not alone in his 
responsibilities for planning: corps command set many of the broader objectives and parameters 
within which Shute and his subordinates in the specialist branches had to work. Chapter two has 
analysed the command structure which emphasised delegation during the planning stage; thus, this 
section will predominantly consider what Shute's effects were.720 
 
                                                 
720 Good planning is considered to be taking the necessary steps to maximise the chance of an operation's success in 
accordance with the circumstances at the time. It does not just take into account enemy actions, but also the internal 
condition of the commander's own forces; morale of troops, supply, communications and possible gains made as a 
result of action. 
 231 
Simon Robbins has suggested that 'some sections of the high command were resistant to demands 
for more preparation' and that certain generals, of which Shute was identified as one: 'were quite 
prepared to browbeat and bully doubtful subordinates into carrying out their wishes and making 
sure that at lower levels of the command structure officers obeyed and implemented the approved 
policy.'721 It will be shown later that Shute was prone to outbursts towards his subordinates who he 
felt failed to meet his exacting requirements, but the charge of resisting preparation is one that is 
much more difficult to accept. The first step towards a successful movement, attack or defensive 
scheme was reconnaissance. In the days leading up to the division's assault on Savy Wood during 
the German withdrawal, Shute emphasised this. On 25 March 1917 his GSO1, Lt-Col A.E. 
McNamara joined Shute in reconnoitring the front line.722 This was followed up on 27 March 1917 
when his Brigadiers and Battalion commanders did the same thing.723 Prior to the attack DHQ 
collated plans from the subsidiary branches which had been tasked with organising administration 
and supply, communications and the artillery barrage as well as distributing the orders. While this 
was not unusual, the attention to detail in the trying circumstances was impressive.724 A fine 
example of this was the division's food arrangements, recognising the difficulties the inclement 
weather and exposed positions were causing the infantry: 'Cookers were pushed right up close to the 
front line, and the risks taken in this direction were well repaid by the additional comfort given to 
the men.'725 This should not be seen solely as a pragmatic means of conserving the fighting capacity 
of his men; it also fitted firmly into the broader paternalism of the army. Arrangements, while hasty, 
worked: multiple lines of communications were established including wire, runner relay, wireless 
and contact aeroplane, along with line extensions to keep up with the proposed advance.726 Supply 
was established by using forward dumps which were advanced as the infantry progressed. Transport 
                                                 
721 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918 (London, Frank Cass, 2005) p.32 
722 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, 25 March 1917 
723 Ibid., 27 March 1917; 'Report on Operations...1st & 2nd April', Part II, point 7. 
724 For more on planning and command structure see chapter three. 
725 Ibid., Part IX, point 59.  
726 Ibid., Part II, Communications schematic; for contact aeroplane system see Appendix F; Extensions see Proposed 
Communications by midnight 1st/2nd April Appendix K. 
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at this time was not easy but the system provided enough ammunition for the artillery to provide a 
protective barrage on both 1 and 2 April 1917, and later a full creeping barrage on 14 April when 
the German positions in Fayet were attacked.727 So that there was a minimum of delay between 
attacks being conducted and guns moved forward, batteries were prepared to advance to new 
positions on the first day of operations, maintaining the tempo.728  
 
A few months later, after a brief spell as 19th (Western) Division's GOC at the Battle of Messines 
Ridge, Shute returned to 32nd Division in the Nieuport sector and called a conference on 26 June 
1917. The first third of the meeting was spent outlining the direction of future operations, but the 
second and third parts concerned the state of the division and methods for strengthening the 
readiness and fighting capacity of the troops. Perhaps the most notable point raised indicated both 
Shute's understanding of warfare and the importance of planning to his outlook:  
 
Retaliation Schemes 6. (a) One scheme for each section 
(b) The essence of retaliation is that it should be immediate and severe 
(c) All arms must combine. Guns, Heavy Trench Mortars, Medium Trench 
Mortars, Stokes Mortars, Machine Guns, Lewis Guns and rifle fire. Discuss 
the best method of combining these. 
 
This formed the essence of the defensive scheme which Shute picked out as being of vital 
importance in limiting the German gains on 10 July 1917.729 In emphasising the value of co-
ordinating retaliation at the lowest level a degree of tactical flexibility was instilled, while also 
                                                 
727 Ibid., Part II, Administrative Instructions, Appendix B, and 'Administrative Instructions for Operations 2nd April 
1917' Appendix K; IWM, 76/225/1, R. L. Venables pp.40-42; TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, Part V, 
Point 30; '32nd Divisional Artillery Operation Order No.32', Appendix D; '32nd Divisional Artillery Operation Order 
No.35', Appendix J; Fayet: '32nd Division Operation Order No.91', Appendix 14, 7 April 1917; '97th Infantry Brigade 
Operation Order No.127'; WO 95/2375 32nd Div. CRA, 'Artillery Instructions No. 4', Appendix 5, 9 April 1917; Map 
A. 
728 TNA, WO 95/2375 32nd Div. CRA, 1 April 1917 
729 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, 'Report on the Operations...10th July 1917', Part IV, point 2. 
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developing and reinforcing FSR I's principle of all-arms co-ordination.  
 
On 2 December 1917, 32nd Division launched a night attack seeking to improve the British lines 
along the Passchendaele ridge. The infamous conditions, limited battery positions, insufficient 
forward supply dumps, and enemy shelling posed serious problems for the division's planners. To 
use Grint's modified Rittel & Webber typology, Shute faced a 'wicked' problem: how to organise a 
surprise assault given the difficulties of the local environment? One problem had a direct influence 
on another: German observation limited the places and the time the infantry could form up for an 
attack to the hours of darkness; the narrow duck-board tracks leading to the front assembly 
positions were searched by shell fire and only permitted single-file passage, which necessitated the 
proposed jumping off time to avoid the heavy periods between 6pm – 8pm; signals needed to be 
extended to co-ordinate the movement of troops; and all of these issues needed to be solved without 
giving the Germans fore-warning of the proposed attack.730 The GOC 32nd Division was not alone 
in planning the Passchendaele attack. As chapter two has shown for the Somme, the BEF's 
command structure ensured that specialist tasks were dealt with by the appropriate specialist 
branches. The RE improved tracks to the front line providing vital supply lines, the signallers dealt 
with communications and the RFA maintained surprise by maintaining 'usual' sporadic fire.731 
Nevertheless, it was still up to Shute to co-ordinate the implementation of the specialists' plans, 
albeit through a dialogue and liaison with Corps.732 These aspects all proved satisfactory in the 
attack and as Michael LoCicero has concluded: 'It is remarkable, given the dreadful conditions and 
almost impossible task of subduing active German battery concentrations ringing the salient that 
                                                 
730 TNA, WO 95/2370 32nd Div. General Staff, 'Operations of the 32nd Division on the 2nd December 1917': Part II, 
points 4 & 7. 
731 TNA, WO 95/2370 32nd Div. General Staff, 'Operation...2nd December 1917'; '32nd Division Offensive Instructions 
No. 2'; 'Scheme of Communications for Operations near Goudberg'; TNA, WO 95/2368 32nd Div. CRA: '32nd 
Divisional Artillery Group Instructions No.5', Appendix VII. 
732 General Officer Commanding Royal Artillery at Corps co-ordinated the preliminary scheme for the heavy and field 
artillery. This was subordinated to suit the divisional, tactical needs and consequently Shute shaped the parameters 
of the artillery requirements through dialogue with the GOCRA who then issued the requisite orders. Shute's role 
would be to make recommendations that would 'make success more likely'. See Simpson, Directing Operations 
(2006) p.64  
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necessary preparation for, and consequent execution of any sort of coherent attack occurred.'733 
 
In 1918 Shute's principles of planning remained broadly consistent. The division's first major 
actions were two large raids on the German Vorfeldzonelinie, outpost line, near Houthulst Forest on 
the night of 18/19 February 1918 and 27/28 February 1918. The raid on 18/19 February involved 
elements of four battalions from 96 and 97 Brigades, and amounted to 21 officers and 395 other 
ranks. Prior to the attack Shute and his brigadiers meticulously compiled and collated 
reconnaissance reports from officer patrols.734 These were conducted by the battalions to be used in 
the raid and the aim was to plot an accurate map of the German strong points in the outpost line. 
Soon Shute had built up: '...a fairly accurate map of the enemy's Pill-boxes, posts and wire by 
February 15th.' It was not only the infantry officers of the proposed battalions who sallied out into 
No Man's Land to assess the enemy positions, Shute insisted the artillery officers also went out to 
reconnoitre the lines.735 The success of the artillery which 'could not have been improved on' was to 
be attributed, according to Shute, to the care taken by the officers in scouting the enemy lines.736 
While the raids were part of the larger Corps policy of reconnoitring the strength of German forces 
in the area, it was unusual for a division to launch a raid on such a broad front.737 Shute's reasons 
for doing so suggests that during the planning phase of operations the GOC attempted to anticipate 
the impact the raids would have upon the enemy. He reasoned that: 'no raid had been carried out on 
the divisional front for many weeks' and that the: 'Artillery had been quiet and our attitude generally 
unaggressive.'738 The consequence of this was that any action would come as a surprise to the 
Germans. Moreover, by attacking on the front of two brigades there was a chance the enemy would 
mistake the action: 'for a more important operation' and his barrage would end up 'scattered and 
                                                 
733 Michael LoCicero 'Moonlight Massacre: The night Operation on the Passchendaele Ridge, 2nd December 1917' 
(Ph.D thesis, University of Birmingham, 2011) p.152 
734 TNA, WO 95/2370 32nd Div. General Staff, 'Report on Raids South of Houthulst Forest, carried out by the 32nd 
Division, February 18th/19th , 1918'. Section I, point 2. 
735 Ibid., Section IV, point 21. 
736 Ibid., Section IV, point 21. 
737 Ibid., Section I, point 1. 
738 Ibid., Section I, point 3a. 
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unequal.' As befitted a commander well versed in FSR I the impact on the German's morale was 
also a factor in Shute's justification for a broad fronted attack: 'The enemy is mystified and 
uncertain as to the scope of the attack, does not know where to apply his artillery, and probably 
orders up reserves from their rest billets thus upsetting the rest of his men.'739 The tactics employed 
for the raid were delegated to the brigades and approved by Shute, a move very much in keeping 
with the decentralised command style.740 Finally, as had become standard operating procedure the 
troops were given a hot meal and rum ration before leaving the British lines. The raid was a local 
success for 32nd Division. Only 4 men were killed and 8 seriously wounded, with the German losses 
approximated at 226 of whom 28 were prisoners.741 
 
Nine days later, 32nd Division conducted another attack on a two brigade front. This time 14 
Brigade furnished the majority of the troops with 96 Brigade also playing a smaller part. The 
operation involved 807 men in a two pronged attack. The primary aim was to penetrate the German 
lines to probe the 'main line of resistance'.742 On the surface this may seem like an unimaginative 
attempt to recreate the success of the first assault; Shute certainly employed much the same 
preparatory methods as for the attack on 18/19 February: reconnaissance was conducted and 
collated at division, the likely German response was considered and the tactical plans were 
delegated to those in the best position to formulate them. Nevertheless, the decision to attack was 
influenced by a number of factors: the original raid had provided further information about the 
German's strong points, the enemy response was weak and the tactical position allowed for the 
assailing of the front line posts from an unexpected direction.743 The attack of 28/29 February 1918 
                                                 
739 Ibid., Section IV, point 30. 
740 TNA, WO 95/2370 32nd Div. General Staff, '96th Infantry Brigade Order 526', Appendix B; '97th Infantry Brigade 
Operation Order No.203', Appendix C; see also TNA, WO 95/2396 96 Infantry Brigade Headquarters, February 
1918; WO 95/2400 97 Infantry Brigade Headquarters, February 1918 
741 Ibid., Section III, points 17 and 18. 
742 TNA, WO 95/2370 32nd Div. General Staff, 'Report on Raids carried out by the 32nd Division, February 27th/28th, 
1918', Section I 
743 TNA, WO 95/2370 32nd Div. General Staff, 'Report on Raids carried out by the 32nd Division, February 27th/28th, 
1918', Section I and II.; WO 95/2391 14 Infantry Brigade Headquarters, February 1918, 14th Infantry Brigade 
 236 
did not yield the same clear cut results. The attack was pressed forward to a depth of 1200 yards 
into the German Vorfeldzone but, rather than hold their positions, many of the outpost garrison 
retreated to the main line of resistance. The division incurred 137 casualties of which approximately 
50% were very slight wounds; 23 men were killed. The German casualties were 169 of which 15 
were taken prisoner.744 The raids on the Houthulst Forest positions, as well as Shute's other 
engagements at Passchendaele, Nieuport, Savy, Holnon and Fayet all conclusively demonstrate that 




Provided a General was successful GHQ never questioned, so far as my experience went, the 
casualties which the operation had entailed and General Shute then, as on other occasions, earned the 
reputation of being a good General because he always attained his objectives though he did so by 
using more troops than were necessary and so never risked the possibility of failure.745 
 
The question of Shute's capacity as a general is one that is intricately tied to his tactical 
understanding. This section will look at how Shute's tactical methods developed as a commander 
and assess whether Stanhope's criticism of his approach was fair. It will argue that Shute's principles 
in the attack remained, to a certain degree, fixed; nevertheless, they were sound principles to begin 
with. His tactical ideas on the defensive were slower to change and did not do so while he 
commanded 32nd Division. 
 
One method of assessing Stanhope's claims about Shute is through statistics. The table below shows 
the monthly break down of casualties by 32nd Division's main commanders compiled from the 32nd 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Operation Order No.191 
744 TNA, WO 95/2370 32nd Div. General Staff, 'Report...February 27th/28th, 1918', Section III, points 35 and 36. 
745 Brian Bond (ed.), The War Memoirs of Earl Stanhope: General Staff Officer in France 1914-1918 (Brighton, Tom 
Donovan Editions, 2006) p.115; James Richard Stanhope, 7th Earl Stanhope and GSO2, V Corps. 
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Division AA & QMG files.746  
 
A cursory glance would suggest that Shute was slightly more profligate than Rycroft but less so 
than Lambert. Shute during his time in charge lost an average of 1069 men per month while Rycroft 
1000 exactly and Lambert 1383. While these hint at some interesting conclusions, such as the 
difficulties and costs faced by Major-General T.S. Lambert in the final months of open warfare, they 
still only paint a very partial picture. The statistics, for example, do not differentiate how the 
casualties occurred. This is particularly important for Shute who was the only general who had to 
deal with a concerted and prepared German attack in July 1917.747  
 
Furthermore his statistics are greatly inflated by the 2658 casualties inflicted mainly through 
periodically intensive German mustard gas and explosive shelling which took place in April 1918 
while the division was line holding south of Arras.748 It is difficult to definitively tell how many of 
                                                 
746 TNA, WO 95/2373; WO 95/2374 32nd Div. AA & QMG, Nov 1915-December 1918. The statistics were compiled 
using the monthly totals wherever possible, or when this was not available; the accumulated totals of the day-by-day 
statistics given in the AA & QMG files in graph form. These day-by-day graph figures do on occasion differ from 
the figures given daily in the War Diary, which tend to be lower: April 1918 War Diary day-by-day statistics give 
Killed 146: Wounded 2191: Missing 53; whereas the graph figures give Killed 186, Wounded: 2410, Missing 62. 
The latter graph figures likely include casualties from divisional troops, RFA, officers not counted in war diary, and 
those reported at a later date but were included and compiled at the end of the month. Neither figures accurately 
account for the proportion of men with slight wounds that returned to their unit promptly. This can be seen in the 
wounded figures for 18/19 February 1918: WO 95/2371 32nd Div. General Staff, 'Report on Raids 18/19 Feb', 
Section III, p.7 reports all but 8 of the 32 wounded were slight and quickly returned; while the graph figures for 
wounded and evacuated in the AA&QMG file show 39 of 40 were sent to Casualty Clearing Station. Therefore the 
figures given will be at the higher end of the likely range, and a variable proportion will be slight wounds that 
returned swiftly to their unit.  
747 The 32nd Division's monthly casualties are given in Appendix 6. 
748 No infantry attack was forthcoming; the German focus having shifted northwards to the Ypres salient before 32nd 
Division could be engaged. The casualties listed in the war diary give a lower figure of 2390. These statistics also 
include 293 casualties from the Division's attack on the village of Ayette, 2 April 1918, as well as nine additional 
casualties from 16/LF's follow-up attack on 3 April 1918 – TNA, WO 95/2371 32nd Div. General Staff, 'Report on 
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these men returned to action quickly but the strength returns indicate that approximately 1569 men 
were added to the infantry, pioneer and machine gun units during this time. From these the vast 
majority, 82% or 1288 men, were listed as reinforcements.749 These figures are not perfect. The war 
diary gives a lower overall figure of 1464; this does not include officers joining the units. In 
addition to this, the larger strength return figure includes some duplicate numbers; these can be 
explained by soldiers moving internally between battalions. One such soldier was Major W.P. 
Bradley-Williams who was cross-posted from 2/KOYI to 11/Borders on 21 April 1918.750 The 
reinforcement figures are somewhat dubious. This is indicated by a number of batches of 
reinforcements arriving shortly after gas attacks. For example 2/KOYLI other ranks suffered 305 
gas casualties in the week ending 13 April 1918 but received 98 other ranks the following day.751 
Perhaps this was a coincidence but it is a pattern repeated throughout the month: 15/HLI for the 
week ending 20 April 1918 suffered 206 gas casualties to the other ranks but received 147 
reinforcements. The 1/Dorsets in the same week suffered 158 gas casualties but had 67 
reinforcements.752 If the War Diary is used to ascertain specifically when the reinforcements arrive 
they follow days where large casualties were incurred, strongly indicating that many of these 
reinforcements were men returning to their units after receiving treatment; were they to be 
casualties brought up from the rear a lag of at least a few days would be expected on account of 
travel time from rear to the front. These reinforcement figures also sit much closer to the wider 
statistics for the British Army in France which suggests 55% of the wounded returned to service 
either at home or abroad. 753 The strength return forms for the infantry and machine gun battalion 
give a better indication of the loss suffered by the division; this amounted to a reduction of 1023 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Operations Night, 2nd/3rd April, 1918 32nd Division'; WO 95/2397 16th Lancashire Fusiliers 2-3 April 1918. 
749 TNA, WO 95/2374 32nd Div. AA & QMG, April 1918.  
750 Ibid., '32nd Division: Explanation of Increase and Decrease for week ending 27th April, 1918' p.3 
751 Ibid., 'Explanation of Increase and Decrease for week ending 13th April, 1918' p.3; AA & QMG War Diary 14 April 
1918; 'Explanation of Increase and Decrease for week ending 20th April, 1918'. 
752 Ibid., 'Explanation of Increase and Decrease for week ending 20th April, 1918' 
753 War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War: 1914-1920 (London, H.M. 
Stationery Office, 1922) p.246 (source gives the figure as 1 in 1.8, but the author has converted this into a 
percentage for ease of understanding) 
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men.754 If the casualties for the RFA (57 men) are included this gives a total loss during the month 
of April of 1080 men.755 This statistical exploration highlights two important points: owing to the 
vagaries of definitions and no clear explanation of how the AA & QMG figures were compiled any 
surface statistical argument, without cross-referencing, is a weak one.756 Yet, in conjunction with 
data taken from other sources it is possible to build up a picture suggesting that April 1918 was not 
quite as bad as the overall casualty figures would suggest. In relation to the command performance 
of Shute the broad statistics show that at the very least he was no worse with his men than his 
fellow commanders and if the months where the division suffered heavily at the hands of the 
Germans are factored in, he was comparatively the most sparing of his men. April 1918 provides a 
good example of the dangers of looking at divisional statistics on the surface. Shute's attack on 
Ayette and the defence of it and the Adinfer Wood area seemingly cost the division heavily but 
when those figures are explored in more depth, they are not quite as damning as would appear at 
first. Ultimately from a statistical perspective, given the engagements he was involved in, the 
duration of time spent in charge, and the circumstances, Stanhope's criticisms cannot be considered 
fair. The next section will look at how Shute's tactical understanding developed during his time with 
32nd Division. 
 
Shute's central tactical principles did not radically change during his time with 32nd Division. In 
some respects he was a forward looking commander who understood the importance of using all 
                                                 
754 TNA, WO 95/2374 32nd Div. AA & QMG, April 1918, 'Casualty Returns', Appendix A. This figure is drawn from 
the 'Column A' figure from 6 April 1918 412 officers and 9940 other ranks deducted from 412 officers and 8917 
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755 TNA, WO 95/2376 32nd Div. CRA, 30th April 1918 of which 6 were killed, 14 wounded, and 37 gassed. 
756 A good example of such a superficial exploration can be found in Brigadier-General James Edmonds, Military 
Operations: France and Belgium 1918 Vol.II March-April Continuation of the German Offensives, (London, 
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figure itself is too high by any measure used by the divisional staffs. 
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available weapons to maximise the chances of victory. Yet in a more profound sense he did not 
understand the attritional character that the war had taken on and the maintenance of ground was a 
preoccupation he remained wedded to until the summer of 1918. This lack of appreciation did not 
affect the 32nd Division in any meaningful sense but it does highlight the important role that 
experience played for a commander on the Western Front. 32nd Division's lack of substantial 
involvement with the German Spring offensives meant that there was no contrary evidence to 
suggest the flaws in their defensive methods. 
 
A number of principles lay at the heart of Shute's tactical understanding. These included variety 
when attacking so as to avoid predictability, attacking the soft-points in the enemy's defence and 
reinforcing success rather than failure. He emphasised all these strongly in his Staff College lecture, 
arguing very early on that: 'I got very sick of frontal attacks at Dawn. Hours must be varied... The 
principle, or what I fear became the principle from continual practice, of always going straight 
ahead baldheaded is like a novice boxer who has no science and simply hits without guarding.'757 
Later in the lecture he argued: 'Never make a frontal attack if you can work round a flank. Don't 
reinforce where checked but where successful.'758 Perhaps the most important point was the 
centrality of combined arms to achieving victory; concluding his lecture he stressed: 'Lastly, 
remember that unless all arms, and all weapons are combined to gain the one result we shall never 
succeed.'759 As has been demonstrated with Shute's other principles, he stuck by them for the most 
part but did occasionally waver. While there was a definite preference for night attacks, the zero 
times for 32nd Division were varied. On 1 April 97 Brigade attacked Savy at 5am, 96 Brigade 
started their attack on Bois de Savy and Point 138 at 2.30pm that same day. The following day's 
attacks by 14 Brigade on Holnon and Francilly also began at 5am, but the attack on Fayet carried 
                                                 
757 JSCSC library, A.H. Marindin Papers, Shute Lecture, November 1920 p.1 
758 JSCSC library, A.H. Marindin Papers, Shute Lecture, November 1920 p.3 
759 Ibid., p.8 
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out by 97 Brigade on 14 April began at 4.30am.760 In December the division launched its attack on 
the German positions on the Passchendaele ridge at 1.55am and in 1918 the February raids took 
place at 11pm for the night of 18/19 and 7.32pm for the second on 27/28.761 On the night of 2/3 
April 1918 32nd Division's capture of Ayette began at 2am, demonstrating that Shute very rarely 
attacked at one specific time.762 It is not so simple to map out whether he avoided reinforcing 
failure. The importance of the objective must be weighed against the action taken by the 
commander. In the face of earlier failure Shute's instruction to 96 Brigade to take Point 138 on 1 
April 1917 using three battalions, certainly appears as if he was throwing troops at the problem and 
reinforcing failure.763 But given the central importance of the location to the planned follow-up 
attacks on Holnon and Selency, themselves part of a larger attempt by IV Corps to flank Holnon 
Wood, it was an understandable course of action.764 The wider context of the attack was also 
important; 96 Brigade had that day passed through 97 Brigade and were carrying out attacks to 
exploit the German defensive instability. Furthermore, by 8.30am on 2 April 1917, 97 Brigade had 
joined up with flank of 61st Division and completely encircled and occupied Bois d'Holnon 
achieving the corps commander's wish to 'turn the strong enemy position of Holnon Wood from the 
North and South without attacking it.'765 In this specific instance a strong defence can be argued that 
Shute was insistent upon maximising the potential success gained rather than reinforcing failure. No 
such defence can be mounted of the proposed repeat attack by 14 Brigade on the German defences 
on the Passchendaele ridge after the earlier failed attack by 97 Brigade on 2 December 1917. This 
                                                 
760 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, 'Report on Operations 1st & 2nd April 1917', p.4; p.10, 'Report on 
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1917 p.70 
 242 
has been dealt with earlier, but the only reasonable conclusion is Shute was attempting to throw 
good money after bad.  
 
Shute was more consistent in his approach to all-arms warfare. This was not confined to his time 
with 32nd Division. While Shute commanded 59 Brigade, 20th (Light) Division, a raid by the 
11/KRRC took place on his front. One battalion war diary noted: 'gas, smoke, Stokes mortars, 
R.F.A. + Heavies all take part in the attack.'766 The importance of utilising all available arms 
continued to be a marked feature of Shute's time as a divisional commander. Organising 63rd (Royal 
Naval) Division's attack on River and Puisieux Trenches on 3 February 1917, Shute orchestrated a 
well co-ordinated artillery plan which saw the division capture the two strong trench lines and lead 
to the German evacuation of Grandcourt on 6 February. Douglas Haig wrote of the attack in his 
third Despatch: 'In this operation, in which the excellence of our artillery co-operation was very 
marked, we took 176 prisoners and four machine guns.'767 Even Shute's fierce critic Stanhope was 
moved to say that Haig's comments were true: 'and fortunately resulted in our casualties being less 
severe than General Shute's plan would have otherwise entailed.'768 Shute was not the architect of 
the artillery plan, but having stepped up to temporarily command of II Corps in Claud Jacob's 
absence, he effectively oversaw much of the planning at both the divisional and corps level.769 
There were certain hallmarks in Shute's approach that remained consistent from the River and 
Puisieux Trench attack through to his time in command of 32nd Division. One such hallmark was 
the machine gun barrage, of which he remained a firm proponent. In the River and Puisieux Trench 
attack Shute allotted sections of 189/MG Coy and the whole of 190/MG Coy to barrage duty while 
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ten guns of 189/MG Coy were pushed forward with the infantry attack.770 This division of machine 
guns into those allotted to support the attack and those concentrated for indirect fire reflected 
Shute's enduring belief that: 'It is useless to keep machine guns in reserve. Every possible machine 
gun should be collected and brought to bear on the enemy at the decisive moment.'771 In practice 
this meant those guns not employed supporting the attack should be used in an indirect support role. 
The value of the machine gun barrage was categorically proven to Shute after the division's attacks 
on 1 and 2 April 1917. In the after-action report on operations Shute observed in his second point:  
 
The value of an effective Machine Gun and Lewis Gun barrage was strikingly proved in the attack 
on SAVY Village. This attack was supported by 36 Machine Guns and a large number of Lewis 
Guns. Of the 70 German dead counted in SAVY after the operation about 70% had been killed by 
machine gun fire.772 
 
The implications of Shute having a staff officer forward to analyse the attack have been considered 
in more detail in chapter three, but here the evidence should be treated with caution. It is impossible 
to know whether the staff officer analysed the angle of impact the bullets made. This would be the 
only method of distinguishing the effects of the machine gun barrage from that of the effects of the 
small arms fire of the attacking infantry. Moreover the fluidity of the front lowered the intensity of 
the shelling on both sides leading to a commensurate increase in the proportion of deaths from small 
arms comparative to artillery fire.773 Whether the analysis was conducted that thoroughly is beside 
the point; it was enough to convince the commander that the approach he was taking to machine 
gun barrages was correct. With hindsight it is possible to conclude that Shute's 'forward and back' 
approach was a well-considered and sensible use of a weapon that would otherwise have been 
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wasted held in reserve. 
 
It was not only machine guns Shute that viewed as pivotal to the combined arms approach. The 
GOC recognised the great importance of the artillery and trench mortars. Early in the advance Shute 
pushed his artillery within 1000 yards of the front line and later urged batteries of the field artillery 
be advanced at the earliest opportunity, entailing some to fire over open-sights.774 He was less 
successful on 2 December 1917. With the space and topography of 32nd Division's sector only 
allowing for the gun pits to be dug in enfilade of the line being attacked, Shute was deprived of the 
chance to use a creeping barrage.775 This, he felt, was a direct contributing factor to the ultimate 
failure of the attack: 'Had it been possible for the Infantry to follow close up to a creeping barrage 
formed by guns placed directly behind them, it is possible that the enemy machine guns might have 
been kept under till captured.'776 Nevertheless, Shute's comments do firmly indicate that he saw the 
artillery's role as that of neutralisation rather than destruction. It is likely that he recognised the 
importance of the neutralising capacity of artillery much earlier than this late reference suggests; in 
the 'Notes to Accompany Operation Orders' dated 31 July 1917 the importance of the infantry co-
ordinating their rush with the lifting of the barrage was stressed: 'Failure to dash into the enemy's 
position the instant the barrage lifts enables the enemy to come out of his shelters & mow down the 
attackers with Machine gun & rifle fire.'777 These notes were signed by Lt-Col A.E. McNamara who 
joined the division shortly after the failure at Munich and Frankfort Trenches on the Ancre in 1916, 
factoring this into account even if Shute had been unaware of the important shift his GSO1 would 
not have been. Furthermore, given the importance Shute ascribed to machine-gun barrages and his 
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approach to utilising artillery in his first attack with 32nd Division, it can be concluded with some 
certainty that his thinking revolved around neutralising rather than destructive fire.778 By 1918 
artillery played a much bigger role in Shute's battle system. This was largely a result of the broader 
developments within the BEF's battle system, but nonetheless it should be noted that the GOC was a 
firm proponent of these developments. In his report on the large raid carried out by the division on 
the night of 18/19 February 1918, Shute praised the counter-battery, and sound ranging and survey 
section both for discovering six new active German batteries shortly before the attack and keeping 
them 'completely in hand throughout.'779 To achieve this gas shells were used, a feature that Shute 
also took time to praise in his report.780 
 
The use of trench mortars was an integral aspect of Shute's all-arms approach. Their co-ordination, 
especially the more portable Stokes mortars, remained difficult to fully integrate with the infantry 
until 1918. During the German withdrawal in 1917 the difficulty in getting Stokes mortars to the 
sites where they were needed led Shute to conclude: 'In planning all attacks arrangements should be 
made to push at least two Stokes Mortars close up behind the attacking troops to deal with any 
strong points which temporarily hold up the advance.'781 The confusion of battle made co-ordination 
challenging. Despite ordering two Stokes mortars of 14 Brigade to move forward to Tournant Farm 
on 2 December 1917, the men and guns remained unused. Shortly after the attack Shute conducted a 
series of interviews and collated reports, as part of a wider investigation into the failure of the 
division. By 4 December 1917 he had cause to suspect that the Stokes mortars never arrived. Shute 
sent a series of questions to Major H.K. Utterson, commanding 15/LF and asked: 'Where were the 
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Tournant Farm Stokes Mortars of 14th Brigade? Did they report to Col. Utterson?'782 Shute received 
the reply that they did not report to him on 2 December.783 A.E. McNamara, on behalf of Shute, 
then contacted 14 Brigade on 5 December and demanded an explanation of the situation as it 
appeared:  
 
14th Infantry Brigade will please report why the instructions conveyed in para. 2 of 32nd Division 
Offensive Instructions No.11, as to the O.C. STOKES MORTARS reporting to the O.C., No.5 
Battalion at his Headquarters at V.28.c.7.8. were not complied with.784 
 
The subsequent response sent on 8 December gave an account of the testimony of Lt Howard, the 
officer in charge of the Stokes mortar battery. It confirmed the officer had visited the headquarters 
of the No.5 battalion (15/LF) at 4.30am, after which he returned to his battery at Tournant Farm.785 
Shute forwarded the response to 96 Brigade on 10 December adding that he was reported to 
personally by the commander of 15/LF, Major Utterson. This is where the paper trail ends; given 
the losses and confusion of the battle there are a number of possible explanations for the absence of 
the trench mortar battery. Lt Howard could have reported to the wrong person, gone to the wrong 
location or been misunderstood, while Major Utterson, already struggling to hold the ground gained 
may have simply forgotten about them. The incident demonstrates the real problem facing the BEF 
and its leaders. Shute may well have wanted to incorporate all-arms in unison to overcome the 
increasingly dynamic German defences, but in the confusion and mélange of battle this was not 
always possible. Within a few weeks things had rapidly improved. After the attack by 32nd Division 
on 18/19 February 1918 Shute concluded: 'The action of the Stokes Mortars was extraordinarily 
successful in the case of both Brigades, and all the men now say they have implicit faith in the 
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Stokes Mortars. (a [sic] rare admission on their part).'786 The integration of Stokes mortars was 
certainly not a smooth upward progression; on occasion such as July 1916 they worked well, while 
at other times when the circumstances were more confused or preparation rushed – as was the case 
during the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line and the Passchendaele night attack – they 
had less of an effect. 
 
The extra dimension of air power contributed to the First World War subsequently being seen as a 
'revolution in military affairs' (RMA).787 While Shute had little comprehension of such concepts, he 
certainly understood the value of air power. This was at its most marked when it was taken away. 
On 10 July 1917 the Germans had near-complete air superiority over the 32nd and 1st Divisions' 
lines. A number of sorties were flown over the British lines to inspect the damage the shelling was 
achieving. The effects of this were crucial in Shute's eyes: 
 
The command of the air is the first necessity to success. 
 
When enemy planes can reconnoitre our lines and “spot” our batteries there is a great loss of morale 
and success is most difficult to obtain.788 
 
When air support in the form of observation or communication was available Shute pushed for its 
usage. On both 1 April 1917 and 2 December 1917 Shute used air support to gather intelligence and 
communicate with his forward units. On 1 April he contacted both IV Corps and 7th Squadron RFC 
directly requesting help: 'I am not getting any satisfaction out of these aeroplanes. They have been 
over but I am getting shelled and I have got heavies and I Must [sic] find out where the batteries are 
that are shelling me.' He added: 'If our aeroplanes cannot do all this cannot we get some aeroplanes 
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from the French Corps to find out where these guns are and then they can fire at them with their 
Heavies.'789 Later that morning he contacted 7th Squadron RFC asking for help tackling a German 
observation balloon in St. Quentin. Shute was not content to simply use Corps as a go-between for 
the utilisation of aerial assets; at 3.58pm on 1 April 1917 he called 7th Squadron again: 'Can 
somebody come and see us about to-morrows [sic] operations.'790 The division utilised air power in 
a number of ways. For example on the first two days of April 1917, air power was used to spot 
enemy barrages and co-ordinate counter-battery work, communicate with soldiers on the ground 
and tackle enemy observation balloons.791 This approach was later planned for the aborted attack on 
Lombartzyde and repeated at Passchendaele on 2 December 1917.792 While air-power was under 
corps command and not within Shute's purview, that he embraced it so fervently and was willing to 
directly liaise when necessary, demonstrates the important role he saw for it in the broader all-arms 
tactical approach. Gas was similarly not within the remit of division, but when it was employed care 
was taken to maximise its impacts. During August and September 1917 a tug-of-war began between 
the British Special Brigade and German artillery. The Special Brigade launched four sizeable gas 
attacks on the 32nd Division front: 9 and 16 August and 7 and 12 September.793 The Germans 
continued to engage in periodic gas bombardments from their artillery, conducting four attacks on 4, 
7 and 10 August and 27 September. They also fired lachrymatory rounds into 32nd Division's lines 
on 6 September.794 While Shute was not the architect of the attacks, which would have involved the 
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assent of Corps, Army and ultimately Major-General Charles Foulkes, Director of Gas Services, he 
did oversee that the division gave what support it could.795 In the attack on 9 August 1917 the 
divisional artillery were given instructions that: 'No shells to fall nearer the objectives than the 
limits above laid down before Zero plus 10, as they break up the gas clouds.'796 Instead the artillery 
peppered the communications and rear trenches in an effort to hit Germans moving from or to the 
focal points of the gas attack (Lombartzyde and Groot Bamburgh Farm). This was augmented with 
a machine gun barrage of the main objective, and direct enfilade fire on the approaches and 
communication lines.797 Direct control of all the constituent arms may not have been possible for 
Shute, but it was necessary to co-ordinate the actions of the arms over which he did have control. In 
this respect Shute recognised the importance of the 'weapons system' beyond the division's capacity; 
the moral aspects were equally well understood. 
 
The consistency in Shute's principles regarding all-arms warfare, surprising the enemy and 
manoeuvring for the soft-spots remained relevant until the end of the war. They were sound 
principles which were an important aspect of final victory. The difficulty came in co-ordinating and 
managing these resources and when errors occurred they proved costly. It is not fair to say that the 
flaw in his approach was simply to throw men at any given objective until it fell. This did a 
disservice to Shute's planning and broader tactical views of how best to command his division. 
There were valid criticisms of Shute's tactics to be made. Throughout his time with 32nd Division 
Shute's defensive tactics emphasised the maintenance of territory and position more than attrition. 
The GOC partially understood the principles of defence-in-depth and adhered to them but ignored 
the elasticity required of those in the forward zone leading to a static uncompromising 
implementation. On 27 December 1917 Shute issued his guidelines to defensive training. This 
emphasised the importance of SS 621 Translation of a German Document. Manual of Position 
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Warfare for all Arms and he stressed that part 1A in particular: 'should be carefully and thoroughly 
studied by all Officers'.798 Despite arguing that: 'The most difficult defensive system to attack has 
been found to be one which consists of a series of strong points and short lengths of trench, 
arranged in depth' Shute undermined this through his insistence upon defence to the last man: 'The 
one main point that must be impressed on all is that the garrison of no strong point must retire or 
surrender even if surrounded.'799 The GOC's conception of defence-in-depth was one designed to 
make concentrated artillery fire difficult, by spreading his forces more thinly along a deeper front. 
'The enemy cannot shell everywhere.' he succinctly and correctly reasoned.800 There were attritional 
points within this. By stressing the use of hidden obstacles and well-sited strong points he argued: 'it 
will be easy for half a Battalion of determined British infantry to hold up the advance of vast 
numbers of Germans and to destroy them at short range.'801 Perhaps the biggest fault lay in the lack 
of flexibility or elasticity, especially in the holding of the Forward Zone. This had not been a 
consideration at the turn of the new year and would take, by his own admission, until summer 1918 
to be realised: 'In June 1918 most formations realised that the principle of holding the front line at 
all costs was unsound in DEFENCE. Hence defence in depth and artillery well back to defend the 
battle zone.'802 32nd Division's evidence bears this out. The defensive scheme distributed in April 
1918 gave the Principles of Defence as:  
 
(a) The 32nd Division will fight where it now stands. 
(b) All lines of defence will be held to the last whether their flanks are turned or not. 
If troops holding any line of defence are driven in they are to contest every inch of ground and regain 
any ground lost as soon as possible. 
(c) The defence will be active, raids and minor operations will be undertaken to prevent the enemy 
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from organising strong positions or withdrawing troops to fight elsewhere.803 
 
The final realisation that depth was not enough, but needed to be married with a degree of flexibility 
came at a time when Shute was promoted to corps command and thus was exposed to the views of 
his subordinates who had a broader range of defensive experience. Two things lay at the heart of 
32nd Division's persistence with absolute rigidity: experience and culture. When the Germans began 
their Spring Offensives on 21 March 1918 32nd Division were holding the line south of Houlthulst 
Forest in the Ypres Sector. There they remained until 29 March at which point they were transferred 
to GHQ Reserve and shortly thereafter joined VI Corps, commanded by Lt-Gen. J.A.L. Haldane in 
the Third Army sector.804 Here they held the line but were not attacked. By the time 32nd Division 
reached the endangered front the German attacks were petering out to be resumed further north at 
Ypres. While the division certainly incurred significant casualties these were not caused by the 
German offensives but a combination of their own attack and enemy shelling. This left lateral 
transfer of knowledge between divisions and central doctrine as the only two realistic mechanisms 
for lessons to be picked up. To a certain degree this was possible; upon entering VI Corps's area 
Shute issued orders that: 'All Defence Schemes, defensive arrangements, information as to the 
various lines of defence must be carefully taken over and made known to all.' He went on to 
impress that: 'officers know all details of the defences they take over, and that the flanks of units are 
in touch.'805 Nevertheless, as the April defensive schemes demonstrate this did not radically alter the 
core principles of defence. Indeed, even by June 1918, with Major-General Lambert in command of 
the division, only marginal concessions were given to making the defensive scheme more elastic: 
any withdrawal from a defensive line was only to be ordered by DHQ; the men were still expected 
to fight to the last man; counter-attacks were to be organised locally but the main line of resistance 
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was only to provide help if division approved.806 Ultimately the depth of front defended may have 
increased but the principles remained firmly consistent and decidedly rooted to the notion of 
holding important defensive features to the last man. Another explanation for this can be found in 
the cultural traditions of the British Army: there was a certain degree of regimental pride to fighting 
to the end and not yielding any ground to the enemy. Captain Charles Miller, 2/RIF, summed the 
broader concept up: 
 
The British Army incidentally has certain shibboleths, one of which, and it has cost the lives 
of scores of thousands of soldiers, is that when you are attacked in overwhelming force you 
mustn't run away. The French, who are much more logical than we, and who consider results 
not prestige, invariably run away under such circumstances, and when the right moment 
comes run back again and deliver a counter attack.807    
 
Martin Middlebrook has persuasively demonstrated that in reality whole units fighting to the death 
was a great rarity. Soldiers fought long enough to satisfy their personal honour and once that 
'threshold of resistance' had been eclipsed they surrendered.808 The underlying historical and 
cultural factors that slowed Shute's, adoption of a truly elastic defence were summed up by one 
NCO quoted in the official history: 'It don't suit us. The British Army fights in line and won't do any 
good in these bird cages.'809 A degree of caution should be taken ascribing too much weight to this 
view. It would be easy to over-simplify or reduce the issue down to one of a simple national 
preference for line tactics binding the Army to a hybrid system of depth and rigidity. But heritage 
and tradition were certainly factors in Shute's thinking and a means used to encourage stiff 
resistance, as he explained in December 1917: 'The traditions and exploits of British Infantry must 
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be explained to all ranks. It is want of confidence in themselves and in their weapons – not want of 
courage – which is the trouble.'810 While heritage, culture and preference encouraged the 
maintenance of a rigid form of defence-in-depth in real terms the enduring view of the importance 
of territory, and the practical problems engendered by a truly elastic, flexible system of defence-in-
depth combined to impress this hybrid system of sorts.811 
 
Shute's tactical understanding, approach and development was generally well suited to command on 
the Western Front. His fundamental principles were sound and he constantly pushed for the 
integration of all-arms to overcome the challenges posed by the Germans both on the attack and the 
defence. He did have flaws, for he was at best inconsistent in his attempts to employ 'soft-spot' 
tactics and defensively he argued for a rigid system which left bleak prospects for the troops 
holding the forward zone. Nevertheless, he was far from alone in his views on defence and he did 
change when experience was gained and reflection was possible. As a tactical leader there was a 
high degree of consistency, in principle, with pre-war ideas. This should not be seen as a negative 
quality; many of those principles remained relevant throughout the war. The difficulty was in its 
implementation, and in this respect Shute actively sought improvement; chapter three has explored 
the systems used to facilitate this: active enquiry, usage of staff officers and consultation with 
subordinates. Yet, it still required the leader to recognise improvements, and implement them. His 
position may not have varied much, but the consistency in approach ultimately led to a series of 
successes in April and July 1917 and once again in February and April the following year. The 
December Passchendaele attack remains a blemish on his otherwise impressive record but 
irrespective of this tactically he must be considered a success, albeit a qualified one. 
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6.2 Aims of Leadership: Identity and Cohesion 
 
How successful was Shute at developing cohesion within the formation and congruency with the 
purpose of the army? The evidence is suggestive of both developing in early 1917, prior to Shute 
taking charge, but firmly established after the successes during the German withdrawal. Captain 
E.B. Lord described 32nd Division as: 'the Mad Division because of our propensity for patrolling 
and raids.'812 He did so specifically referring to the relief of the French lines near Le Quesnel at the 
end of February 1917. Shute was in charge by this point, but his limited involvement and period of 
leave make it highly unlikely he could have instilled such an offensive spirit in so short a time. Lord 
was writing after the war however, and it remains a possibility that he transposed the idea of the 
'attacking division' or corps d'elite backwards upon a time when the identity was less assured. 
Writing in a general sense, R.L. Venables a driver for B Battery, 164 Brigade RFA, described 
different divisions functioning in different capacities within the British Army, of 32nd Division he 
wrote: 'Our Division was usually moved to where a battle was planned to take place, so that if they 
captured a gun or vehicle of ours and know to which Division it belonged they would be 
prepared.'813 More specifically, Albert Elshaw, after arriving at Nieuport in mid-June 1917, wrote: 
'It seemed neither side had aggressive intentions – garrison duty had been the order of the day. That 
is until two “striking” British divisions took over front-line duties.'814 He was referring to the 1st 
and 32nd Divisions. Furthermore after the successes during the German withdrawal to the 
Hindenburg Line, he wryly and somewhat hyperbolically observed the problems success could 
bestow: 
 
This was to bring forth at a later date a pat on the back followed by what we looked upon as a 'kick 
in the pants' from the High Ones. The pat on the back was on the occasion of a spit-and-polish 
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review. “The division has done wonderful work and is now considered to be one of the best attacking 
formations – blah! blah!” Then followed the pant dusting (This sort of thing will be familiar to any 
“old sweat” of the time.) 
 “In consequence of this magnificent record you will be very proud to learn that you have 
been selected for and will have the privilege of participating in the biggest and bloodiest battle of the 
whole war!”815 
 
On both occasions Elshaw was referring to the proposed inter-service coastal action to be conducted   
in conjunction with the Dover Patrol (Operation Hush).816 He would not be the only one to 
comment on the division's selection. After the war Charles Douie gave a short account of the 
episode, which he began with: 'Certain divisions were chosen to carry out an attack of a particularly 
hazardous character on the Belgian coast.'817 This notion was not confined to the Belgian operation. 
In May 1917 the division was informed that it would be in reserve at Messines, under the command 
of Lord Cavan's XIV Corps.818 Lt Heathcoat-Amory, wrote in his diary on 12 May 1917, the same 
day as a divisional conference was held by Shute: 'we go to rest and train for two or three weeks, 
then in an honoured post!' 819 Word of this clearly travelled amongst the gunners. The Rev. Grice-
Hutchinson, wrote in his diary on 14 May 1917: 'I heard to-day that our Division together with the 
Guards and the 1st Division are to form a kind of corps d'élite, which sounds pretty lively. Whether 
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of Cavan (16 October 1865 – 28 August 1946), commissioned Grenadier Guards 29 August 1865; took over 
command of XIV Corps 11 January 1916. The infantry of the reserve Corps at Messines remained unused in the 
attack, while the artillery was attached to divisions in the attacking formations. 32nd Divisional Artillery was 
attached to 36th (Ulster) Division, X Corps: TNA, WO 95/2375 32nd Div. CRA, 1-9 June 1917. 
819 Lt Ludovic Heathcoat-Amory, 'The Diary of the Late Major L. Heathcoat-Amory' in Whinyates (ed.) Artillery and 
Trench Mortar Memories (1932) 12 May 1917; p.618 
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as a corps of attack or of pursuit I do not know.'820 It is interesting to note that the Reverend did not 
comment on the possibility of two to three weeks of rest, but instead chose to focus on the future 
role. There was clearly talk of the division's reputation circulating at this time. 
 
32nd Division's selection for Operation Hush was promoted by Shute as a badge of honour for the 
formation. At 3pm on 21 May 1917, the GOC organised a large conference at DHQ which brought 
together all infantry officers down to company level as well as the specialist MG Coy and Trench 
Mortar Battery commanders. Shute's second point (out of 17) was: 'Composition of Corps. Division 
specially selected. Warn all ranks to keep up to reputation they have gained.'821 The only issue he 
valued higher was warning all ranks not to talk about operations.822 Furthermore this was the 
second time he had explained such a point in conferences. As the war diary of the CRA, 32nd 
Division and Heathcoat-Amory's testimony quoted above show, the GOC had first revealed the 
plans to his some of his subordinates on 12 May 1917.823 Even in 1918 he would impress upon the 
troops: 'The reputation of the 32nd Division, of the Brigade and Regiment must be upheld.'824 Thus, 
there was a conscious drive by Shute to instil the division with the shared esprit de corps based 
around their reputation in combat. This drive fitted in with his own and the contemporary 
understanding of a formation or unit being: 'a reflection of PERSONALITY OF 
COMMANDER.'825 In this he can be considered a success; a divisional identity clearly existed. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean 32nd Division was a corps d'elite in practice and it is difficult to 
disentangle the bravado one would expect to find within any formation from a consciously 
developed identity predicated upon being an attacking formation. To do this it is necessary to look 
                                                 
820 Grice-Hutchinson, M.C., 'The Diary...' in Whinyates (ed.), Artillery and Trench Mortar Memories 32nd Division 
(1932) 24 May 1917; p.210 
821 TNA, WO 95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff: May 1917, 'Conference held at Beaucourt 3pm 21/5/17', Appendix 11. 
822 Ibid. 
823 TNA, WO 95/2375 32nd Div. CRA, 12 May 1917; Lt Heathcoat-Amory, 'The Diary of the Late Major L. Heathcoat-
Amory' in Whinyates (ed.) Artillery and Trench Mortar Memories (1932) 12 May 1917;  p.618 
824 TNA, WO 95/2371 32nd Div. General Staff, January 1918, 'Notes on Conference held at Divisional Headquarters 
January 8th, 1918', Appendix 8. 
825 JSCSC Library, A.H. Marindin Papers, Shute Lecture, November 1920 p.8 
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at whether the identity persisted after set-backs such as at Nieuport on 10 July 1917 or after 
Operation Hush was cancelled.  
 
The best indication that Shute as a leader played an important role in sustaining the idea of an 
'attacking division' can be seen in the maintenance of the idea throughout 1917. In light of attacks at 
Nieuport and the loss of trenches the division's attitude remained fairly constant. Rev. Grice-
Hutchinson, returning from leave, wrote in a moment of understatement: 'The Germans have 
attacked at Nieuport and carried all the trenches between there and the sea as far as the Yser canal, 
which would be, I should say, on the 1st Division front. Rather an upset for our plans.'826 Heathcoat-
Amory on the other hand merely noted that: 'Bosches got 1st Division line, but we got back 
practically all in the end.'827 On the front line, the focus was not on identity but on the combat they 
had just experienced, Charles Rooke, 11/Borders, wrote after the war: 
 
I shall always remember the 10th July 1917. On this day, the Germans start their twenty-four hours' 
intense bombardment with high explosive and gas shells, and, during this terrible time, we had, I 
regret, many, many casualties. You were safe nowhere.828 
 
Others were more reflective and recognised there had been a set-back, albeit on the 1st Division's 
front. Lt Eric N. Platt, 1/Dorsets looking back in 1919 wrote: 'This was an important turn, but 
events like these must be expected sometimes. We cannot always be winners.'829 While the Germans 
had inflicted a heavy blow on the 32nd Division the soldiers still viewed the repulse of the main 
attack as a success, in the circumstances; neither of 97 Brigade's two front line battalions were 
                                                 
826 Grice-Hutchinson, M.C., 'The Diary...' in Whinyates (ed.), Artillery and Trench Mortar Memories (1932) 11 July 
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829 IWM, 78/72/1, C.L. Platt, Jumbo in the Great War: A Record of War Services Rendered by the staff of Carter, Platt 
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forced back across the Passchendaele canal.830 Shute, in spite of the heavy casualties to 97 Brigade, 
also viewed the action as a German failure. His second lesson from the attack was titled: 'Reason 
for his failure' and he wrote: 
 
...his attack failed to develop in sufficient depth owing: 
(a) To the effectiveness of our counter preparation. 
(b) The tenacity of the garrison of the front trenches, and the prompt action of local reserves.831 
 
In light of this interpretation of the battle being a success, there was simply nothing to challenge the 
established notions of identity. 
 
A further factor to consider in the division's identity was how it sat alongside the regimental cap-
badge loyalty. As the specialist unit and regimental histories published after the war demonstrate 
there was no shortage of this.832 Paddy Griffith suggested that it 'was a vital and highly constructive 
force which enhanced the cohesion and fighting will-power of even a mediocre battalion' but '...was 
also a seriously damaging obstacle to all-arms co-operation'.833 This argument can be taken too far, 
while rivalry, competition and occasionally hostility could flare up within 32nd Division, so too did 
co-operation, and cordiality. Trench mortars had a troublesome relationship with the infantry. As 
Griffith noted, they were often brought into action for a bombardment, but would swiftly retreat 
while the infantry were left to suffer the subsequent retaliation.834 That complaints occurred as a 
consequence of this was to be expected, but a sense of common purpose and interest did occur: 
                                                 
830 Chalmers (ed.), History of the 16th Battalion HLI (1930) pp.101-102 
831 TNA, WO95/2369 32nd Div. General Staff, July 1917, 'Report on Operations...10th July 1917': Part V Lessons and 
Comments. 
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833 Paddy Griffith, 'The Extent of Tactical Reform in the British Army' in Paddy Griffith (ed.), British Fighting Methods 
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834 Ibid., p.7  
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'...the Infantry, especially the H.L.I. and the Inniskilling Fusiliers, always lined the trench, and we 
[the gunners] felt somewhat compensated by their cheery remarks when a good hit was made.'835 
The hardships of the infantryman were numerous and their complaints many, but to look back and 
accept them as firm evidence for serious issues of cohesion would be a step too far. Without 
question, it took time for all arms to learn their places in the greater order of battle, but that did not 
stop them from holding the identity of the larger group as well as that of the specialist.836 This is not 
to argue that Griffith's point is without merit. His case is well made for infantry observing 
difference between themselves and the specialists. That these differences led to limited integration 
in combat is not wholly borne out by 32nd Division's experience. Under Rycroft, 19/LF used a 
Trench Mortar smoke barrage to cover their movements on 1 July 1916.837 During Shute's tenure, 
Brigadier-General Cyril Blacklock, 97 Brigade, placed eight Lewis gun teams of 16/HLI under the 
command of the 97/MG Coy to take part in the machine gun barrage on 1 April 1917. During the 
same attack two sections of the 97/MG Coy came under the orders of 17/HLI.838 Differences in 
demeanour and self-identity existed but it is too great a generalisation to argue that this equated to a 
lack of co-operation and cohesion across the Army.839 Identities should not be seen as mutually 
exclusive, but more like Russian Dolls; individuals could strongly associate with their section, then 
their platoon, company or regiment; outside of which they could also feel an affinity for their 
brigade, and division, all the while recognising their role as a part within the British Army. Bonds at 
the lowest level may have been strongest, but that did not preclude co-operation. Cap-badge loyalty 
co-existed with identification with the division. Scepticism of specialists and 'grousing' occurred but 
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there is nothing to suggest that they negatively affected performance in battle. 
 
The divisional identity had the important effect of promoting the wider aims of the organisation. By 
emphasising the attack the division were meeting the guidelines laid down by FSR I which firmly 
stated: 'Decisive success in battle can be gained only by a vigorous offensive [bold in 
original].'840 Yet as the concept of 'consent and evade' in chapter four has demonstrated, the 
promotion of these principles did not guarantee they were carried out in the manner that was 
intended. Nevertheless, a key dividing aspect between 'consent and evade' and insubordination was 
congruency with the army’s objectives. Soldiers were willing to bend orders to suit the local 
circumstances but very few disobeyed with the outright intent of self-preservation. Shute did not 
approve of such manipulations and interpretations, but his flexible command system gave his troops 
greater latitude to execute their orders in battle. The men responded by applying 'consent and evade' 
to deal with the strict discipline, but used their initiative in battle. When 17/HLI were inspected by 
Shute in the summer of 1917 he was suitably impressed to exclaim: '“Ah...The division that shines 
in the mud.”' Hours later, after a downpour, the shine was gone and one soldier glibly remarked: 'It 
was later found possible to maintain esprit de corps on a smaller ration of “brasso”!'841 The 
implication was that the full clean and polish was only done when inspections were due, while at 
other times it proved highly impractical. In battle, Shute recognised that his information was often 
partial and problematic. On 10 July 1917 after a brief lull in the German bombardment he 
recommended 97 Brigade: 'carry out one or if possible two strong raids during the night.' This was 
both to ascertain the situation and 'preserve the offensive spirit'. Yet he left the ultimate decision to 
Brigadier-General Blacklock adding: 'you should not do anything which you consider inadvisable, 
or beyond the powers of your men.'842 In using this approach Shute empowered his subordinate and 
                                                 
840 General Staff, FSR I (1909) p.107 
841 IWM, PP/MCR/49, A. Elshaw, pp.42-43 
842 TNA, WO 95/2370 32nd Div. General Staff, July 1917, 'Record of Telegraph and Telephone messages - 10th July 
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avoided what would have been a costly raid against an enemy that was amassing to launch an attack 
of their own. Shute's approach to personal command and discipline mirrored that which was 
recommended by FSR I. The leadership was not always obeyed to the letter, but this did not 
preclude the formation from operating in line with the efforts of the broader army.  
 
The difficulties of tracking the causal effects of identity mean that any conclusions must necessarily 
be tentative. Shute clearly attempted to build a positive divisional identity based upon his own 
preference for the offensive and there is evidence that the men subscribed to this. The second 
criterion, that of congruency with the broader institutional aims, was achieved by the formation and 
promoted through Shute's leadership style which mirrored that of FSR I. It did not stop soldiers 
from employing consent and evade when they felt it necessary, but this was generally conducted in 
line with the greater aims of the army. 
 
6.3 Shute: a Mentor, Role Model and Peer? 
 
This final section will assess whether Shute fulfilled the requirements of a 'learning leader'. It will 
examine how he fared interacting with his subordinates and peers, questioning whether he aided the 
development of those around him. The previous sections have demonstrated that Shute was a 
capable commander who faced a series of challenges which were generally successfully overcome. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to be a successful leader but leave no lasting legacy of learning and 
development. Shute's ability to mentor his subordinates, act as a role model and engage in 
discussions with those around him will be used as the criteria for assessment.843 It will be argued 
that aspects of his character such as his discipline and aggression made him a divisive leader who 
inspired fear as much as admiration. This left certain subordinates and peers doubting the wisdom 
                                                 
843 See chapter five for a more detailed explanation of these criteria. 
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of his decisions. This did have some beneficial effects which will be analysed, but overall it will 
shown that Shute was much too divisive to truly be considered a 'learning leader'. 
 
Shute's best claim to being a 'learning leader' stems from his actions as a mentor. The importance of 
the 1920 Staff College, Camberley lecture in providing an insight into his command philosophy and 
leadership style has been demonstrated throughout this case study, but it also provides tacit 
evidence that he actively sought to pass on his knowledge and opinions. His relationship with his 
brigadiers and staff reinforces the point. In a letter to Edmonds mainly concerning the ignominious 
dismissal of Rycroft, Austin Girdwood wrote:844 
 
I had a Battn [sic] and afterwards a Brigade in the 32nd Div. and so I know what the same units could 
do when the Division was commanded by a man like “Tiger” Shute who worked us hard but sensibly 
and who damned us all to heaps but whom we all adored all the same because he understood infantry 
and their funny ways as none of the others did. He had McNamara and Lumsden to back him up and 
this is why the Division did so brilliantly afterwards.845 
 
While many letters to Edmonds in the Cab 45 series have a certain air of gossip about them this was 
not a hollow sentiment expressed by Girdwood. In a much earlier letter to his former GOC, Rycroft, 
sent on 28 May 1917 during the period Shute was parachuted into 19th (Western) Division, 
Girdwood wrote: 'He [Shute] is known as the Tiger. He is a fine soldier and we are sorry to lose 
him. He has been sent to apply a little ginger to another Division + Gen Stuart Wortley reigns in his 
stead.'846 This letter indicates that Girdwood's favour was won as a consequence of Shute's 
leadership rather than any patronage; it pre-dates his rise to brigadier, which did not occur until 21 
August 1917. Shute and Girdwood's relationship sheds light on the process of promotion. The letter 
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to Rycroft includes exasperated comments indicating that in Spring 1917 Girdwood felt he had little 
chance of being promoted to command of a brigade: 
 
I fear that without influence I can not hope to get much out of this war. It is a little bit hard 
sometimes to sit still and see fellows, like my own young brother who have never commanded a 
battn [sic] or even a company in action and who has not got P.S.C. or as much service; get on without 
an effort.847  
 
Earlier in the letter he had pointed out to Rycroft that: 'General Shute made a special application for 
a Brigade for me but nothing has happened so far tho' that is the 3rd time it has gone in.' Within two 
months of Shute rejoining 32nd Division in June 1917 Girdwood had been promoted to command of 
96 Brigade. To echo the sentiments of A.D. Thorburn, and subsequently Gary Sheffield, the well-
being of an army (and by extension a division) depends on the interplay of human relationships.848 
The success Girdwood had achieved during the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line was not 
quickly forgotten by Shute, nor the men of 11/Borders who nominated their battalion commander 
for an honour.849 Despite the difficulties the battalion had at Nieuport, Girdwood was swiftly 
promoted when a brigade became available in August 1917. Where talent was seen, Shute groomed 
it and developed it.850 The impact of such promotions had a positive effect on the atmosphere 
amongst senior commanders and staff within the division. In a later letter to Rycroft after he had 
taken over command of 96 Brigade, Girdwood observed the harmony of the staff within the 
division: 'The whole Division is greatly changed but I am glad to say that all the Staff are very nice 
& easy to work with.'851  
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Shute's personality could alienate subordinates at the lower levels of command, but he instilled 
strong admiration in those around him; perhaps none more so than Cyril Blacklock, 97 Brigade. 
When Shute joined 32nd Division Blacklock swiftly followed him, as Girdwood noted: 'He brought 
in a pal of his own (Blacklock) to command the Bde.'852 If Shute was a mentor to anyone, it was 
Blacklock. To paint this as a simple case of nepotism or cronyism would do a disservice to the 
working relationship the pair had. An illuminating insight is given by Captain R.C.J. Chichester-
Constable's letter to Captain Cyril Falls who was then compiling the first volume of the Official 
History for 1917. In the letter Chichester-Constable gives a short account of the situation which led 
up to 97 Brigade's attack on Fayet: 
 
The three Brigadiers and Brigade Majors were hurridly [sic] summoned to a conference at 
D.H.Q. Two of the Brigadiers stressed the impossibility of carrying out the operation in the 
time available, but Bg.Gen.Blacklock volunteered to undertake the job, although in the 
ordinary rotation it would have been the job of one of the other two Brigades.853 
 
The working relationship between Shute and Blacklock was a strong and mutually beneficial one. 
As has been shown already Blacklock, once assigned the task, knew he would get the freedom to 
carry it out as he saw fit, while conversely Shute knew he had a reliable and trustworthy subordinate 
who would be able to give him honest appraisals. The evidence for their personal relationship is 
scant, but their careers both followed an intertwined upward trajectory culminating in a wonderful 
symmetry when Blacklock was given command of Shute's old charges, 63rd (Royal Naval) Division.  
For subordinates like Girdwood and Blacklock, Shute filled the criteria as a mentor. He offered 
advice, set out principles and promoted talent when he saw it. This was a symbiotic relationship and 
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consequently Shute created a strong team of brigade commanders whose opinions he could trust and 
performances he could rely on. 
 
This case study has shown that Shute was in most respects an ideal example of the pre-war leader: 
he was courageous, a firm disciplinarian, a determined optimist and aggressive character. This 
established him as an ideal role model by the standards of the Edwardian Regular army, but in 
practice aspects such as punctilious discipline, and his curt manner led to a sharp polarisation of 
attitudes both inside and outside the division. Earl Stanhope and Lt I. A. MacDonell were both 
scathing of Shute's approach, and William Heneker, GOC 8th Division, who had previously served 
under him briefly in 63rd (Royal Naval) Division, had deep misgivings about Shute's tactical 
planning for the attack of 2 December 1917.854 He also had his supporters, not least his superiors 
who saw fit to promote him to command V Corps in 1918, where he continued to be a divisive 
leader.855 In practice, Shute was too polarising to be considered a positive role model in the citizen 
army of 1916-1918. 
 
There are objective actions Shute took to encourage and foster a positive learning environment. It 
has already been demonstrated that Shute essentially 'talent spotted' his subordinates and this 
extended down the ranks as well. The conference agenda from 21 May 1917 demonstrate that Shute 
discussed the issue of promotions with his subordinates and stressed: '(Not by Seniority – this will 
encourage energy in junior ranks).'856 At both the top and the bottom Shute was establishing a 
precedent for performance-based promotion. Shute also adhered firmly to the principles of 
paternalism for his charges. In his lecture to the Staff College in 1920 he argued that to earn the 
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trust of men you had to take care of them.857 His strict insistence upon Regular discipline stifled 
this, but he also took great steps to look after the physical fitness of the men. In the divisional 
instructions distributed at the end of December 1917, alongside the importance of training the men 
in defensive tactics, the issue of care in training was raised:  
 
Officers must take the greatest care that their men have the maximum of comfort, are housed as well 
as possible and that their meals are as comfortable as possible. Recreation, games, competitions 
should be arranged and encouraged to keep the men amused and happy.858 
 
This followed a reminder of the mental and physical strain the men had faced over the final few 
months of 1917 and urged the brigadiers to ensure their first priority be 'to restore vitality. They 
require rest both physically and mentally and amusements to divert their thoughts from the 
discomforts and the shell fire in which they have been living.'859 This was not a measure taken in a 
period of abnormal stress. Throughout his time with the division Shute laid his plans with the 
condition of his men in mind. Forming up spots were chosen according to distance and convenience 
for the men, and hot food was brought up before battle.860 Shute understood the role of recreation 
and throughout his tenure sporting competitions were arranged. One such competition was 
organised by Lt-Col. I. H. MacDonell on behalf of Brigadier-General Ashburner in May 1917.  
MacDonell's views show the importance sport played in the well-being of the men:  
 
Of course sports [sic] is not war but you must have them in order to keep these great bodies of men 
fit + content. The Brigadier was out to make a 'splash' + eclipse all other Brigades in their Divn.[sic] 
I was set to organise + run it much against my will. However it was a roaring success – This of 
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course wont [sic] 'do you any harm' because you can run one thing one can run another.861 
 
At the heart of Shute's appreciation for sport lay his understanding that competition could be used to 
foster enthusiasm for offensive action amongst the troops. In February 1918 Shute created a 
'Divisional Cup' to promote aggressive patrolling and raiding. This was a monthly competition 
between the battalions of 32nd Division. Points were awarded for capturing prisoners, securing 
identification and capturing machine guns or trench mortars. The claims had to be verified at 
brigade level with the winning battalion being awarded a trophy and leave vacancies. A 100 franc 
prize was also given to 'men who specifically distinguish themselves and show enterprise initiative 
and gallantry in patrolling, raiding and front line work generally.'862 This tournament proved to be a 
success and was continued until the Armistice, the battalion with the most wins being the 15/LF.863 
This provides further support for Sheffield's conclusions that sport played an important role in both 
leadership and officer-man relations.864 In establishing such tournaments Shute was doing more 
than providing a slightly modified version of coercion. He was establishing circumstances in which 
positive behaviour - in tune with the aims of the army - was rewarded. He was using transactional 
leadership techniques to promote behaviour that improved performance and learning. This had the 
further benefit of encouraging soldiers to be proactive on the front line, and gain experience.865 
Shute objectively set two key examples: paternalism and innovative thinking, although, it is 
doubtful whether those who took a natural dislike to him could ever fully appreciate these measures. 
Despite these efforts Shute's divisive character placed a ceiling on who he could reach as a role 
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The final area worth assessing is Shute's ability to promote improvement through his actions, 
discussions and appraisals. Despite the abundance of reports the effects of his advice upon his 
subordinates is difficult to trace. Unlike the impact of training and after-action reports which have 
left a sizeable paper trail, no subordinate has left an account of how Shute directly influenced their 
thinking. Nevertheless some general points remain to be made. Shute's approach when interviewing 
could evidently get heated. During the 2 December 1917 attack his barrage of questions to 
Blacklock demonstrated that no one was safe from his occasional but fierce inquisitions.866 Under 
such duress it was little wonder subordinates such as MacDonell felt their jobs were under threat. 
While this possibly prompted an awareness and a desire to improve it could easily have had the 
inverse reaction; bringing on a sense of inevitability. The GOC had certainly built up a reputation 
for clearing out subordinates he felt were not up to the job. Girdwood remarked to Rycroft that: 
'General Shute sacked 8 C.Os out of 12 + 2 Brigadiers.'867 While MacDonell also noted his ruthless 
reputation: 'The man has consistently sacked one Commanding Officer after another. It is only a 
question of time.'868 There was certainly a degree of justification for that reputation. Within six 
months of joining the division all three brigadiers commanding before Shute had arrived had been 
replaced.869 For battalion commanders it was not necessarily Shute who was the problem. In the 
aftermath of the Passchendaele attack, Blacklock removed Lt-Col Tweed, the commanding officer 
of 11/Borders, from his position. In February 1918 Tweed, having recovered from a nervous 
breakdown on the front (a contributing factor in his removal) contacted the Brigadier-General, 
Director of Personal Services requesting reassignment: 'I would be in the best service in being 
                                                 
866 TNA, WO 95/2370 32nd Div. General Staff, 2 December 1917 'Telephone Messages', To 97th Bde. 7.20.p.m  
867 PKCA, Rycroft Papers, MS35/99 Austin Girdwood to William Rycroft, 28 May 1917 
868 IWM, 88/39/1, Lt-Col I A MacDonell, 24 June 1917 
869 Not all were removed by Shute. Brigadier-General L. Ashburner for example left for an unknown reason and his 
replacement by Girdwood was not reported either in the 32nd AA & QMG file nor the General Staff file. 
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appointed to duties of an instructional character.'870 Tweed noted: 
 
The covering report of the Divisional Commander Major-General Shute is sufficient to exonerate me 
of incapacity. As you know, General Shute has a very high standard & his adverse reports can be of a 
very different nature than that of which he was good enough to give me.871 
 
This letter did not get the desired result and so he appealed to the Military Secretary at the War 
Office and once again pointed out in his letter that: 'I was given command of the XI Border Reg in 
Aug 1917 & was frequently praised by both Brigade & Divisional commander Major-General C.D. 
Shute CB for my work with that unit.'872 Tweed's appeal ultimately failed and he left the army. 
Blacklock in this instance was following Shute's example, which he later set out in his 1920 
lecture.873 Shute recognised that to gain the trust of the men a leader had to: '(c) Get rid of 
inefficients.'874 Irrespective of its accuracy Shute acquired a reputation during spring and summer 
1917 for removing subordinates. The situation was more complex than that. Shute, despite his 
rebuke, kept MacDonell in place and after Girdwood was promoted to Brigadier-General in August 
1917 the command team would remain in position until Cyril Blacklock was promoted to command 
9th (Scottish) Division on 13 March 1918. There was no evidence of a climate of fear arising which 
would stifle discussion; the opposite was true. Major E. N. Evelegh, O.C. Signals 32nd Division 
complained to Shute 'that he has been refused everything.' An exasperated A.E. McNamara, GSO1, 
sent a short note to the GSO2 that he would be receiving the complaint: 'I asked him to put it in 
writing, as I could not make head or tail of his incoherent statements. What about dug outs? What 
                                                 
870 TNA, WO 339/21553 Lt-Col. Thomas Frederic Tweed, The Lancashire Fusiliers. 
871 Ibid. 
872 Ibid. 
873 Blacklock was not alone in tackling subordinates he deemed were not up to standard. On 14 March 1918 Brigadier-
General J. A. Tyler, standing in for Shute who was away on leave, interviewed Lt-Col V.B. Ramsden M.C. (15/HLI) 
The AA & QMG War Diary recorded that it was regarding a 'report made by Brigadier-General F.W. Lumsden V.C. 
D.S.O. of [a] lack of energy.’ It also noted he ‘interviewed Lieut A.F. Dale 2nd Manchester Regt at 97th Brigade Hd 
Qrs.' WO 95/2374 32nd Div. AA & QMG, 14 March 1918 
874 JSCSC Library, A.H. Marindin Papers, Shute Lecture, November 1920 p.8 
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about R.A. Communications – We have to finish these.'875 Shute's actions promoted the removal of 
officers who were deemed unable to continue to adequately fulfil their role. This willingness was 
demonstrably shared by at least two of his three brigadiers. Despite this there was no evidence that 
the removals stifled discussion, appraisal or even informal conversation. Shute himself was less 
involved with the sacking of battalion commanders, and in the case of Lt-Col Tweed, attempted to 
soften the blow of being sent home. There is not however, enough evidence to make a case that 
Shute positively infused the formation with his knowledge. 
 
Was Shute a leader who could encourage learning? He certainly had a profound impact on those 
subordinates closest to him. The sources demonstrate that he had a strong working relationship with 
his brigadiers and GSO1. His relationship with Blacklock was of mutual benefit to both 
commanders and remained an integral aspect of Shute's leadership of the division. Further down the 
chain of command it becomes much more difficult to trace a direct effect. His personal 
characteristics deeply divided opinion both within the division and outside of it, yet Shute was able 
to offset this through a successful, if under-appreciated, approach to soldier care. This was largely 
motivated by classical ideas of paternalism and trust, yet Shute infused it with a touch of innovation 
in establishing the Divisional Monthly cup, which proved an enduring success until the Armistice. 
The GOC’s careful approach to assigning his troops work and the care taken in the preparation for 
battle took some of the sting out of the hardships for the men. The innovative cup rewarded soldiers 
with tangible prizes for success in working positively towards their collective goals, gathering 
experience as they went. This was transactional leadership applied to encourage learning. Shute's 
stern questioning and short temper coupled with a reputation for removing subordinates 
theoretically should have stifled much of the discourse within the division. That it did not indicates 
a more nuanced picture. Shute certainly did remove subordinates but not as often as had been 
                                                 
875 IWM, 80/10/1, Major-General T.S. Lambert, handwritten note GSO1 to GSO2, undated. 
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claimed. His brigadiers must shoulder some of the blame for later removals. It is worth noting that 
fear could be an effective motivational tool. In this respect the best that could be said is that he did 




Shute was a traditional Edwardian commander in nearly every respect. By the contemporary criteria 
he was a strong leader: courageous and comfortable in the front line, determined and 
knowledgeable in his craft. He epitomised both the moral and organisational aspects promoted in 
manuals such as FSR I. Yet in doing so he failed to adapt to the changing character of his 
subordinate soldiers. Shute's strict code of discipline jarred with the citizen soldier, more used to an 
'auxiliary' approach to conduct. He had an aggressive streak propelled by his own optimism and 
confidence which led to victories in April 1917 and again the following year. Conversely this also 
encouraged Shute to push for further attacks, which a combination of circumstance and command 
structure halted. Under the leadership of Shute the division's identity developed further, and 
persevered through set-backs. Through his offensive actions the commander ensured that the 
division's actions were in line with the broader goals of the army. Nevertheless, this was subject to 
consent and evade as had been the case with the other commanders of the division. This was simply 
a part of life within a large organisation. The true arbiter of whether the leadership within the 32nd 
Division was successful must ultimately rest on the combat performance. This was generally 
positive, although the black spot of the 2 December 1917 lingers over a record which included 
impressive victories at Savy, Selency, Holnon, Fayet, Nieuport, Houthulst Forest and Ayette. The 






On 21 March 1919 Haig published his Final Dispatch. Exactly a year earlier the BEF had been 
plunged into crisis as the Germans launched Operation Michael, their opening gambit in their 
attempt to win the war in 1918. The fortunes of war had changed drastically, and yet despite the 
rapid ebb and flow in that final year, Haig argued the causes of victory lay in the long term strategy. 
He laid out the case that the principles of war that he fought along had been vindicated.876 Leaving 
aside the valid criticisms of Haig's ex post facto justification, this work has shown that, on this 
fundamental point at least, he was correct.877 
 
The learning process at the divisional level was forged well before the first shots were fired in 
August 1914. The ethos and doctrine of the army established a firm foundation of principles that 
would remain relevant throughout the conflict. Delegation to the man-on-the-spot, the importance 
of moral factors in war, and the initiative granted by offensive action were all vindicated in 1918. 
The problems that occurred lay not with the principles but with the practice. At the start of 1916 the 
BEF was essentially an enthusiastic but unskilled army. It would take the experience of battle for 
improvements to be forthcoming. The command structure remained essentially consistent in 
principle but required far greater doctrinal development, improved training and decisive leadership 
than it had in 1916. The 32nd Division was well-led in the Edwardian sense by Cameron Shute, but 
his divisiveness limited his value as a leader who could inspire learning amongst his subordinates. 
In many ways battle wisdom was the keystone to the whole process. It is also the most difficult to 
analyse. Soldiers adapted to the conditions of warfare through a process of evolutionary selection. 
Actions that brought benefit to the primary group or efficiency in an allotted task generally 
proliferated while those that brought reprisal or injury fell away. Battle wisdom was the process of 
                                                 
876 Sheffield and Bourne, Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters (2005) pp.517-523 Appendix 4 
877 Sheffield, The Chief (2011) p.363-364 
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learning the danger spots in the line, testing the effectiveness of steel helmets, of digging trenches in 
the most efficient fashion and of 'scrounging' or 'winning' things that could improve the quality of 
life on the front line for the soldier and his chums. Battle wisdom was a process that had the 
potential to undermine the cohesion of the formation and army. What defined whether it did or did 
not do so was whether the soldiers' actions were congruent with those of the broader army. On most 
occasions they were. The negative aspects of scrounging, while potentially reducing the 
effectiveness of the supply chain, were more than compensated for by the paternalism fostered 
among officers and rankers and the comfort of the troops and camaraderie instilled at the primary 
group level. Many officers understood this implicitly and, despite orders to the contrary, allowed 
scrounging to proliferate without check. At the more serious end of the scale, as men became battle-
wise and accrued their own body of knowledge – what theorists would consider non-canonical 
practice – they would often employ measures such as consent and evade to circumvent inefficient or 
impractical orders handed down by their seniors. If something was done without explicit consent 
when one’s superiors nevertheless believed it had been conducted in the prescribed manner, then the 
system had the immediate benefit of improving efficiency or lightening the burden of bureaucratic 
processes. In principle this could undermine the feedback process. If consent was not given by the 
superiors the likelihood of reporting a better method was slim and reduced the possibility of broader 
dissemination. In practice this was not the case. As the chapters two and six demonstrated, the 
principle of decentralisation meant that when it mattered – that is in battle – freedom to act 
according to situation was often decentralised to the lowest levels. By the time the Hundred Days 
began the 32nd Division had urged its NCOs to recommend targets and methods of advancing the 
front line.878 The system of decentralisation prevented consent and evade becoming a counter-
productive force. 
 
                                                 
878 TNA, WO 95/2372 32nd Div. General Staff, 'Some Lessons from Recent Fighting 8th to 11th Aug. 18th Aug. to 12th 
Sept., 1918', Appendix 36 
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When consent and evade operated explicitly against the broader goals of the army it slid into 
outright insubordination. This occurred for understandable reasons on the night of 10/11 July 1916. 
Under Gough, decentralisation had been replaced by micro-management, rushed localised attacks 
and an inquisitorial approach to feedback. The men of 11/Borders employed the methods they had 
at their disposal to subvert an order which threatened to cause further damage to their skeletal 
battalion. The Court of Enquiry was given its scapegoat in the form of the medical officer Captain 
George Kirkwood, and the process demonstrated how destabilising such actions could be if they 
were pursued by authority. It is difficult to fully condemn the men of 11/Borders who under the 
circumstances knew they should never have been ordered to undertake such a bombing attack in 
their condition. Situations like this were rare. Under new leadership and outside Gough's army the 
32nd Division's decentralised command structure did not punish junior leaders who exercised their 
own judgement. 
 
This is best seen in Major-General Shute's leadership. Shute was a proponent of decentralised 
command and used a consultative approach not often associated with the martinet reputation he 
gained after his short time in charge of 63rd (Royal Naval) Division. This reputation for 
punctiliousness was not unfounded and was perhaps his weakest characteristic. It undermined his 
relationships with some junior subordinates. Nonetheless, if assessed by performance his tenure was 
a positive one. Edwardian standards of leadership prized paternalism, leading by example and 
individual initiative. These moral traits were promoted through training, doctrine and the actions of 
their commanders. Alongside this, organisational characteristics of a commander such as thorough 
planning, an understanding of combined arms and the delegation of responsibility remained 
critically important. The identification of lessons stemmed from reflection on front line and combat 
experience. After-action reports drove this process and were funnelled up the chain of command 
through the feedback system. The process of collation took time, but on the ground new methods 
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were being attempted and, coupled with a strong ethos of decentralisation, the benefits of battle 
wisdom could be harnessed and exploited. This triumvirate system of learning was not hermetically 
sealed from the rest of the BEF or from their French allies. Liaison between the French and British 
yielded benefits when evaluating the British performance on the Somme and the army took the 
relationship and co-ordination with the neighbouring army very seriously. Often this simply added 
support to the existing experiences and perspectives but that should not diminish the fact that it was 
another source of information regarding how to overcome the manifest difficulties posed by the 
industrial battlefield. 
 
Like pre-war doctrine itself, there can be no one set of prescribed bullet points for the BEF's 
learning process. It was a complex interplay between effective structure, battle-wise lower ranks, 
and good leadership that allowed the whole system to flourish. A flaw in any one of these could 
hamper the system as a whole. On the Somme the learning system responded to the flaws in 
structure and leadership. The changes were external and thrust upon the division by senior 
command, but they worked. Wholesale changes to the division's leadership and personnel led to 
significant improvements. From summer 1917 individuals would move on and be replaced but the 
system continued to work with a generally high degree of efficiency. By 1918 external factors 
limited the combat capabilities of the division but it was still able to take part in some of Fourth 
Army's key actions during the Hundred Days. 32nd Division was a typical British division, and its 
experiences are representative of the broader whole. Some questions are worthy of further 
exploration. How did differing corps systems assist or inhibit the upward flow of lessons? How did 
the staff and leaders at GHQ assist the doctrinal development of the army as a whole? Did units or 
formations with experience in other theatres carry lessons across with them? There is more work 
required on the personnel at the divisional level: the commanders, the staffs and the supporting 
technical specialists. This work is only an initial step towards a greater understanding of how the 
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BEF's learning process functioned. 
 
How then, did the British Army learn on the Western Front during the First World War? It adhered 
throughout to its pre-war principles which remained relevant but insufficient alone. Experience in 
battle provided important lessons that refined the command structure, tactical methods, planning 
and organisation. This produced a system that was well suited to the rigours of the modern 
battlefield. This structure drew lessons from the lower echelons of the organisation whose battle 
wisdom could often improve the overall efficiency of the army. Leadership played a large role in 
fostering the right atmosphere for learning, and providing subordinate commanders with the 
freedom to exercise initiative. The learning process varied in effectiveness as circumstances 




Field Service Regulations: Part I Operations 
Advice on Orders 
 
Notwithstanding the greatest care and skill in framing orders, unexpected local circumstances may 
render the precise execution of the orders given to a subordinate unsuitable or impracticable. Under 
such circumstances the following principles should guide an officer in deciding on his course of 
action:- 
i. A formal order should never be departed from, either in letter or spirit – (a) so long as 
the officer who issued it is present; (b) if the officer who issued the order is not present, 
provided that there is time to report to him and await a reply without losing an 
opportunity or endangering the command. 
ii. A departure from either the spirit or the letter of an order is justified if the subordinate 
who assumes the responsibility bases his decision on some fact which could not be 
known to the officer who issued the order, and if he is conscientiously satisfied that he is 
acting as his superior, if present, would order him to act. 
iii. If a subordinate, in the absence of a superior, neglects to depart from the letter of his 
orders, when such departure is clearly demanded by circumstances, and failure ensues, 
he will be held responsible for such failure.  
iv. Should a subordinate find it necessary to depart from an order, he should at once inform 
the issuer of it, and the commanders of any neighbouring units likely to be affected. 





Divisional Artillery Organisation 1 July 1916 
 
Fig.1 
Source: TNA, WO 95/2368 32nd Div General Staff, Report on Preparation and Action of the 32nd 
Divisional Artillery During Operations of July 1916; WO 95/2375 32nd Div CRA, June and July 
1916 
Artillery Group HQ: Left 
Observation Exchange 
Artillery Batteries: 9 
(7x18pdrs, 2 x 4.5” How.) 
1 Batt = 1 OP 
Artillery Group HQ: Right 
Observation Exchange 
Artillery Batteries: 10 
(8x18pdrs, 2 x 4.5” How.) 
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J.N. Marshall Victoria Cross Citation 
 
 
For most conspicuous bravery, determination and leadership in the attack on the Sambre-Oise 
Canal, near Catillon on the 4th November, 1918, when a partly constructed bridge came under 
concentrated fire and was broken before the advanced troops of his Battalion could cross.  
 
Lt.-Col. Marshall at once went forward and organised parties to repair the bridge. The first party 
were soon killed or wounded, but by personal example he inspired his command, and volunteers 
were instantly forthcoming. 
 
Under intense fire and with complete disregard of his own safety, he stood on the bank encouraging 
his men and assisting in the work, and when the bridge was repaired, attempted to rush across at the 
head of his battalion and was killed while doing so. 
 
The passage of the canal was of vital importance, and the gallantry displayed by all ranks was 
largely due to the inspiring example set by Lt.-Col. Marshall. 





Extract from 'The Duties of an Officer' 
The Times, Saturday 1 April 1916; S.S. 415 The Duties of an Officer 
Knowledge and Character (October, 1917) 
 
I would begin by impressing on you the great importance of your work. You must realize that, 
however good and skilful the disposition may be, battles must be won by fighting; the heroism, skill 
and firmness of the most junior officers will have the most far-reaching results. 
 
You are responsible for the successful leading of your men in battle; you are responsible for their 
health, for their comfort, for their good behaviour and discipline. Finally, and not least, you are 
responsible for maintaining the honour of England, for doing all you can to ensure the security of 
England, and of our women and children after us. 
 
To bear all these responsibilities successfully you must acquire, first, KNOWLEDGE. You must 
know what to do and how to do it, in order to lead your men with success and honour, and protect 
them from destruction or loss, which will be suffered if you are ignorant of your work and of your 
profession...Secondly, you must acquire CHARACTER – that is, resolution, self-confidence, self-
sacrifice – in order to inspire your men by your example, sustain their courage in danger by your 
example, and their endurance in hardship by your example... 
 
The men must have confidence in their officer. They must feel not only that he knows his job, but 
also that he will set the example of courage, self-sacrifice, and cheerfulness, and that he will look 
after their welfare and comfort... 
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The creation of Discipline and the maintenance of Discipline are among your most important duties. 
Your orders, and the orders given by your N.C.O.'s must always be obeyed without hesitation, with 
energy and with cheerfulness. Never pass any lapse from duty, however, trivial, without taking 
notice of it. Drop hard on to slackness, disobedience, slovenliness. Never stand any rot or nonsense. 
Insist on great cleanliness, on great alertness, quickness and cheerfulness. 
 
I don't want you to go away, however, with the idea that the men must be treated like dogs – very 
far from it. You don't want to curse or damn every time you notice things wrong. Sometimes a word 
of encouragement, or a patient listening to an explanation, or a smile when pointing out the fault 
will go a long way. Remember that, though we are officers and the men are privates, still we are all 
comrades in the great dangers and the great struggle; make the men feel that you realize this 
comradeship and love it... 
 
Keep up your own energy and that of your men, and maintain the offensive spirit most carefully... 
To do this, don't overlook that fact that one of your chief duties is to be always thinking. You have 




General Cameron Deane Shute Biographical Information 
 
Cameron Deane Shute was born in Dorking, Surrey on 15 March 1866 and was commissioned as a 
Lieutenant into the Welsh Regiment 29 August 1885, before being given a captaincy in the Rifle 
Brigade on 18 September 1895. Shute's next three promotions were within the Rifle Brigade: Major 
4 June 1904; Lieutenant-Colonel 24 March 1910; Colonel 2 June 1913. The First World War 
provided Shute with ample opportunity for career advancement and shortly after the outbreak of 
war he was given a number of administration positions first becoming General Staff Officer First 
Grade of the Aldershot Training Centre on 23 August 1914, before moving out to France as 
Brigadier-General General Staff on 25 November 1914. After six months service with the General 
Staff Shute was given command of the 59 Infantry Brigade on 6 July 1915, here he stayed before 
being promoted to temporary Major-General and given command of The Royal Naval Division in 
17 October 1916. Here Shute would only last four months before being transferred to command of 
the 32nd Division, replacing Major-General Reginald Walter Ralph Barnes on 19 February 1917. 
Aside from a brief sojourn in temporary command of the 19th Division at Messines (24 May 1917 – 
19 June 1917) Shute remained in command until his promotion to command of V Corps, on 26 
April 1918, where he would remain for the rest of the war. After the armistice was signed, Shute 
went on to command 4th Division, and finished his career as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, 
Northern Command. He retired in 1931 and died in 1936. 
 
His nickname was 'Tiger', a play on the term 'tiger shoot'. 
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Appendix 6 
A.P. Herbert's Poem 
 
The General inspecting the trenches, 
Exclaimed with a horrified shout 
'I refuse to command a division 
Which leaves its excreta about.' 
 
But nobody took any notice 
No one was prepared to refute, 
The the presence of shit was congenial 
Compared to the presence of Shute. 
 
And certain responsible critics 
Made haste to reply to his words 
Observing that his staff advisors 
Consisted entirely of turds. 
 
For shit may be shot at off corners 
And paper supplied there to suit, 
But a shit would be shot without mourners 













































































































































































































































































































 Casualties by Commander
Taken by Month
Rycroft: Nov 15 – Nov 16
Barnes: Dec 16 – Feb 17
Shute:* Mar 17 – Apr 18
M.Stuart-Wortley:** Jun 17
Lambert: Jun 18 – Nov 18
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Appendix 8 
32nd Division Order of Battle 
Source: Major A.F. Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions Part 3b: New Army Divisions (30-41) and 





155th Brigade, RFA [joined New Year 1916, left 20 January 1917] 
161st Brigade RFA [joined New Year 1916] 
164th (H) Brigade RFA [joined New Year 1916, broken up September 1916] 
168th Brigade RFA [joined New Year 1916] 
V.32, W.32 Heavy Trench Mortar Batteries RFA [formed June 1916; W.32 broken up 28 Dec 1916; 
V.32 redesignated X on 12 February 1918] 
 
X.32, Y.32 andZ.32 Medium Mortar Batteries RFA [formed May 1916, on 12 February 1918 Z 




206th, 218th, 219th (Glasgow) Field Companies [joined June 1915] 
32nd Divisional Signal Company [joined June 1915] 
 
Dates Infantry 
 Brigades Battalions and attached Units 
May 1915 95 
96 
97 
14/RWR, 15/RWR, 16/RWR, 12/Glouc. 
16/NF, 15/LF, 16/LF, 19/LF 
11/Borders, 15/HLI, 16/HLI, 17/HLI 
December 1916 95 
96 
97 
14/RWR, 15/RWR, 16/RWR, 12/Glouc. 
16/NF, 15/LF, 16/LF, 19/LF 
11/Borders, 15/HLI, 16/HLI, 17/HLI 
June 1916 14 
96 
97 
5/6 R.Scots, 1/Dorsets, 2/Manc, 15/HLI, 14 Bde MG Coy, 14 TM Bty 
16/NF, 15/LF, 16/LF, 2/RIF, 96 Bde MG Coy, 96 TM Bty 
11/Borders, 2/KOYLI, 16/HLI, 17/HLI, 97 Bde MG Coy, 97 TM Bty 
June 1917 14 
96 
97 
5/6 R.Scots, 1/Dorsets, 2/Manc, 15/HLI, 14 Bde MG Coy, 14 TM Bty 
16/NF, 15/LF, 16/LF, 2/RIF, 96 Bde MG Coy, 96 TM Bty 
11/Borders, 2/KOYLI, 16/HLI, 17/HLI, 97 Bde MG Coy, 97 TM Bty 
March 1918 14 
96 
97 
5/6 R.Scots, 1/Dorsets, 15/HLI, 14 TM Bty 
15/LF, 16/LF, 2/Manc, 96 TM Bty 
11/Borders, 2/KOYLI, 10/A&SH, 97 TM Bty 
May 1918 14 
96 
97 
5/6 R.Scots, 1/Dorsets, 15/HLI, 14 TM Bty 
15/LF, 16/LF, 2/Manc, 96 TM Bty 





17th (Service) Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers [joined June 1915, left October 1916, returned 
September 1917, left November 1917] 
1/12th Battalion (Pioneers) Loyal North Lancashire Regiment [joined November 1916, left January 
1917] 
16th (Service) Battalion (2nd Glasgow) Highland Light Infantry [Februaray 1918] 
 
Machine Gun Units: 
 
219th Machine Gun Company [25 March 1917 moved into 32 MG Battalion 21 February 1918] 
No 32 Machine Gun Battalion [created 21 February 1918] 
 
Divisional Mounted Troops: 
 
B Squadron, South Irish Horse [left May 1916 to join XV Corps Cav. Regt.] 
F Squadron, North Irish Horse [attached briefly between April and June 1916] 




90th, 91st, 92nd Field Ambulance. [November 1915] 
 
[96th, 97th, 98th Field Ambulance left the Division in November 1915] 
 
32nd Divisional Train Army Service Corps [ASC] 
202,203,204, 205 Companies ASC. 
 
229th Divisional Employment Company [joined 25 March 1917] 
 
42nd Mobile Veterinary Section  
 
72nd Sanitary Section [left 17th April 1917] 
 
32nd Divisional Motor Ambulance Workshop [joined 20 November 1915, disbanded 6 April 1916] 
 
Divisional Commanders, GSO1s and the Dates Appointed 
 
All of rank Major-General unless otherwise stated. 
Date Appointed GOC 
29 June 1916 W.H. Rycroft 
22 November 1916 R.W.R. Barnes (sick 9/1/1917) 
9 January 1917 Brig.-General J.A. Tyler (acting) 
16 January 1917 R.W.R. Barnes (sick 29/1/17) 
29 January 1917 Brig.-General J.A. Tyler 
19 February 1917 C.D. Shute 
24 May 1917 Hon. A. R. Montagu-Stuart Wortley (temp.) 







27 April 1918 Brig.-General J.A. Tyler (acting) 
27 April 1918 J. Campbell 
6 May 1918 Brig.-General F.W. Lumsden, V.C. (acting) 
7 May 1918 R.J. Bridgford 
31 May 1918 T.S. Lambert 
Date Appointed 95 Brigade 
22 December 1914 Brig-General J.T. Evatt 
17 August 1915 Brig.-General C.R. Ballard 
Date Appointed 14 Brigade 
10 Septemeber 1915 Brig.-General C.W. Compton 
24 November 1916 Brig.-General W.W. Seymour (sick 12/4/1917) 
12 April 1917 Brig.-General F.W. Lumsden (V.C. 8/6/1917; killed 4/6/1918) 
4 June 1918 Lt-Col. V.B. Ramsden (acting) 
10 June 1918 Brig.-General L.P. Evans 
Date Appointed 96 Brigade 
21 December 1914 Brig.-General J.G. Hunter 
20 May 1915 Brig.-General W. Thuillier 
28 August 1915 Brig.-General C. Yatman 
24 November 1916 Lt-Col. A.E.Glasgow (acting) 
4 December 1916 Brig.-General L.F. Ashburner 
20 August 1917 Brig.-General A.C. Girdwood 
Date Appointed 97 Brigade 
5 January 1915 Brig.-General F. Hacket-Thompson 
1 September 1915 Brig.-General J.B. Jardine (sick 21/2/17) 
22 February 1917 Lt-Col. C.R.I. Brooke (acting) 
8 March 1917 Brig.-General C.A. Blacklock 
17 March 1918 Brig.-General J.R.M. Minshull-Ford (sick 1/10/18) 
1 October 1918 Brig.-General J.A. Tyler (temporary) 
6 October 1918 Brig.-General G.A. Armytage 
Date Appointed GSO1 
30 June 1915 Major F.W. Gosset (acting) 
24 August 1915 Lt-Col. F.W. Gosset 
28 April 1916 Major A.C. Girdwood (acting) 
2 May 1916 Lt-Col. E.G. Wace 
28 November 1916 Lt-Col A.E. McNamara 






Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge 
 
RWLN, Rawlinson Diary 
 
Imperial War Museum, London 
 
Misc. 3 Item 42, Biography of Lieutenant – Colonel J.N. Marshall V.C. M.C. 
67/52/1, J.H. Butlin 
PP/MCR/386 W.N. Child 
83/23/1 E. F. Churchill 
86/86/1, C. C. Cordner 
Misc 31 (567) Defence Scheme 15/HLI 
PP/MCR/49, A. Elshaw 
10/12/1 B. Eppel 
79/5/1 J Garvie 
95/16/1 F. D. Hislop 
74/132/1 J.L. Jack 
P455, J.A. Jellicoe 
Misc 58 (863), W. Kay 
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